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2United States Detainees at Guantánamo Bay:
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
Responds to a “Legal Black Hole”
by Richard J. Wilson*
On January 10, 2003, Amnesty International sent a letterto the Bush administration noting that exactly a year hadpassed since the U.S. military began to place a group
of detainees at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. Amnesty International
called the prisoners’ situation a “legal black hole,” referring to
the fact that the U.S. government continues to argue that the
nearly 650 detainees from an estimated 40 nations are not
entitled to any of the legal protections of U.S. domestic law or
international human rights law. 
On February 25, 2002, a group of petitioners filed the first
international legal challenge to those detentions with the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights (Commission). The
petition was coordinated by the Center for Constitutional
Rights, based in New York City, in collaboration with the Cen-
ter for Justice and International Law in Washington, D.C.; the
Human Rights Law Clinic at Columbia University in New York
City; Judith Chomsky, a private practitioner; and myself, acting
in my personal capacity. After the initial filing, a number of addi-
tional law professors, NGOs, and lawyers from England and
France joined in signing onto the petition, which was filed in
parallel with a federal petition for habeas corpus on behalf of
named detainees at Guantánamo pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241,
a federal statute by which federal courts grant writs of habeas
corpus. The federal action, Rasul v. Bush, filed in the United
States District Court in Washington, D.C. and later consolidated
with a similar case involving Kuwaiti nationals in detention in
Cuba, was dismissed for want of jurisdiction because “the mil-
itary base at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba is outside the sovereign ter-
ritory of the United States.” On March 11, 2003, the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia, under the case name
Al Odah Khaled v. United States, affirmed the ruling of the dis-
trict court on similar grounds.
The petition with the Commission was filed to bring together
the existing evidence regarding the status and treatment of the
Guantánamo detainees, to bring media and community atten-
tion to the situation of the detainees, and to obtain a prompt
and hopefully favorable interpretation of the international
legal obligations of the United States with regard to those
detainees. It accomplished all of those goals.
Who Are the Detainees at Guantánamo?
All information about the detainees at Camp Delta and
previously at Camp X-Ray in Guantánamo Bay, and the con-
ditions of their confinement, is based upon publicly available
information gleaned from press reports both here and abroad.
The U.S. government refuses to release the names, nationali-
ties, or addresses of any of the detainees. Detainees are allowed
only limited correspondence rights with members of their
families, and all access into Camp Delta has been barred except
for a limited number of diplomatic missions from detainees’
home countries and a visit from the International Committee
of the Red Cross, which communicates only privately with the
government in question after such visits. 
The detainees are mainly nationals of Middle Eastern and
Asian countries such as Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Egypt, and
Kuwait, although there are also nationals from European
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countries and Australia. The U.S. government maintains that
all of the prisoners are either members of the Taliban gov-
ernment’s armed forces or of the al-Qaeda terrorist network.
All were taken into custody after the beginning of U.S. mili-
tary actions in Afghanistan on October 7, 2001, although
many were not taken prisoner in Afghanistan itself. Six Alger-
ian prisoners, for example, were taken by the U.S. military from
Bosnia, while one Australian national was taken from Egypt and
a British national was taken from Zambia. More than 200 
al-Qaeda suspects picked up in six European countries report-
edly were transferred to custody in Guantánamo. 
President Bush issued a military order on November 13, 2001,
authorizing the detention and trial by military commission of
any current or former member of the al-Qaeda organization,
as well as anyone who aids or abets its work or harbors its
members. Military commission sentences allow for the impo-
sition of the death penalty based on non-unanimous decisions
and are subject to limited review in civilian courts. No known
trials have been carried out on Guantánamo or elsewhere by
those commissions to date. None of the detainees has been
charged publicly with any criminal offense, and none has been
provided with access to counsel or the courts. Although the pres-
ident recognized in February 2002 that Taliban detainees “are
covered by” the Geneva Conventions, he also concluded that
3neither the Taliban soldiers nor al-Qaeda detainees are enti-
tled to prisoner of war status.
Interrogation of the Guantánamo detainees began on Jan-
uary 23, 2002, and is presumably ongoing. No detainee has been
permitted to have access to a lawyer prior to or during that ques-
tioning. Furthermore, there is no indication that any of the
detainees has been informed of his or her rights under the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, which permits a for-
eign national to promptly contact and meet with a consular rep-
resentative of his home government, or any of the other inter-
national instruments that apply to the United States and
protect the fundamental human rights of the detainees. Such
instruments include the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights; the American Declaration of the Rights and
Duties of Man; and the Geneva Conventions, particularly the
third, which deals with prisoners of war. 
At the time of the initial filing of a petition with the Com-
mission, the government had detained 254 prisoners. As of early
February 2003, 640 prisoners were in detention. The Defense
Department has budgeted for up to 2,000 inmates at Camp
Delta, with contingency expenditures permitted over the next
20 years. In mid-2002, the press carried graphic pictures of the
arrival of some of the detainees at Guantánamo in shackles and
blackened goggles. Reports indicate that prisoners are refused
access to calendars and watches. Interrogation can take place
regularly at all times of day and night. As of September 2002,
reports indicated that nearly 60 prisoners were being treated
for psychiatric problems, and in January 2003, there were four
new suicide attempts reported by the detaining officials them-
selves, bringing the attempts officially reported to 14 since the
facility’s opening (press sources placed the number of sui-
cide attempts at “at least 30” during 2002). To date, the only
reported releases from Camp Delta are five elderly and infirm
detainees returned to Afghanistan. 
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, as well as
other NGOs and foreign governments, have criticized U.S.
actions relating to the Guantánamo detainees, particularly
after the release of recent press reports stating that up to ten
percent of the detainees were determined to have no intelli-
gence value during their interrogations in Afghanistan. Much
more alarming are recent reports that the U.S. military admits
to the use of “stress and duress” interrogation techniques con-
demned as torture or cruel and inhuman treatment by many
international bodies. Officials have also reported to the press
that some terrorist suspects have been surrendered without
proper legal process to countries in which the United States
is well aware that torture is used to extract information. No
administration official has disputed or denied these reports to
date. The unrebutted reports of torture and transfer of
detainees to countries known to practice torture led to the filing
of another petition with the Commission by the Center for Con-
stitutional Rights and others, detailing those allegations in
early February 2003. As of this writing, the Commission has
requested additional information from the petitioners. On
March 4, 2003, the petitioners submitted additional informa-
tion responding to the Commission’s requests, as well as new
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U.S. military police handle a detainee at Camp X-Ray on January 17,
2002. In April 2002, the U.S. government transferred the detainees from
Camp X-Ray to Camp Delta, also in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba.
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Arelated request for precautionary measures was filed with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights byhuman rights NGOs in June 2002, on behalf of “INS detainees ordered deported or granted voluntary depar-ture.” These detainees are foreign individuals, mostly men of Middle Eastern or Asian nationality, detained within
the United States. The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), now a part of the new Department of Homeland
Security, took these individuals into custody for minor immigration violations such as visa overstays and kept them in
custody indefinitely, without criminal charges or the opportunity to leave voluntarily for their home countries. The INS
holds closed hearings in these matters, does not release the names of the individuals in question, and refuses to pro-
vide public information on the conditions of their confinement or their treatment in custody. Furthermore, the
detainees have no effective legal means of challenging their detention. While their exact numbers are unknown,
recent detentions in conjunction with new “alien registration” requirements may take the number of detentions above
2,000, although some individuals have reportedly been released or deported. 
After repeated requests to the U.S. government for information went unanswered, the Commission issued a formal
request for precautionary measures on September 26, 2002. The request noted that the government had failed to clar-
ify or contradict the petitioners’ assertions that there is no basis under domestic or international law for continued deten-
tion of these persons, that there is no public information on the treatment of these detainees in custody, and that the
detainees have no basis for challenging their status. The Commission’s request asks the U.S. government for precau-
tionary measures to protect the detainees’ “right to personal liberty and security, their right to humane treatment, and
their right to resort to the courts for the protection of their legal rights, by allowing impartial courts to determine whether
the detainees have been lawfully detained and whether they are in need of protection.”
facts relating to deaths in custody of prisoners held at the U.S.
air base at Baghram, Pakistan and other secret locations. Those
reports coincide with press concerns for the treatment during
interrogation by U.S. officials of Khalid Shaikh Mohammad,
reportedly one of Osama bin Laden’s closest aides, who was
arrested in Pakistan in early March.
Responses of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
to Post-September 11 Events in the United States
The Commission has been active in its responses to the U.S.
war on terrorism, not only with the Guantánamo detainees but
on other fronts as well. First, in its Annual Report for 2001, the
Commission noted that the United States took “exceptional
measures” after the tragic events of September 11, 2001. The
Commission noted in that regard that although the United
States is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Polit-
ical Rights, it “has not notified the UN Secretary General in
accordance with Article 4 of the Covenant of any resort by it
to emergency measures that might justify derogation from
the United States’ obligations under that treaty.” Although the
United States has no reporting obligations under the Ameri-
can Convention on Human Rights regarding declarations of
emergency measures because it is not a party to that treaty, the
Commission also reiterated its oft-stated conclusion that the
United States is “subject to the fundamental rights of individ-
uals” contained in the OAS Charter and the American Decla-
ration of the Rights and Duties of Man. 
Second, on October 22, 2002, the Commission issued its
comprehensive Report on Terrorism and Human Rights,
which provides a legal framework and general recommenda-
tions regarding governmental responses to acts of terrorism,
with which it has had extensive experience throughout the
Americas. The Commission has dealt with cases and situations
arising from guerrilla or insurgent organizations known for their
use of terrorist methods, such as Peru’s Shining Path, as well
as state terrorism, such as some of the responses to Shining Path
and other insurgencies in Peru by the government of former
president Alberto Fujimori. Although the report does not
address the issues in any national context, there is little doubt
it is addressing the United States when it states, in its recom-
mendations, that member states of the OAS must “refrain
from the use of . . . military tribunals or commissions to try civil-
ians,” and further that: 
in situations of international armed conflict,
when an individual has committed a belligerent
act and falls into the hands of an adversary and
a doubt arises as to their status as a privileged or
unprivileged combatant or civilian, [the government
must] convene a competent tribunal to determine the sta-
tus of the detainee, and ensure that such persons
enjoy the protections of the Third Geneva Con-
vention. . . (emphasis added).  
It is this last recommendation that also lies at the heart of
the decision by the Commission in response to the February
petition mentioned above. The petition sought only the
issuance of precautionary measures, not a ruling on admissi-
bility or the merits. The rules permit the issuance of such
measures “in serious and urgent cases” in order “to prevent
irreparable harm to persons.” The rule is designed to protect
the existing status and legal protections for the alleged victims
while the action is pending before the Commission, making it
akin to a request for injunctive relief. The Commission’s rul-
ing on precautionary measures does not constitute a ruling on
the merits. Normally, a request for precautionary measures is
sought contemporaneously with the filing of a petition for
review of human rights violations on the merits, but in this case,
the petitioners sought only precautionary measures. Because
it was one of the first rulings on any aspect of the govern-
ment’s new war on terrorism, it received extensive publicity,
both nationally and internationally.
On March 12, 2002, the Commission issued one of its most
extensively documented requests for precautionary measures
ever issued to the United States under Article 25 of its Rules
of Procedure, a request that it later reiterated on May 28,
2002. The Commission concluded in its request that the
detainees are all “subject to the authority and control” of the
U.S. government, wherever they are physically located. Despite
U.S. government arguments to the contrary, the Commission
has jurisdiction over the detainees in Guantánamo because its
powers reach to the extraterritorial acts of nations under an
“authority and control” test similar to that used by the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights. After the Commission’s initial
request for precautionary measures in March, the U.S. Depart-
ment of State’s Office of the Legal Adviser filed an extensive
legal defense of the administration’s Guantánamo policy in a
40-page submission to the Commission in April. That sub-
mission was the most fully articulated legal justification of U.S.
policy filed with any tribunal up to that time, as the first legal
challenge to the Guantánamo detentions in the United States
was dismissed almost immediately for lack of standing of the
petitioners in Coalition of Clergy, et al. v. Bush et al., a decision
that was subsequently upheld on appeal. 
As it has in the past, the U.S. government argued that the
Commission lacks jurisdiction over the United States and is thus
wholly without authority to bind the United States with its
decisions. The government went on to defend its policies on
the merits, however. The gist of that pleading and others that
have followed was the assertion that the Guantánamo detainees,
by virtue of the president’s determination that they are “unlaw-
ful combatants,” thereby enjoy no legal protections. Thus,
they may be held at the military’s discretion until the cessation
of hostilities, which the executive branch asserts to be the end
of the government’s war on terrorism. The detainees do not
enjoy the protection of basic human rights, the government
argued, because those rights have been pre-empted by the more
specialized and precise legal concepts of the “separate and dis-
tinct humanitarian law rules at issue.” Neither can the detainees
claim the protections of humanitarian law, however, because
the president has properly designated them as unlawful com-
batants, by which designation they fall outside of the protec-
tion of the Geneva Conventions. Thus, while the government
asserted that it treats some of the detainees in a fashion con-
sistent with the obligations of humanitarian law, it maintained
that it has no legal duty to do so pursuant to human rights or
humanitarian law. Thus, according to the government, the
detainees legally fail to qualify for any legal protection what-
soever. 
The Commission anticipated both the issues of jurisdic-
tion and the merits of the government’s claims in its March let-
ter to the State Department. First, it was emphatic in its asser-
tion that the U.S. government has an obligation to follow
requests for precautionary measures:
The Commission notes preliminarily that its
authority to receive and grant requests for pre-
cautionary measures . . . is, as with the practice
4
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5of other international decisional bodies, a well-
established and necessary component of the
Commission’s processes. Indeed, where such
measures are considered essential to preserving
the Commission’s very mandate under the OAS
Charter, the Commission has ruled that OAS
member states are subject to an international
legal obligation to comply with a request for
such measures. 
As to the merits of the government’s claim, the Commission
concluded that the detainees “remain the beneficiaries at least
of the non-derogable protections under international human
rights law.” The applicable international norms, the Com-
mission asserted, require that “a competent court or tribunal,
as opposed to the political authority, must be charged with
ensuring respect for the legal status and rights” of the detainees.
It is noteworthy that the Commission did not pre-judge the out-
come of such a court proceeding, suggesting that were the
United States to comply with the due process requirements of
both human rights and humanitarian law, it could achieve the
very outcome it now seeks to defend. 
After submission of additional arguments by the petition-
ers, including the executive branch’s assertions as to the appli-
cation of the Geneva Conventions to the detainees, the Com-
mission issued an additional communication to the United
States on July 23, 2002. The Commission weighed the new evi-
dence submitted by both parties, but reiterated its conclusion
that “doubts continue to exist concerning the legal status of the
detainees,” and that the responses by the government “confirm
the Commission’s previous finding that, in the State’s view, the
nature and extent of rights accorded to the detainees remain
entirely at the discretion of the U.S. government.” By the
explicit language of its decision and its invocation of numer-
ous cases in which it had interpreted the American Declaration
in light of humanitarian law obligations, the Commission also
rejected the U.S. government’s limited reading of the decision
of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (Court) in the
preliminary objections decision in Las Palmeras v. Colombia, in
which the Court ruled that the Court and Commission cannot
directly apply the Geneva Conventions. The Commission, like
the Court, nonetheless continues to use Geneva Convention
norms as a means to interpret or clarify otherwise ambiguous
provisions of human rights law.
The Commission also heard oral arguments in its October
2002 regular session on the status of the detainees, during which
the United States reiterated its legal position without change
or compromise. The recent adverse ruling by the court of
appeals makes it likely that a full petition on the merits of the
claim will be filed with the Commission as soon as domestic
remedies are fully exhausted.
Finally, on March 18, 2003, the Commission issued a
renewed request to the U.S. government for precautionary mea-
sures on two grounds. The request reiterated the earlier con-
cerns for the status of the detainees at Guantánamo. It also
stated that the new factual allegations regarding torture or other
ill-treatment of detainees “raise questions concerning the
extent to which the United States’ policies and practices in
detaining and interrogating persons in connection with its
anti-terrorist initiatives clearly and absolutely prohibit treatment
that may amount to torture or may otherwise be cruel, inhu-
man or degrading as defined under international norms.”
The letter further “requests information from [the U.S.] gov-
ernment concerning the location, status and treatment of
individuals detained by the United States in other facilities in
connection with its post-September 11, 2001 anti-terrorist ini-
tiatives.”
Responses by United States and British Domestic Courts to the
Executive Branch’s “Unlawful Combatant” Claims
The United States judiciary generally has shown little will-
ingness to intervene in cases involving the Guantánamo
detainees and other cases involving assertions by the govern-
ment of unlawful combatant status of detainees or accused per-
sons. The issue is complicated not only because of disputed
issues of territorial jurisdiction in the Guantánamo cases, but
also because of the general unwillingness of the judicial branch
to intervene in what it perceives to be foreign policy issues within
the nearly exclusive prerogative of the executive branch. More-
over, because the administration has cast all of these cases as
matters arising from combat and war, rather than as viola-
tions of criminal law, the courts similarly couch their reluctance
to intervene in terms of executive discretion in the exercise of
war powers and the military. 
The U.S. government, through coordinated efforts of fed-
eral prosecution and immigration authorities, also has taken
extensive measures to hide the identities of alien detainees, both
in Cuba and here at home, and to obstruct legal access to courts
or counsel for all detainees, ostensibly to permit interrogations
to continue unimpeded and to prevent contacts within terrorist
networks. Because of the difficulties experienced by alleged ter-
rorists such as Yaser Hamdi, José Padilla, and Zacarias Mous-
saoui to achieve favorable treatment from the courts, the Inter-
American Commission appears to be one of the few deliberative
bodies willing to address the weaknesses in the Bush admin-
istration’s legal arguments.
The cases of Hamdi, Padilla, Moussaoui, and John Walker
Lindh, the so-called “American Taliban,” raise complex issues
of international law regarding prisoner and combatant status,
as well as proper access to and treatment before the courts. As
early as July 2002, the federal district court judge in United States
v. Lindh had ruled that Lindh, a U.S. citizen who had taken up
arms with the Taliban, could not invoke the protections of the
Geneva Conventions by arguing that he was a lawful combat-
ant—a soldier—fighting a war on the side of the Taliban. José
Padilla, a U.S. citizen arrested in Chicago on a material witness
warrant, was designated as an “enemy combatant” by the pres-
ident and is now being held at a naval detention center in South
Carolina without formal charges. In December 2002, a federal
district court judge in New York affirmed the president’s
authority to designate Padilla as an “enemy combatant” but
nonetheless concluded that he was entitled to the assignment
of defense counsel in the exercise of the court’s discretion over
habeas corpus petitions, rejecting various government argu-
ments that intervention by a lawyer on Padilla’s behalf was
inconsistent with legitimate goals of intelligence gathering
and prevention of further attacks. The judge recently reaffirmed
that ruling while expressing his irritation with the govern-
ment’s legal position. For example, he characterized the argu-
ments of the Department of Justice and solicitor general as “per-
meated with the pinched legalism one usually encounters
from non-lawyers.” 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir-
cuit, one of the most conservative federal courts in the nation,
went further in its pro-government reasoning in Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld. On January 8, 2003, that court held, like the other
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6Personal freedoms in Zimbabwe have disintegrated overthe past few years as President Robert Mugabe has com-promised the civil and political rights of citizens to
maintain his grip on power. In the face of mounting oppo-
sition to his rule, Mugabe has severely restricted the rights of
journalists to express themselves freely, the rights of opposi-
tion political parties to hold rallies and meetings, and the
rights of citizens to assemble freely. These rights are protected
under the Constitution of Zimbabwe, as well as international
covenants to which Zimbabwe is a party. These restrictions
have been codified in two news laws—the Access to Infor-
mation and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) of 2002 and the
Public Order and Security Act (POSA) of 2002. Both laws were
instituted prior to a contentious presidential race in March
2002 and have allowed Mugabe to solidify his hold on power
by subrogating any opposition while claiming to uphold the
rule of law. This effort, which assured him an electoral victory
despite failing to meet international election standards, will
have far-reaching consequences on the rights of Zimbab-
weans to assemble, speak, and conduct a free press for years
to come. In addition, Zimbabwe’s problems come at a time
when the rest of the continent is moving toward democracy
and transparency. The failures of Zimbabwe will reflect poorly
upon pan-African efforts to achieve these goals.
Background
President Mugabe has ruled Zimbabwe since it gained inde-
pendence in 1980. After maneuvering to head the largest
army that fought against white minority rule, he came to power
espousing reconciliation with the white population that had pre-
viously ruled Rhodesia, as Zimbabwe was formerly known.
Mugabe initially attempted to establish a de jure one-party state
with his ruling Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic
Front (ZANU-PF) as the sole legal political party. He did not
succeed, however, and created a de facto one-party state instead. 
During the formative stages of Mugabe’s rule, the admin-
istration did not tolerate dissent. In the early 1980s Mugabe
sent the North Korean-trained Fifth Brigade of the Zimbabwe
National Army to the Matabeleland region of the country,
where it killed 20,000 people. Matabeleland, a base for many
critics of Mugabe and ZANU-PF, was home of the Ndebele peo-
ple who were united behind Joshua Nkomo and his Zim-
babwe African People’s Union party (ZAPU), which opposed
Mugabe’s centralization of power. Nkomo eventually agreed
to a power-sharing agreement in which he would serve as
vice president as long as he merged his party with ZANU-PF,
thus eliminating the only major opposition party. This mas-
sacre, known in Zimbabwe as the Gukuruhundi, or “the rains
that cleanse,” set the tone for Mugabe’s response to future
attempts at political opposition. 
From the late 1980s until the late 1990s, small political par-
ties emerged, such as the Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM),
to contest an occasional parliamentary seat or run a symbolic
presidential candidate who had no real chance of unseating
Mugabe. Even though these parties posed no practical risk to
Mugabe due to limited exposure and support, he did not hes-
itate to resort to violence and intimidation to ensure that no
opposition party gained a foothold in Zimbabwean politics.
For example, a ZANU-PF television ad broadcast during the
1990 presidential race threatened constituents who did not
wish to support ZANU-PF. The announcer of the ad, which
featured a car crash, stated: “This is one way to die. Another
way is to vote for ZUM. Don’t commit suicide. Vote ZANU-
PF and live.”
Mugabe’s hold on power began to crumble in September
1999, when the opposition Movement for Democratic Change
(MDC) was born out of the labor movement. The MDC
demonstrated its strength in February 2000 when it mobilized
an effective campaign to defeat a referendum on a draft
constitution written by ZANU-PF that would greatly expand
the powers of the president. This was the first defeat ZANU-
PF ever suffered at the polls. Four months later, the MDC
emerged from a bloody parliamentary election campaign to
win almost 50 percent of the elected seats. In the process,
ZANU-PF members killed hundreds of people and tortured
thousands, the vast majority of them MDC members. 
The presidential election was due to be held in less than two
years. ZANU-PF’s efforts to use violence and intimidation failed
to defeat the MDC. In subsequent court challenges, the MDC
nullified the elections of several ZANU-PF members of Parlia-
ment after the Zimbabwe High Court ruled that ZANU-PF’s
heavy-handed campaign tactics created an illegal advantage
for the ruling party. Although many judges who ruled against
ZANU-PF were forced to resign, opposition support continued
to grow. It was clear that the traditional tactic of violent sup-
pression of opposition would not be enough to ensure Mugabe’s
re-election. To enhance its candidate’s chances of winning the
presidency, ZANU-PF resorted to instituting new laws in order
to limit dissent, free expression, and free assembly.
The Public Order and Security Act of 2002 
POSA, which was passed in January 2002, replaced the Law
and Order Maintenance Act of 1960 (LOMA), one of the few
pieces of legislation retained from the Rhodesian era. LOMA
generally outlined police powers, state security measures,
Attacks from Within: 
Zimbabwe’s Assault on Basic Freedoms through Legislation
by Jamal Jafari* 
continued on next page
Robert G. Mugabe, President of the Republic of Zimbabwe, addressing
the United Nations General Assembly on September 12, 2002.
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7and the limits of personal freedom as they related to state secu-
rity. LOMA was considered to be a draconian piece of legis-
lation that served the interests of the white minority. Ironi-
cally, the Rhodesian regime often invoked this statute to
inhibit the revolutionary forces and their supporters who
now rule Zimbabwe. Mugabe kept LOMA in place after inde-
pendence mainly due to its effectiveness in suppressing dis-
sent against the government. The decision to replace LOMA
came after years of public criticism over its colonial roots and
the Mugabe regime’s desire to restrict opposition to the gov-
ernment beyond the boundaries of LOMA.
Effects of the Public Order and Security Act on 
Freedom of Expression 
Although LOMA was generally considered restrictive,
POSA has maintained, and in some instances expanded, lim-
itations on personal freedom, including freedom of expres-
sion. POSA retains the provision of LOMA that criminalized
insulting the president, although the passage of POSA reduced
the penalty from five years of imprisonment to one. Section
16 of POSA criminalizes the making of virtually any negative
comment about the president in his professional or personal
capacity. This section also crimi-
nalizes any printed or broadcast
“abusive, indecent, obscene or false
statement” directed toward the pres-
ident. Although there is no inde-
pendent electronic media within
Zimbabwe, virtually any writer at
an independent newspaper could
be arrested for criticizing the pres-
ident. In practice, however, the gov-
ernment has chosen to prosecute
journalists under AIPPA rather than rely on this provision. 
An additional provision of POSA that inhibits the right of
free expression is section 15, which prohibits making any false
statements prejudicial to the government, or any oral or
written false statements that may, inter alia, adversely affect
Zimbabwean defense or economic interests, or undermine
public confidence in defense and law enforcement agen-
cies. The determination of what constitutes a “false state-
ment” is left up to the executive. This provision not only
affects any local or foreign journalist writing about Zim-
babwe, but also severely hinders human rights groups and
other advocacy organizations that serve as a check on the gov-
ernment. If the press and non-governmental organizations are
stripped of their power to criticize the state, critical debate
in Zimbabwe will come to a virtual halt. 
Another new clause incorporated into POSA is section 12,
which addresses causing disaffection among the police forces.
Under this clause, any person who commits an act that may
be construed as attempting to cause the police or defense
forces to withhold their loyalty, services, or allegiance, or to
commit a breach of discipline, may be fined 20,000 Zim-
babwe dollars (U.S.$357) and imprisoned for up to two years.
Because most police stations have close ties to government-
sponsored militias and often apply the law selectively, many
opposition supporters who report acts of political violence to
the police are told that the police cannot help MDC members. 
According to section 12, any person who makes public state-
ments condemning the actions of the police or suggesting that
they should uphold the rule of law may be a target for pros-
ecution. For example, MDC official Kenneth Mathe was
arrested and brought before a magistrate in the resort town
of Victoria Falls on January 24, 2003 for violating section
12(a) of POSA. In an interview with the opposition newspa-
per Daily News, Mr. Mathe commented on reports that police
and members of the armed forces were beating civilians in the
area after the murder of an Australian tourist. He likened the
events to the Matabeleland massacres in the 1980s. The
police interpreted his statement as “causing disaffection
amongst members of the Police Force or Defense Forces,”
arrested him, and released him on bail pending trial. 
Effects of the Public Order and Security Act on 
Freedom of Assembly 
Section 5 of POSA addresses acts of subversion. The lan-
guage of section 5 is so broad, however, that even peaceful
protests may be subject to prosecution. Specifically, subsection
2(iii) of this act makes “coercing or attempting to coerce the
Government” a crime punishable by up to 20 years of impris-
onment. “Coercing” is defined as “constraining, compelling
or restraining” through “boycott, civil disobedience or resis-
tance to any law, whether such resistance is active or passive
. . . if accompanied by physical force or violence or threat of
physical force or violence.” Thus, any participant in a rally or
a mass stayaway may be subject to prosecution under this
clause. This would include any participant in a rally that is later
attacked by a government-sponsored militia, which occurs
with some regularity. 
Section 17 of POSA, which addresses public violence, has
been expanded to apply to anyone
who “forcibly disturbs the peace,
security or order of the public . . .
or invades the rights of other peo-
ple.” On the surface, the objective
of this provision seems to preserve
the peace by punishing rioters. A
closer examination reveals that it
can be applied to anyone who
objects to the operations of the
state. For example, Raymond
Majongwe, secretary-general of the Progressive Teacher’s
Union of Zimbabwe (PTUZ), was twice arrested under sec-
tion 17 while leading a nonviolent national teacher’s strike
in October 2002. Each time, he was arrested for approaching
teachers at schools and encouraging them to join the strike.
During the first arrest he was badly beaten in police custody
and prevented from seeking medical attention for days. Dur-
ing the second arrest he was tortured by having electrodes
applied to his genitals and his mouth. The police told him to
call off the strike and not to talk to the press. 
In general, POSA strengthens the police force and equips
it with broader powers to inhibit demonstrations. Section 25,
which regulates public gatherings, has enabled police to
approve, disapprove, or shut down virtually any public gath-
ering at will. Any person who wishes to hold a public gather-
ing must provide advance notice to the authorities, who then
have the power to determine the duration, location, and
route of the gathering. The authorities may deny any request
for a public gathering if they claim it will cause public disor-
der, a breach of the peace, or an obstruction to any thor-
oughfare. Any organizer of a public gathering who fails to seek
approval from the state may be fined up to $10,000 Zim-
babwe dollars (U.S.$179) and imprisoned for up to six months
according to section 24(6). In addition, section 27 gives the
police the power to prohibit any gathering within a specific
police district for up to three months. Section 28 provides that
the organizer of any public gathering who has breached any
aspect of POSA relating to such gatherings may be held civilly
liable for damage that results from the gathering. Further, sec-
tion 31 states that any person at a public gathering who
“engages in disorderly or riotous conduct; or uses threaten-
continued on next page
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Any organizer of a public gathering who
fails to seek approval from the state may
be fined up to $10,000 Zimbabwe dollars
(U.S.$179) and imprisoned for up to 
six months according to section 24(6).
8ing, abusive or insulting words; or behaves in a threatening,
abusive or insulting manner” may be liable for a fine up to
$50,000 Zimbabwe dollars (U.S.$893) and may be impris-
oned for up to two years. Police have even required advance
notice of political discussions taking place at public places in
the capital city of Harare.
Officials have relied on POSA when arresting elected
MDC officials. On January 11, 2003, Harare Mayor Elias
Mudzuri, his deputy mayor, and several members of the city
council were arrested and charged with addressing an illegal
gathering under section 25(1) of POSA, which regulates
public gatherings that may cause “public disorder; or a breach
of the peace; or an obstruction of any thoroughfare.” Accord-
ing to the British Broadcasting Corporation, at the time of
their arrest, the officials were holding a meeting with residents
at the city council building and were discussing municipal
issues such as water, sewage, and roads. 
Because POSA was passed two months before the presi-
dential election, the restrictions on public gatherings had a
serious effect on the campaign for the presidency. President
Mugabe addressed roughly 50 rallies during that period and
all ZANU-PF rallies were allowed to proceed unhindered. In
contrast, Morgan Tsvangirai, the head of the MDC and its can-
didate for president, managed to hold only eight rallies. The
MDC secured a court order to prevent the police from inter-
fering in a rally in February 2002, but cancelled the rally
after police refused to provide security in the face of mount-
ing threats. In all, the police used POSA to disrupt or prevent
83 MDC rallies between January and March 2002. They often
prevented MDC meetings in private homes as well, and dis-
rupted a meeting between Mr. Tsvangirai and diplomats
held at a hotel. The police disrupted several gatherings of the
Zimbabwe Election Support Network, an organization devoted
to voter education and free and fair elections, after classify-
ing the gathering as political and therefore subject to the pro-
visions of POSA. 
The Access to Information and Protection of 
Privacy Act of 2002 
The Zimbabwean Constitution has never explicitly guar-
anteed freedom of the press, although it does guarantee free
expression to all citizens in section 20, which has been inter-
preted to include journalists. Before AIPPA was passed in
March 2002, journalists were prevented from publishing infor-
mation that contained state secrets or could be proven to be
defamatory. There was no law hindering the ability of journalists
to operate, except for a statute regulating electronic media. 
Accreditation of Journalists and Mass Media Outlets 
AIPPA has drastically changed the work of journalists in
Zimbabwe. Among other measures, it has created a Media and
Information Commission (Commission) to oversee the press,
has imposed a strict registration policy on journalists, and has
introduced severe penalties for publishing false informa-
tion. Three members of the Commission are chosen by offi-
cials from journalist organizations and three by associations
of media owners, while the remaining members are chosen
by the minister of information under orders from the presi-
dent. The minister has the power to accept or reject any
members nominated by journalists and media owners and
holds the final decision, along with the president, as to who
sits on the Commission. 
The Commission has the power to register any individual
journalists and all mass media outlets, including newspa-
pers, magazines, news services, and any organization that
derives revenue from news collection and dissemination.
Sections 65 through 77 of AIPPA specify who may be a mass
media owner, the manner in which he or she must apply for
registration, and the manner in which he or she must oper-
ate in order to retain registration with the Commission. Sec-
tion 65 provides that all mass media owners must at least be
citizens of Zimbabwe. In addition, all partial owners must be
permanent residents of Zimbabwe. Under section 69, the
Commission may refuse to register any organization that vio-
lates the Act and may suspend or nullify registration due to
bankruptcy of any owner or membership in a banned orga-
nization pursuant to section 71. 
In a country where there is little internal capital investment,
section 71 severely hampers the ability of news organizations
to raise money. In addition, the mandatory registration of jour-
nalists amounts to the requirement of approval from the
government to practice as a journalist. In practice, local jour-
nalists are initially granted registration, but renewal by the
Commission is delayed or halted for those who have been par-
ticularly critical of the government. A journalist cannot report
freely on government activities if he or she is worried about
the nullification of his or her registration. 
Journalists are subject to individual registration according
to sections 78 through 90 of AIPPA. Under section 79, all jour-
nalists must apply to the Commission for registration that must
be renewed annually. Only Zimbabwean citizens and per-
manent residents are eligible to receive this type of accredi-
tation. Section 79(4) stipulates that any foreign reporter may
be accredited for a maximum of 30 days. Therefore, all
reporters from outside the country must get prior approval
from the government and inform it of the subject of their
work. A foreign media outlet may set up a permanent office
in Zimbabwe, but only with prior approval from the Com-
mission according to section 90. 
As a result of the passage of section 79, numerous foreign
journalists have been denied entry into Zimbabwe after their
requests for temporary accreditation were denied. Among
those denied visas were Sally Sara of the Australian Broad-
continued on next page
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Morgan Tsvangirai, leader of the Movement for Democratic
Change (MDC), at a press conference in Harare, criticizing
the ZANU-PF-led government for physically abusing
members of his party during a mass stayaway opposing
Zimbabwean president Robert Mugabe’s human rights
record and dictatorship.
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9casting Corporation and David Blair of the British Daily Tele-
graph who was immediately deported upon arrival. Further,
the government alleges that it accredited 580 journalists
before the March 2002 presidential election, but a private
media watchdog group, the Media Institute of Southern
Africa, suggests that number is closer to 72. 
Local reporters have been most affected by the registration
policy. For example, Fanuel Jongwe, a senior reporter for the
Daily News, was arrested on January 27, 2003 in the town of
Zvishavane along with five foreigners and charged under
section 79 of AIPPA, which prohibits practicing journalism
without a license from the Commission. The five foreigners,
reported to be members of the World Lutheran Foundation
(WLF), were charged under sec-
tion 72, which prohibits running a
media outlet without authorization.
Jongwe stated that he had been
invited to cover the WLF’s activi-
ties as a development organization
in the area. The group was later
released after police confiscated a
laptop, notebooks, cameras, and lit-
erature. 
Effects of the Access to Information
and Protection of Privacy Act on
Freedom of Expression 
Possibly more troubling to journalists than the accredita-
tion issue are the new restrictions on freedom of expression
imposed by AIPPA. Section 64, entitled “Abuse of Freedom of
Expression,” criminalizes usage of mass media outlets to com-
mit a criminal offense or publish a false record. Anyone who
violates this section may be fined up to $100,000 Zimbabwe
dollars (U.S.$1786) and may be sentenced to up to two years
in jail. While many countries hold journalists civilly liable for
defamation, criminal liability serves to stifle the free expres-
sion of information due to the threat of imprisonment. 
Individual journalists are also criminally liable from pub-
lishing false information under section 80, which provides
penalties if a journalist “falsifies or fabricates information, pub-
lishes falsehoods . . . or contravenes any of the provisions” of
AIPPA. The definition of a falsehood is left up to the Com-
mission and the minister of information. The penalties for vio-
lating this section are up to a $100,000 Zimbabwe dollars
(U.S.$1786) fine and up to two years in jail. 
These sections of AIPPA have been used repeatedly to
detain journalists who publish stories that criticize the gov-
ernment. In April 2002, Geoff Nyarota, the editor-in-chief of
the Daily News, was arrested under section 80 after publish-
ing a story accusing the Registrar General of Elections of
releasing contradictory information to different media out-
lets concerning the results of the presidential election. In his
subsequent legal challenge, Nyarota was remanded to prison
until early 2003 while the government considers whether
section 80 of the AIPPA violates section 20 of the Constitu-
tion, which guarantees freedom of expression. In total, at least
16 journalists were arrested and charged under section 80
from the time of the presidential election until early July 2002. 
Zimbabwe’s Responsibilities under the Zimbabwean
Constitution and International Law
AIPPA’s Compliance with the Constitution and 
International Law 
AIPPA has sparked fierce constitutional debate within
Zimbabwe. Section 20 of the Constitution maintains that
every citizen has the “freedom to hold opinions and to receive
and impart ideas and information without interference, and
freedom from interference with his correspondence.” There
are exceptions to this right. In Section 20(2)(a), exceptions
are made in the interest of “defence, public safety, public
order, the economic interests of the State, public morality or
public health.” AIPPA goes one step further, however, and
restricts freedom of expression on the basis of accuracy of
information as perceived by the state. This is clearly a limi-
tation the Constitution did not intend, and is currently being
debated by the courts. 
In addition, the provisions of AIPPA outlined above vio-
late Zimbabwe’s obligations under international law. Article
19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), to which Zimbabwe is a state party, guarantees
freedom of expression, including
“freedom to seek, receive and
impart information and ideas of all
kinds, regardless of frontiers,
either orally, in writing or in print,
in the form of art, or through any
other media of his choice.” The
only restrictions that may be
imposed are those that are pro-
vided for by law and aim to protect
the rights or reputations of oth-
ers, national security, public order,
public health, or morals. Any
restriction must be justified as
“necessary” for achieving one of these purposes. General
Comment 10, which elaborates on the implementation of Arti-
cle 19, is clear that a state party may impose restrictions on
the right to freedom of expression only if such restrictions do
not jeopardize the right itself.
AIPPA’s requirement that journalists provide accurate
information is in violation of Zimbabwe’s international oblig-
ations. Although most international bodies recognize some
restrictions on press freedom to protect national security, AIP-
PA’s prohibition against publishing false information regard-
less of content surpasses acceptable international norms. By
making journalists criminally liable for their reports, AIPPA
has trampled on internationally recognized components of
a free press by imposing illegitimate restrictions on journal-
ists’ right to freedom of expression. Further, the restrictions
on the press not only inhibit journalists’ right to impart
information, but they also jeopardize the public’s right to
receive information. Unless AIPPA is amended, a truly free
word may never again be published in Zimbabwe, in turn sti-
fling public debate among Zimbabweans.
Zimbabwe also has obligations as a state party to the
African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (ACHPR).
Article 9 states that “every individual shall have the right to
receive information,” and “every person shall have the right
to express and disseminate his opinions within the law.”
AIPPA certainly violates this provision by withholding regis-
tration from some independent journalists and prosecuting
others for publishing allegedly false information. Imposing
such limitations violates the Constitution, making its legal
application dubious. In addition, AIPPA contradicts the spirit
of Article 9 of the ACHPR. 
AIPPA also contradicts nearly every provision of the Wind-
hoek Declaration (Declaration) (1991) governing freedom
of the press in Africa. Zimbabwe signed this document, which
was drafted during the General Conference of United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization in 1989 and
later passed by the UN General Assembly. The Declaration
establishes that a free press is essential to a functioning
democracy and every effort should be taken to remove gov-
In April 2002, Geoff Nyarota, the editor-in-
chief of the Daily News, was arrested
under section 80 after publishing a story
accusing the Registrar General of Elections
of releasing contradictory information to
different media outlets concerning the
results of the presidential election.
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ernment restrictions on the press, establish constitutional
guarantees of press freedom, and protect journalists from-
prohibitions on their freedom of expression. Specifically, the
Declaration states that “African States should be encouraged
to provide constitutional guarantees of freedom of the
press . . . .” Additionally, the Declaration asserts that “African
Governments that have jailed journalists for their profes-
sional activities should free them immediately.” 
These documents represent the will of Africa and the will
of the world in allowing free speech. By preventing free
access to information through the restrictions in AIPPA,
Zimbabwe is turning its back on regional and international
standards to which it previously agreed to adhere. Through-
out its current crisis, Zimbabwe has repeatedly said that
African problems demand African solutions, but this argument
holds little weight considering the disrespect Mugabe has
shown to standards of free speech outlined by the ACHPR. 
POSA’s Compliance with the Constitution and 
International Law 
Zimbabwe has contravened sections of its own Constitution
and provisions of international law by passing and imple-
menting POSA. Section 21 of the Constitution guarantees the
right to assembly and does not provide for the sweeping
authority POSA gives to officers of the state to restrict such
gatherings. Further, Section 20 provides for freedom of
expression and makes exceptions only for the protection of
national security, defamation, and other circumstances relat-
ing to the general public welfare. POSA’s restrictions on
freedom of assembly, including breaking up private meetings
and outlawing all public assembly in certain areas for up to
three months certainly contradict the Constitution, even if
state security is considered. The assembly itself should always
be guaranteed even if the content of the discussions at cer-
tain gatherings may be regulated, in extreme circumstances,
in the interests of security. 
POSA also contradicts many provisions of the ICCPR. Arti-
cle 21 guarantees the right of peaceful assembly and only
provides for exceptions for situations “necessary in a democ-
ratic society in the interests of national security or public
safety, public order, the protection of public health or morals
or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” Pre-
venting peaceful demonstrations as stipulated under POSA can-
not be considered necessary in a democratic society. These
internationally recognized provisions, if implemented, would
allow Zimbabweans of all political persuasions to assemble
peacefully. As POSA is written, this is not possible. 
Article 11 of the ACHPR states that every individual shall
have the right of free assembly provided he abides by the law.
As provisions of POSA itself may be unconstitutional, certain
provisions may violate Article 11 regarding to peaceful assem-
bly. These provisions represent the will of Africa to protect
peaceful assembly. POSA’s restrictions on assembly and crit-
icism of the president contradict the will of Zimbabwe’s
neighbors and the previous will of Zimbabwe itself. 
Conclusion
POSA and AIPPA represent an assault on the freedoms of
the Zimbabwean people guaranteed to them under the
ICCPR, the ACHPR, and their own Constitution. A careful
examination of both acts reveals that they were designed in
part to aid the government during the presidential election
and were used afterward to silence opposition voices and
journalists in the independent media. Unchallenged, they cre-
ate a virtual police state in which the government can deny
any public assembly (even gatherings in private homes),
prosecute any person for a perceived threat or insult to the
government, prevent journalists from expressing themselves,
and prosecute journalists who disseminate information con-
trary to the official version of events. While sections of these
acts are being challenged in court, they represent a trend by
Mugabe and the government of Zimbabwe to put self-preser-
vation before the rights of the people. 
These pieces of legislation are symptomatic of the larger
problem of Mugabe’s autocracy and disregard for the needs
of the Zimbabwean people. At age 79 and a hardened veteran
of many physical and political battles, it is unlikely that he will
have a change of heart and loosen his grip on basic freedoms.
As internal dissent is suppressed, the key to the reinstatement
of these rights lies within the international community, start-
ing with Zimbabwe’s neighbors. As Zimbabwe dwindles deeper
in its political and economic problems it relies more on
international organizations such as the Commonwealth, an
organization composed mainly of Britain and its former
colonies, and the Southern African Development Community
(SADC). To date, SADC has offered mild criticism, and the
Commonwealth renewed its suspension of Zimbabwe for a sec-
ond year due to gross neglect of human rights. Despite
mounting criticism, African powers such as South Africa and
Nigeria have shielded Zimbabwe from further action by the
Commonwealth while SADC has taken little significant action.
South African President Thabo Mbeki recently suffered a
setback to his “quiet diplomacy” efforts with the Mugabe
regime. Days after using POSA to arrest MDC Vice Presi-
dent Gibson Sibanda for his involvement in leading success-
ful mass stayaways protesting the government, Minister of Jus-
tice Patrick Chinamasa announced that neither POSA nor
AIPPA would be amended in any way because the government
is “under siege” from the MDC. The government had con-
sidered the idea of amending POSA and AIPPA as a way of
easing sanctions and gaining favor among international bod-
ies, but eventually abandoned this plan.
The test of Africa’s future begins with Zimbabwe. If the
ideals of the African Charter are going to be realized, ushering
in an era of democracy and peaceful transfer of power
through free and fair elections, Zimbabwe must be used as
a model. African leaders must join the international call for
“smart” sanctions targeted at Zimbabwe’s leadership, not its
suffering population. The Commonwealth and SADC should
strip Zimbabwe of any power within their organizations until
a legitimate election has been held. Most importantly, all
nations should condemn the restriction of basic rights and
the establishment of an autocracy where a democracy once
existed. If all nations, especially African nations, condemn
Mugabe’s tactics, he might be convinced to leave office and
hand over power to a more moderate government. Only
then can Zimbabweans hope to enjoy the rights guaranteed
to them by their Constitution and the laws of humanity. 
*Jamal Jafari is a J.D. candidate at the Washington College of
Law and a staff writer for the Human Rights Brief. 
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On February 20, 2003 the Inter-Amer-ican Court of Human Rights (Inter-American Court or Court) con-
cluded a three-day hearing regarding
allegations that the Republic of Guatemala
violated numerous provisions of the Amer-
ican Convention on Human Rights (Amer-
ican Convention) due to its role in the 1990
murder of Guatemalan anthropologist
Myrna Mack Chang. Attorneys from the
Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights (Inter-American Commission or Com-
mission), the Center for Justice and Inter-
national Law (CEJIL), and Hogan & Hartson
L.L.P. filed this case seeking a declaration of
the responsibility of Guatemala and repara-
tions for damages suffered by the victim’s
next of kin. The hearing was a major step in
both the struggle for justice in the Mack case
and the effort to expose the impunity enjoyed
by state officials in Guatemala.
Background: The Civil War in Guatemala
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the Guatemalan popu-
lation was subjected to a “dirty war.” The Guatemalan mili-
tary used every means at its disposal to maintain its historic
control over the country’s power structure and rid the coun-
tryside of the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity
(URNG), a leftist guerilla movement in opposition to the
Guatemalan government. A “scorched earth” campaign waged
throughout rural Guatemala left 440 villages totally destroyed,
some 200,000 civilians dead or disappeared, and more than
a million people displaced. The military’s tactics, however,
were not confined to the Guatemalan countryside. As early
as the 1960s, semi-official death squads had become a com-
mon means to deal with civilian opposition leaders in
Guatemala. During the 1980s, an intricate system for the
surveillance and “disappearance” of such individuals had
been established within the Ministry of Defense. The Estado
Mayor Presidencial (EMP), a high-ranking military unit offi-
cially charged with the protection of the president and his fam-
ily, was widely known to carry out these covert directives.
The targets were named by the highest ranking military offi-
cials, and were systematically eliminated by groups of EMP offi-
cers. By the mid-1980s, the military deemed its campaign
successful enough to permit the election of a civilian presi-
dent, a gesture that many viewed as liberating Guatemalan
society.
In 1986, Myrna Mack Chang, a highly regarded anthro-
pologist, collaborated with several colleagues to found the
Association for the Advancement of Social Sciences in
Guatemala (AVANCSO). AVANCSO was a social science
research facility conceived as a means to explore the impact
of the country’s decades-old civil war on Guatemalan society.
Myrna conducted an in-depth study of “internally displaced”
populations—Indigenous Peoples left without homes and
denied the benefits of refugee status because they remained
within Guatemala’s national boundaries. The publication of
Myrna’s research, including testimonials of internally
displaced individuals, generated interna-
tional awareness of the extreme poverty and
violence suffered by these populations and
exposed the military’s role in creating such
conditions. The military, still the ruling
authority in Guatemala despite the façade
of a civilian government, quickly deemed
Myrna an “internal enemy” and set the
machinery of the EMP into motion. 
On the evening of September 11, 1990, as
Myrna prepared to leave AVANCSO for her
home, she was accosted, brutally stabbed 27
times, and left in the street for dead. Since
Myrna’s murder, her sister, Helen Mack, has
worked tirelessly to bring Myrna’s killers and
those responsible for planning her murder to
justice. Helen has pursued remedies in both
domestic and international fora in an effort
to overcome Guatemala’s recognized tradi-
tion of impunity for human rights violations.
Helen Mack’s Search for Justice in the Guatemalan Courts
Helen’s efforts to seek justice for her sister have spanned
more than a decade. From the initial investigation into
Myrna’s murder to the ultimate conviction of two of the
responsible parties, however, the Guatemalan government,
acting on behalf of those accused of Myrna’s murder, fre-
quently refused to cooperate, and at times, actively obstructed
the judicial process. These improprieties in Guatemala’s
criminal prosecution of the Mack case began with the initial
investigation of Myrna’s murder. No fingerprints were taken
from the crime scene; investigators failed to obtain blood sam-
ples as well as a complete set of photographs of her wounds;
and although fingernail samples were obtained, they were
discarded before a laboratory technician could analyze them.
In addition, investigators never examined the clothing Myrna
was wearing when she was killed. 
Perhaps most disturbing was the Guatemalan police’s
handling of a 60-page report completed by the detectives
assigned to investigate Myrna’s assassination. In this Sep-
tember 29, 1990 report, detectives concluded that Myrna’s
assassination was politically motivated, and they named
Sergeant Major Specialist Noel de Jesús Beteta Alvárez as
one of two individuals suspected in her killing. (The investi-
gation failed to uncover the identity of the second suspect.)
Rather than submitting this report to the courts, the police
turned over a 13-page, abridged version, which lacked any
mention of military involvement in Myrna’s assassination.
Additionally, this report replaced the investigators’ charac-
terization of the crime as “politically motivated” with a find-
ing that the crime was simply a robbery. It was not until
nearly ten months later that the existence of the original 60-
page police report was disclosed in court through testimony
offered by one of the detectives who had authored the report.
One month after offering this testimony, while preparing to
flee Guatemala in response to threats against his life, the detec-
tive was assassinated just outside of police headquarters. His
killers remain unidentified.
The Case of Myrna Mack Chang:
Overcoming Institutional Impunity in Guatemala
by David Baluarte and Erin Chlopak*
continued on next page
Myrna Mack Chang with her sister
Helen and daughter Lucrecia.
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Despite the irregularities that characterized the investi-
gation, on February 12, 1993, a Guatemalan trial court con-
victed Sergeant Major Specialist Noel de Jesús Beteta Alvárez,
one of Myrna’s assassins, and sentenced him to a 25-year
prison term. 
In addition to pursuing the prosecution of those respon-
sible for carrying out Myrna’s assassination, Helen Mack
sought justice against the individuals alleged to have planned
the murder: high ranking military officers in the EMP, includ-
ing General Edgar Augusto Godoy Gaitán, Colonel Juan
Valencia Osorio, and Colonel Juan Guillermo Oliva Carrera.
Her efforts were frustrated, however, when the same court that
convicted Beteta declined to permit the case against these
“intellectual authors” to proceed. The court’s refusal was
improper in that it foreclosed proceedings before the suspects
were indicted. In furtherance of its own impropriety, the
court also placed the burden of identifying additional suspects
in the case upon the Office of the Human Rights Ombuds-
men, when the institutions actually responsible for making
such determinations are the courts and the public prosecu-
tors’ office. 
Also frustrating Helen’s struggle to seek justice against the
intellectual authors of Myrna’s murder was the fact that her
efforts were entirely unsupported by the public prosecutors
working on the case. While Helen filed multiple appeals to
keep the investigation open against both the second unnamed
material author and the alleged intellectual authors, the
public prosecutors joined only to investigate the second
material author. Following the denial of these appeals, Helen
filed a final appeal with the Guatemalan Supreme Court,
which in turn overruled the lower court’s decision and per-
mitted the proceedings against the alleged intellectual authors
to move forward. 
Following this February 1994 holding, Helen pursued the
prosecution of Valencia, Oliva, and Godoy, though her efforts
were met with intense resistance and numerous challenges.
In March of 1994, only one month after the Guatemalan
Supreme Court permitted the case to proceed, the parties
accused of planning Myrna’s murder individually filed amparo
petitions—extraordinary writs requesting the immediate pro-
tection of a jeopardized constitutional right—with the trial
court, challenging the Supreme Court’s holding. Although
the trial court ultimately denied the petitions, it failed to make
its decision until December 6, 1994, and further failed to give
notification of its denials until March 9, 1995, three months
later. In addition to postponing the proceedings, these delays
violated the Guatemalan Code of Criminal Procedure, which
mandates that courts give notification of their decisions
within one day of the date on which the decision is reached. 
In late March of 1995, an additional complication emerged.
The Mack case was transferred by the Supreme Court from
a civil trial court to a military tribunal, despite the international
customary practice and international precedent requiring
human rights violations to be prosecuted in civil rather than
military courts. Helen filed multiple challenges to the trans-
fer. In spite of Helen’s efforts, the case was not returned to
a civil court until July of 1996, when the Guatemalan legis-
lature passed a law eliminating the jurisdiction of “special mil-
itary tribunals.” This resulted in the transfer of all cases pend-
ing in military courts to civil courts, including the Mack case.
Despite what appeared to be a conclusive resolution of this
issue, the following months were characterized by judicial
efforts to avoid exercising jurisdiction over the Mack case. In
light of the clarity and simplicity of the new law, such efforts
seem to have stemmed from fear among the judges of the ram-
ifications of being associated with the Mack case. Once again,
Helen Mack’s extraordinary efforts brought a final resolution
to this jurisdictional issue, and by the end of 1996, the case
was able to proceed. 
In the midst of these numerous setbacks was yet another
complication. The July 1996 law dissolving Guatemala’s “spe-
cial military tribunals” also instituted changes in Guatemala’s
Code of Criminal Procedure. These changes resulted in a
dilemma: the proceedings that had taken place prior to July
1996 had been conducted in accordance with provisions that
had been nullified by the new law. Therefore, the court was
faced with the question of how to conduct the remaining pro-
ceedings and how to treat those proceedings conducted in
accordance with provisions that no longer existed. 
In November of 1997, more than a year after the new law
was passed, the Guatemalan Constitutional Court ordered
that the Mack case be prosecuted under the new Code of
Criminal Procedure. In so holding, the Court vacated all pro-
ceedings against the alleged intellectual authors conducted
under the repealed code of criminal procedure, including
those proceedings that generated evidence in compliance
with the new law. This result served to delay the proceedings
even further.  
The last major legal complications in the Mack case arose
out of the 1996 enactment of the National Reconciliation Law.
The result of a peace settlement between the Guatemalan gov-
ernment and the URNG, this law facilitated the URNG’s re-
incorporation into Guatemalan civil society by granting
amnesty to persons who committed political crimes during
the country’s internal conflict. In January 1997, the alleged
intellectual authors of Myrna Mack’s assassination applied for
immunity under the new law, asserting that the crimes with
which they were charged were “political” crimes falling within
the boundaries of the provision. Upon the denial of their
applications for immunity, the alleged intellectual authors
filed numerous appeals and amparos, while simultaneously
reapplying for amnesty with a different court. Despite the fact
that their initial applications had already been denied by an
equally competent court, the new court agreed to consider
the applications. Ultimately, the new court denied the appli-
cations for amnesty, but in light of the fact that amnesty
continued on next page
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applications had already been filed with another court, the
proper response would have been to decline consideration
of the applications outright. Because this unjustified con-
sideration of repeated applications for immunity was not
concluded until four months after the new applications were
filed, it further compounded the delays already hindering the
proceedings and wasted the time of all parties involved.
Finally, in addition to the numerous dilemmas that char-
acterized the judicial proceedings against the alleged intel-
lectual authors of Myrna’s assassination, Helen’s efforts were
further hampered by extra-judicial obstacles. Beyond the
detective who was assassinated outside of police headquarters,
a number of witnesses, as well as one of the judges involved
with the case, were intimidated to such an extent that they
chose to go into exile. 
On January 29, 1998, Godoy, Valencia, and Oliva finally
were ordered to stand trial for planning and ordering the
assassination of Myrna Mack. Throughout these proceed-
ings, the defendants continued to abuse their right to file
amparos, seeking the extraordinary relief on multiple occasions
while failing to exhaust alternative measures, as required
before such writs are filed. The defendants’ excessive filing
of amparos further hampered the expediency of the pro-
ceedings. In addition to the defendants’ efforts to delay the
proceedings, other representatives of the Guatemalan state
also obstructed the judicial process by failing to comply with
multiple discovery requests made by Helen Mack. 
On March 3, 2000, Guatemala acknowledged institutional
responsibility for Myrna’s murder and for the delay of justice in
the Mack case. Two-and-a-half years later, on October 3, 2002,
a Guatemalan civil court convicted Juan Valencia for ordering
the assassination of Myrna Mack, sentencing him to 30 years in
prison. Valencia’s superiors, Godoy and Oliva, both were acquit-
ted due to the court’s finding that there was insufficient evidence
of their direct involvement in the planning of Myrna’s assassi-
nation. Helen’s appeal of these acquittals is pending. 
Petition to the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights
Almost immediately after Myrna’s murder, Helen Mack,
as the representative of Myrna’s next of kin, began to seek the
involvement of the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights in order that they might oversee the domestic crimi-
nal investigation and trial. The Guatemalan Human Rights
Commission, a national human rights commission, presented
a petition against the State of Guatemala to the Inter-Amer-
ican Commission on September 12, 1990, denouncing Myr-
na’s murder. Five days later, the Inter-American Commission
opened case number 10.636. 
On March 5, 1996, after carefully observing the domestic
investigation and judicial proceedings, the Commission
declared the Mack case admissible in accordance with Arti-
cles 46, 47, and 48 of the American Convention. Petitioners
and Guatemala subsequently filed a series of allegations
regarding the merits of the case, which the Commission took
under review. In accordance with Article 48(f) of the Amer-
ican Convention, the Commission held hearings with the
goal of mediating a friendly settlement between the parties.
During those hearings, the Guatemalan state acknowledged
institutional responsibility for the extra-judicial killing of
Myrna Mack, a gesture that lead to the signing of a compro-
mise agreement on March 3, 2000.
This compromise agreement embodied a number of sig-
nificant steps toward justice. In acknowledging international
responsibility, Guatemala agreed to reinitiate the case against
the alleged intellectual authors and ensure that the pro-
ceedings could progress without further delay. As a means to
ensure Guatemala’s compliance, the compromise agreement
also included a formal request to the Inter-American Com-
mission to assign representatives in Guatemala with the man-
date to oversee the proceedings and verify respect for due
process and judicial guarantees.
The verifiers presented their first and second reports on
August 23, 2000 and October 5, 2000, respectively, express-
ing their belief that the Guatemalan state was not serious about
advancing the prosecution of the intellectual authors nor was
it doing everything within its power to ensure fairness in the
proceedings. As a result, Helen desisted in her efforts to
reach a friendly settlement. 
On March 8, 2001, pursuant to Article 50 of the American
Convention, the Inter-American Commission approved report
No. 39/01 (Report), in which the Commission detailed its
findings on the Guatemalan proceedings in the Mack case.
The Commission found that the Guatemalan state had
deprived Myrna Mack of her right to life, in violation of Arti-
cle 4 of the American Convention. The Commission con-
cluded that Myrna’s murder resulted from a military opera-
tion planned and executed by officials in the EMP. The first
step of the operation involved singling out Myrna because of
her professional work, the second was to kill her, and the third
was to cover up the identities of the material and intellectual
authors, ensuring their impunity. Secondly, the Report con-
cluded that the Guatemalan state had not done everything
within its power to investigate the crime sufficiently so as to
facilitate the prosecution of those responsible within a rea-
sonable period. The report also noted that the state tolerated
interference with the proper administration of justice, and in
as much, violated the rights to a fair trial and judicial pro-
tection under Articles 8 and 25 of the American Convention,
respectively. 
The Inter-American Commission also reported that the
state had a responsibility to investigate extra-judicial killings
with the goal of fully prosecuting all those responsible, and
that Guatemala did not fulfill this responsibility. In using
state actors to perpetrate Myrna Mack’s extra-judicial killing
and shielding those responsible from prosecution, Guatemala
violated its obligation under Article 1(1) to assure respect for
all of the rights and freedoms enumerated in the American
Convention. 
Finally, the Report declared that, under international law,
Guatemala’s acknowledgment of institutional responsibility
was legally valid, and required the state to redress the dam-
ages caused to Myrna Mack’s next of kin. The Report empha-
sized that more than a year had passed since Guatemala
acknowledged responsibility and it had made no genuine
effort to penetrate the shield of impunity that protected the
intellectual authors of Myrna’s murder. 
Based on these findings the Inter-American Commission
made certain recommendations, asking that the state of
Guatemala conduct a thorough and impartial investigation
with the goal of bringing those responsible to justice; adopt
measures to assure that Myrna’s next of kin receive adequate
reparations for the damages they suffered; remove all obsta-
cles preventing the case from going forward; and dismantle
the EMP as soon as possible, in compliance with the 1996
continued on next page
Myrna Mack, continued from previous page
14
Peace Accords. The Inter-American Commission forwarded
the Report to Guatemala on March 19, 2001, and Guatemala
responded by revoking its March 2000 admission of institu-
tional responsibility for the death of Myrna Mack and deny-
ing central facts of the case. The Commission determined that
Guatemala failed to demonstrate genuine intent to comply
with the recommendations and referred the case to the juris-
diction of the Inter-American Court on June 14, 2001. 
On July 26, 2001, the Inter-American Commission filed an
official petition in the Inter-American Court against the state
of Guatemala regarding the Mack case. Two months later,
Guatemala filed its response in the form of preliminary objec-
tions. In these objections,
Guatemala once again retracted its
earlier admission of institutional
responsibility, stating that the Com-
mission had misunderstood this
earlier gesture to mean that the
state itself was responsible for the
murder. Guatemala claimed that
because domestic remedies had not
been exhausted, the Inter-Ameri-
can Court did not have jurisdiction
over the case. In addition,
Guatemala argued that the state
could not be responsible for the
murder of Myrna Mack, a crime
that had been committed by indi-
viduals who were being prosecuted for their unlawful acts.
On November 29, 2001, the Inter-American Commission
filed its response to Guatemala’s preliminary objections. The
Commission invoked Article 46(2), which provides that the
exhaustion of domestic remedies requirement does not apply
when the necessary remedies either do not exist, are inef-
fective, or present unjustifiably long delays. The Commission
made its decision on admissibility after observing that domes-
tic efforts to obtain justice were thwarted by an incomplete
investigation, unjustifiably long delays in the judicial pro-
ceedings, intimidation of witnesses and judges, and the with-
holding of discoverable evidence. The Commission found that
the conviction of one of the three alleged intellectual authors,
which had occurred since the Commission filed its petition
with the Court, did not change the fact that Guatemala failed
to comply with basic requirements of ensuring justice, as set
forth in the American Convention. In light of the Commis-
sion’s determination that domestic remedies were effectively
exhausted, the Inter-American Court had jurisdiction over the
case to determine whether Guatemala violated international
law in enabling the assassination of Myrna Mack and ensur-
ing impunity for those responsible. 
Proceedings before the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights
From February 18-20, 2003, the Inter-American Court
heard oral arguments and testimony regarding the merits of
the Myrna Mack case. On the first day of the hearing, both
sides gave their opening statements, after which representa-
tives of the Guatemalan government sat passively, declining
to cross-examine the petitioners’ first four witnesses. Among
those who testified were Myrna’s daughter, Lucrecia Hernán-
dez Mack, who offered a dramatic account of the pain she has
suffered as a result of her mother’s death, and Myrna’s sister,
Helen Mack, who discussed the Guatemalan state’s institu-
tional responsibility for Myrna’s assassination, as well as the
legal and extra-legal delays that have prolonged the domes-
tic judicial proceedings for over 12 years. 
The following day, before the petitioners examined their
remaining nine witnesses, representatives of the state of
Guatemala withdrew from the proceedings, stating their
refusal to be present during testimony that discredited the
Guatemalan government. This was the first time in the his-
tory of the Inter-American Court that a state withdrew from
ongoing proceedings. Nevertheless, following the Court’s
own procedural rules, the hearing continued in the state’s
absence. Witnesses offered testimony regarding the flawed
investigation into Myrna’s assassination; the institutional
involvement of Guatemalan intelligence agencies, particularly
the EMP, in ordering and carry-
ing out political assassinations; the
pronounced threat that Myrna’s
work posed to the Guatemalan gov-
ernment; the extensive delays that
have characterized the domestic
criminal proceedings; and the psy-
chological injuries suffered by Myr-
na’s family as a result of her brutal
murder and the obstacles they have
encountered in their efforts to
obtain justice on Myrna’s behalf. 
On the final day of the inter-
national proceedings, both peti-
tioners and a representative of
Guatemala returned to present
closing arguments. Following a summation of the barriers to
justice that plagued the domestic proceedings in the Mack
case, petitioners asked the Court to award reparations in the
form of two scholarships—one for a law student and the
other for an anthropology student—in Myrna’s honor, and
an order that a memorial to Myrna be erected in Guatemala.
Petitioners further asked the Court to award monetary repa-
rations for the pain they have suffered as a result of their loss,
as well as for the pain Myrna suffered at the time she was killed.
Finally, petitioners implored the Court to order the
Guatemalan government to dismantle the EMP and take
additional affirmative steps to ensure that human rights vio-
lators no longer enjoy impunity. 
In a very brief closing argument, the representative of
the Guatemalan state noted that the domestic proceedings
in the Mack case were ongoing and that the Inter-American
Court should not act in a manner that would interfere with
Guatemala’s pursuit of justice in its own courts. The state’s
representative also discussed the political importance of mov-
ing forward, urging the Inter-American Court not to be
swayed by the emotionally charged testimony of the peti-
tioners’ witnesses. The Inter-American Court is expected to
render its decision in the Mack case between the summer and
fall of 2003. 
The Significance of the Mack Case
The Mack case demonstrates the fundamental inability of
Guatemalan political and legal institutions to protect the
human rights of the Guatemalan people and provide swift jus-
tice when those rights are violated. The case also illustrates
Guatemala’s ongoing tradition of assuring impunity for indi-
viduals who, acting on behalf of the state, violate domestic and
international human rights laws. More broadly, the Mack
case is emblematic of the type of litigation that comes before
Myrna Mack, continued from previous page
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In recent years a body of international norms and standardsfor protecting children affected by armed conflict hasemerged. Of particular importance is the Optional Pro-
tocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the
Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (Optional
Protocol), which entered into force on February 12, 2002. The
Optional Protocol sets 18 as the minimum age for compul-
sory military recruitment. It also requires that states mandate
a minimum age, never less than 15, at which they will accept
voluntary military recruits. 
Although the enactment of the Optional Protocol is a laud-
able achievement, it is abundantly clear that child soldiers
continue to be employed at increasingly alarming rates.
One statistic illustrates the depth to which armed conflict con-
tinues to deleteriously affect children: more than 300,000 chil-
dren under 18 are engaged in conflict, serving as combatants
in nearly 75 percent of the conflicts around the globe. While
protracted conflicts ensue from Asia to South America,
potential conflicts loom on the horizon as well. Such conflicts
test the capacity of the Optional Protocol to protect children
in conflict and serve as reminders that the enactment of inter-
national instruments alone has not stopped the aggressive
mobilization of the world’s youngest and most vulnerable
population.
The most effective means of ending this offensive practice
is a multi-faceted approach. Governments, international
agencies, and local actors must continue to pressure armed
forces to stop recruiting and deploying child soldiers. Human
Rights Watch recently noted that several armed opposition
groups in Burma appear to be responding to such pressure.
It also is important to curb the easy availability of small arms
and military aid, both of which facilitate the use of child sol-
diers. Additionally, it is critical to reduce the risk of child
recruitment. Governments should regularize recruitment
procedures and prosecute those who violate rules precluding
underage recruitment. Educating parents and local com-
munities about national and international law strengthens
their capacity for advocacy, protection, and monitoring, thus
potentially minimizing the risk of recruitment. Further, child
soldiers often are products of impoverished and desperate
socio-political environments. Addressing these root causes is
another key component of reducing the risk of recruitment. 
Additionally, demobilization and rehabilitation pro-
gramming is important. The establishment of peace creates
an opportunity for war-torn states to begin directing energy
and resources toward the victims of conflict. Peace agreements
thus ought to include specific measures pertaining to the
demobilization and reintegration of children, including the
creation of jobs for youth and rebuilding schools and local
communities. As the tenable peace in post-conflict Sierra
Leone demonstrates, developing a protective environment for
demobilized child soldiers and laying the groundwork for
reunification is important. Absent meaningful and effective
implementation of disarmament, demobilization, and rein-
tegration programming, post-conflict situations could once
again degenerate into conflict. 
From Impressionable Youth to Ruthless Killer: 
The Phenomenon of the Child Soldier
Across each continent countless states are submerged in
conflict. In armed conflicts from Sierra Leone to Burma to
Colombia, fighting between government forces and non-
state armed groups has led to the destruction of entire com-
munities. Murder, rape, and torture of the local population
are the predominant tactics that government and opposition
groups employ to strike terror and maintain power. The
aggressive recruitment of child soldiers enables such cam-
paigns of terror around the world. Government and rebel
forces abduct and forcibly conscript children, violently quash-
ing their innocence and transforming them into fighters
and sex slaves. 
Abducted and forcibly recruited by armed forces, chil-
dren in armed conflicts suffer two-fold as both witnesses to
atrocities and perpetrators of unspeakable crimes. Many
child soldiers fight on the front lines; others are used as
spies, messengers, and servants. For young girls, recruitment
leads to particularly atrocious suffering. Young girls often are
employed as sexual slaves and are subject to rape, sexual
abuse, and sexual harassment.
Child soldiers are appealing to armed forces for various
reasons, including the fact that children are easy to arm and
control. Children are easy to manipulate because they are
continued on next page
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obedient and unlikely to question orders. As the Coalition to
Stop the Use of Child Soldiers notes, governments and armed
groups use children because they are “easier to condition into
fearless killing and unthinking obedience.” Armed forces
consider children to be useful soldiers because of the ability
to arm children with newly developed lightweight and easy
to fire weapons. Also, armed forces frequently assign children
to a fatally dangerous task because of their size and agility: the
laying and clearing of landmines.
Armed forces employ countless tactics to turn young chil-
dren into murderers. Drugs and alcohol are forced upon chil-
dren to dull their sensitivity to pain. In all too many conflicts,
sheer terror and a desperate struggle to survive lead children
to war. This practice of brutalizing children and transform-
ing them into hardened killers creates a moral and political
dilemma for states in conflict with regimes that employ child
soldiers. Conflict with such regimes requires a state to simul-
taneously condemn the use of child soldiers as a violation of
international law, yet remain aware of the threat they pose. 
International Legal Mechanisms
International Labor Organization Convention 182 Con-
cerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elim-
ination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour was adopted in
June 1999 and was the first international legal instrument to
legally recognize child soldiering as a form of labor. In fact,
the convention deems child soldiering to be one of the worst
forms of child labor. Article 3(a) specifically states that the
worst forms of child labor include “all forms of slavery or prac-
tices similar to slavery, such as . . . forced or compulsory
labour, including forced or compulsory recruitment of chil-
dren for use in armed conflict.” Convention 182 is also the
first international treaty to set 18 as the minimum age for mil-
itary participation.
Convention 182 precipitated the development of a body
of international norms and standards for protecting chil-
dren affected by armed conflict. As Secretary-General Kofi
Annan noted during a recent Security Council meeting on
children and armed conflict, on January 23, 2003, there is
growing evidence of an increased international commitment
to the protection of children and child soldiers. Secretary-Gen-
eral Annan emphasized the importance of two landmark
instruments — the Rome Statute of the International Crim-
inal Court (Rome Statute) and the Optional Protocol to the
Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement
of Children in Armed Conflicts — both of which entered into
force this past year and significantly strengthen existing pro-
tections for children in armed conflict. 
The Rome Statute defines the use of child soldiers under
15 as a war crime. Consistent with this definition, the Inter-
national Criminal Court has jurisdiction over the war crime
of conscripting or enlisting children under 15 into national
armed forces or armed groups and of using children as active
participants in hostilities. Additionally, the Rome Statute
contains an expansive definition of “participation in hostili-
ties.” The statute explains that “use of children in a direct sup-
port function such as acting as bearers to take supplies to the
front line, or activities at the front line itself, would be
included within the terminology.”
The Optional Protocol, which has been signed by over 100
countries and ratified by more than 40, presents perhaps
the most useful tool for combating the employment of chil-
dren in warfare. This landmark instrument represents uni-
versal opposition to the harmful impact of armed conflict on
children. The underlying Convention on the Rights of the
Child (Convention) generally defines a child as any person
under the age of 18, yet sets 15 as the minimum age for mil-
itary recruitment and participation in armed conflict. The
Optional Protocol amends the Convention by making 18
the minimum age for conscription. This change is significant
because it marks a shift in international opinion regarding the
age at which it is acceptable to conscript children. 
The first three articles concern direct participation in
hostilities, compulsory recruitment, and voluntary recruit-
ment, respectively. Article 1 stipulates that states parties “shall
take all feasible measures to ensure that members of their
armed forces who have not attained the age of 18 years do not
take a direct part in hostilities.” Article 2 requires states par-
ties to ensure that persons who are under 18 are not com-
pulsorily recruited into the armed forces. Article 3 has been
lauded as a particularly significant achievement. This provi-
sion that states parties raise the minimum age for the voluntary
recruitment of persons into their armed forces from that set
out in the Convention. The second paragraph of this article
authorizes states parties to determine the minimum age at
which it will permit voluntary recruitment into its armed
forces. Where a state party permits voluntary recruitment
under the age of 18, states must comply with the following
minimum safeguards as set forth in Article 3, paragraph
3(a): (1) recruitment must be genuinely voluntary; (2) recruit-
ment must be conducted with the informed consent of the
person’s parents or legal guardians; (3) recruits must be
fully informed of military duties; and (4) recruits must pro-
vide reliable proof of age prior to acceptance into national
military service. 
The fourth and fifth articles of the Optional Protocol per-
tain to non-state armed groups and establish a framework for
holding non-state armed groups accountable for child sol-
diering. Article 4 explicitly states that “armed groups that are
distinct from the armed forces of a State should not, under
any circumstances, recruit or use in hostilities persons under
the age of 18 years.” The Optional Protocol further provides
that application of its principles is not contingent on the exis-
tence of an armed conflict, rendering questions as to whether
a situation amounts to an armed conflict irrelevant. Perhaps
most importantly, the Optional Protocol requires all states par-
ties to endeavor to prevent the recruitment and use of chil-
dren under 18, rather than limiting this obligation to parties
involved in a particular conflict.
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The Optional Protocol also addresses post-conflict issues,
including demobilization of child soldiers. Article 6 provides
that persons “recruited or used in hostilities” are to be demo-
bilized and accorded “all appropriate assistance for their
physical and psychological recovery and their social reinte-
gration.” Notably, the language makes clear that children vol-
untarily or forcibly recruited into armed groups, as well as non-
state forces, are to be included in demobilization and
reintegration efforts.
Assessing the Optional Protocol  
During the Optional Protocol’s brief existence it has been
both lauded and criticized. As Casey Kelson, coordinator of
the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, recently
remarked, “This first anniversary of the Optional Protocol
should not be a celebration but a time to call upon other coun-
tries to join the international community in condemning
this appalling practice.” 
In an article entitled, “Children in Conflict: Assessing the
Optional Protocol,” Center for Defense Information senior
analyst Rachel Stohl articulated five strengths of the Optional
Protocol: (1) it establishes an international standard for the
employment of children in conflict; (2) it codifies a legal norm
by which states can be held accountable; (3) it sets a minimum
age requirement that makes it more difficult for govern-
ments and non-state actors to fabri-
cate the ages of children employed in
armed conflict; (4) it encourages
states to implement existing national
laws and policies or enact domestic
standards that will reflect the stan-
dards enunciated in the statute; and
(5) it raises public awareness regard-
ing the use of child soldiers.
The Optional Protocol is not, how-
ever, flawless. As Stohl concedes, “The
Optional Protocol is a compromise.”
In particular, its effectiveness suffers
from vagueness. For instance, Arti-
cle 1 stipulates that states “shall take all feasible measures to
ensure that members of their armed forces who have not
attained the age of 18 years do not take a direct part in hos-
tilities.” The deliberate vagueness of this provision enables
states to determine what constitutes “all feasible measures” and
define “direct part in hostilities.” By setting the standards by
which they are judged, states may easily escape the scrutiny
of the international community. The Optional Protocol also
breaks with standard international norms concerning pro-
tocols. Generally, a country is prohibited from becoming a
party to a protocol unless it ratifies the parent agreement. The
Optional Protocol permits states that have not ratified the Con-
vention, such as the United States, to ratify the Optional
Protocol, in turn undermining the spirit of the Convention.
Although much can be gained by allowing states to commit
themselves to the Optional Protocol even where such states
are unwilling to accept all of the terms of the Convention,
some argue this loophole effectively diminishes the signifi-
cance of the Convention. 
Further, the Optional Protocol is not comprehensive in its
approach to tackling the employment of young children in
armed conflict. For example, the Optional Protocol fails to
adequately address the issue of voluntary recruitment of chil-
dren under 18. Additionally, the Optional Protocol fails to
delineate a means for encouraging adherence on the part of
non-state groups. Non-state groups did not participate in
crafting the content of the statute, potentially rendering it dif-
ficult to persuade their adherence. Finally, there is a glaring
absence of monitoring, verification, and enforcement pro-
visions. The absence of such critical components inevitably
will hinder the Optional Protocol’s implementation.
The United States Congress has conducted its own pre-
liminary assessment of the Optional Protocol. The Congres-
sional Human Rights Caucus of the United States Senate
recently sponsored a briefing on child soldiers. The purpose
of the briefing was to highlight the continuing plight of chil-
dren in armed conflict and address implementation and
enforcement of the Optional Protocol. The briefing focused
on countries that have been submerged in conflict for years,
in some instances even decades, highlighting Burma, Cam-
bodia, and Uganda as the most egregious cases of the use of
child soldiers. As the various speakers at the briefing demon-
strated, the pervasive use of child soldiers continues unabated
in spite of the ratification of the Optional Protocol and
increasingly unified international opposition. 
The Role of the Optional Protocol in Protracted Conflicts:
Burma 
To assess the potential effectiveness of the Optional Pro-
tocol, it is useful to consider it in the context of protracted
conflicts, such as the internal conflict in Burma. Protracted
conflicts like Burma underscore the
shortcomings of the Optional Pro-
tocol. The State Peace and Devel-
opment Council (SPDC), Burma’s
military government, crushed pro-
democracy demonstrations in 1988.
Following this victory over democ-
racy, the military government imme-
diately directed energy toward build-
ing its armed forces, capitalizing on
the nation’s youth. In many
instances, young boys are forced to
choose between imprisonment and
military service. Some children even
voluntarily join opposition groups in hopes of avenging past
abuses by the Burmese army. 
With more than 70,000 boys serving in Tatmadaw Kyi,
the government’s army, Burma is estimated to have the
largest number of child soldiers in the world. Armed oppo-
sition groups in Burma also recruit child soldiers. The United
Wa State Army, the largest armed opposition group, utilizes
approximately 2,000 child soldiers. 
Burma’s use of child soldiers is characterized by excessive
brutalization. Should a child be brave enough to refuse enlist-
ment, that child likely is sent to a local army base or recruit-
ment camp and beaten into submission. Following recruit-
ment, Burmese child soldiers, some as young as 11, are
subject to beatings during training, forced to commit human
rights abuses against civilians, and prohibited from contact-
ing their families. Further, children face severe reprisals if they
attempt escape. 
A primary source of recruits is the Ye Nyunt system, or
“Brave Scouts.” Boys as young as seven engage in military
training at the Ye Nyunt camps and are later transferred to Su
Saun Yay recruit holding camps. All recruits entering the gov-
ernment army first endure brutalization and isolation in the
continued on next page
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Su Saun Yay camps. Young recruits performing training exer-
cises are routinely beaten, sometimes to the point of uncon-
sciousness. The brutalization continues at one of twenty for-
mal military training camps. As with initial recruitment, escape
is severely punished. The most common punishment entails
forcing the entire group of trainees, often numbering more
than two hundred, to line up and beat the escapee. The bru-
talization continues even after deployment as these Burmese
child soldiers are forced to carry out brutal acts. Although some
opposition groups have begun to respond to international pres-
sure by reducing the recruitment and deployment of child sol-
diers, the SPDC and the United Wa State Army continue to
ignore such pressure. In fact, the SPDC adamantly denies
that it has even recruited and deployed children. 
Burma’s use of child soldiers vio-
lates its domestic law as well as its
commitments under the Convention,
which Burma ratified in August 1991.
Notably, Burma has not ratified the
Optional Protocol. Even if Burma
were to ratify the Optional Protocol,
its effectiveness is dubious. Among
the flaws Rachel Stohl highlighted,
the Optional Protocol fails to ade-
quately address voluntary recruitment
of children 18 and under. Thus, the
Optional Protocol would be powerless with respect to the
scores of children that voluntarily join the Burmese govern-
ment army or non-state armed groups. Additionally, the
dearth of monitoring, verification, and implementation
provisions impedes the Optional Protocol’s potential effec-
tiveness, particularly in a situation such as that in Burma
where the key players consistently refute their utilization of
child soldiers.
The Role of the Optional Protocol in New Conflicts: Iraq
The Optional Protocol may potentially play a role in the pro-
tection of children before conflict emerges as illustrated by the
war in Iraq. International attention focuses almost exclusively
on Saddam Hussein’s development of weapons of mass destruc-
tion. With international scrutiny centered on the threat of
chemical and biological weapons, Saddam Hussein’s regime
deliberately recruits children into its armed forces with
impunity. With the onset of the war with Iraq, the international
community must address the ineluctable fact that war will
almost certainly entail combat with children. The Iran-Iraq War
and the Gulf War are instructive because reports suggest that
children fought among Iraqi forces during both conflicts. 
The Iraqi regime has been training children as young as
ten years old since the mid-1990s. Peter Singer, an analyst with
the Brookings Institution, recently reported that Baghdad is
home to nearly 8,000 child soldiers. As Singer explains, “A
common means for totalitarian regimes to maintain control
is to set their country on a constant war footing and milita-
rize society.” Recruiting and training children, and perhaps
most importantly, indoctrinating their impressionable minds
with extremist ideology, enables Saddam Hussein to consol-
idate his hold over the Iraqi people. These were the tactics
Nazi Germany employed to a frighteningly effective degree.
Comparing Iraqi child soldiers with Hitler Youth, Singer
noted that Iraqi child soldiers could similarly “operate with
unexpected and terrifying audacity.” 
National law and policies perpetuate the mobilization of
Iraq’s children. Article 1 of the Iraqi Constitution states that
“[t]he defence of the homeland is a sacred duty and honour
for citizens.” The 1969 Military Service Act sets the mini-
mum age for compulsory recruitment at eighteen. It is unclear
what the minimum age for voluntary recruitment is; sources
such as the Center for Defense Information indicate it may
be as young as fifteen. In fact, the Revolutionary Command
Council is authorized to determine whom it may conscript dur-
ing wartime.
Supplementing national law and policies that permit tra-
ditional recruiting and conscription, military training schools
and military youth organizations are predominantly respon-
sible for the mobilization of Iraq’s children. A host of mili-
tary training programs and youth organizations were launched
following the Gulf War. For instance, in 1998 the Iraqi gov-
ernment initiated a military-preparedness project designed
to equip all Iraqi citizens between
the ages of 15 and 65 with basic self-
defense and small arms training. The
government also developed military
training camps for children between
12 and 17. These military camps have
trained more than 23,000 children in
the usage of light arms and Ba’ath
ideology, which espouses pan-Ara-
bism, socialism, and resistance to for-
eign interference. Political scientists
have even likened Ba’ath ideology
to European fascism. Additionally, numerous military youth
groups are employed to train Iraq’s youth. The Ashbal Sad-
dam, or Saddam Lion Cubs, with members as young as ten,
is but one organization whose training includes the use of
small arms, hand-to-hand combat, and infantry tactics. The
U.S. State Department’s Human Rights Report on Iraq notes
that families who do not enroll their children in these pro-
grams face sanctions, such as the loss of their food ration cards.
Because sanctions are imposed for failure to enroll, enroll-
ment is not functionally voluntary. The report also noted that
the failure to register children in the Fedyayeen Saddam, or
Saddam’s Martyrs, generally results in the denial of school
examination results. The Fedyayeen Saddam reportedly is
comprised entirely of children, numbering between 18,000
and 40,000 troops. 
The near certainty that Saddam Hussein will deploy chil-
dren makes it incumbent upon the international community
to address the use of child soldiers. Presented with this dis-
turbing reality, the shortcomings of international instru-
ments such as the Optional Protocol are evident. Iraq has nei-
ther signed the instrument nor taken any steps toward
preventing the use of children in armed combat or limiting
their participation in military training programs. In fact, it is
conceivable that Iraq’s utilization of child soldiers will only
increase as the war unfolds. Yet as reported in the Independent,
among other sources, it appears the Pentagon has not explic-
itly prepared for facing child soldiers in combat. Given the
psychological trauma that accompanies military combat with
children, as well as the public relations debacle that inevitably
will ensue, it is shocking that American forces did not address
the issue before troops were deployed. Lacking such pre-
paredness, the United States will find itself in a precarious posi-
tion: the United States must condemn the use of child soldiers
as a violation of international law yet remain vigilant against
the threat they pose. 
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As war with Iraq demonstrates, the usefulness of the
Optional Protocol is undermined when rogue states are at
issue. Iraqi law and policies controvert the standards enu-
merated in the Optional Protocol and conflict with a devel-
oping international consensus opposed to the recruitment and
deployment of children under 18. Because Iraq is not oblig-
ated to abide by the Optional Protocol, a concerted campaign
of international pressure may, therefore, be the most effec-
tive tool for protecting Iraqi children.
Conclusion 
The development of international norms and standards
concerning the involvement of children in armed conflict is
significant. In particular, the widespread acceptance of the
Optional Protocol is cause for optimism. Precarious peace
processes, protracted conflicts, and the threat of new conflicts
nonetheless demand a vigilant and concerted commitment
from the international community. Such conflicts also illus-
trate the shortcomings of the Optional Protocol. Buttressed
by mechanisms for implementing, reporting, and monitor-
ing, as well as a more explicit declaration concerning voluntary
recruitment, the Optional Protocol could be employed more
effectively to protect children affected by armed conflict.
International condemnation of the use of child soldiers war-
rants a strengthened Optional Protocol with a capacity for
comprehensive protection of children from conflict. Yet
given the Optional Protocol’s limitations, ending the
deplorable practice of child soldiers requires a multi-faceted
approach. Such an approach should include application of
internal and international pressure, reduction of the risk of
child recruitment, implementation of demobilization and
rehabilitation programming, and prosecution of those who
recruit and deploy child soldiers. 
* Shara Abraham is a 2002 graduate of the Washington College
of Law and a staff attorney with the Prison Reform Advocacy Center.
** This article was drafted in anticipation of the war in Iraq and
does not take into account the recent events in the region.
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the Inter-American Court every year. It exemplifies the extent
to which human rights abuses occur in the Americas and
evidences the potential for the inter-American system to play
a definitive role in removing the shield of impunity for those
who plan and carry out such abuses. 
A decision in favor of Guatemala would set a precedent that
limits the extent to which the Inter-American Court can
exercise its jurisdiction to evaluate the efficacy of domestic
systems of justice in addressing violations of fundamental
human rights. 
Indeed, the convictions of one of the individuals suspected
of carrying out Myrna’s assassination and one of the three
accused of planning the crime were important triumphs in
Helen Mack’s endeavor to seek justice on her sister’s behalf.
In light of such achievements, the Court could choose to con-
strue strictly the requirement of exhausting domestic remedies
and refuse to find the state in violation of the Convention where
it had made progress in the pursuit of justice.
If the Inter-American Court decides the case in favor of the
petitioners, the decision would add force to the existing
jurisprudence that recognizes the Court’s jurisdiction over
cases pending in domestic fora when such domestic pro-
ceedings have been unreasonably delayed or ineffectively
prosecuted. Specifically, this decision would establish the
precedent that although prosecution and conviction of some
state actors responsible for planning or executing human
rights violations are important steps toward fulfilling a state’s
international legal duties, they are insufficient when others
who shared responsibility for such violations continue to
enjoy impunity. Finally, such a decision would underscore
states’ institutional responsibility for state actors who are
involved, at all levels, in planning or carrying out human rights
violations. 
*David Baluarte is a J.D. candidate at the Washington College
of Law and an articles editor for the Human Rights Brief. Erin
Chlopak is a J.D. candidate at the Washington College of Law. The
authors were part of a student group invited to participate in the hear-
ings by WCL Dean Claudio Grossman, former president of the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights and Commission delegate
to the Court for Myrna Mack v. Guatemala. This article represents
the opinions of the authors, and not necessarily those of the IACHR
or the OAS.
Myrna Mack, continued from page 14
20
On March 27, 2002, the United States Supreme Courtheld that undocumented immigrants improperly dis-charged by U.S. employers for union organizing activ-
ities are not entitled to back pay. The case, Hoffman Plastic Com-
pounds, Inc. v. NLRB (Hoffman), has generated widespread
concern—both domestically and internationally—among
workers and advocates who worry that Hoffman represents a
substantial reduction in labor rights for workers. Advocates
fear the decision creates a chilling effect on reports of
employer abuse by undocumented workers in the United
States and curbs freedom of association for all U.S. workers.
Beyond U.S. borders, the decision violates international
human rights norms; the United States, by denying employ-
ment protections to undocumented workers, discriminates
against them based on their immigration status.
Workers’ Rights within the Human Rights Framework
The right of workers to form a union is protected as an
aspect of the freedom of association contained in a number
of international human rights instruments. While contem-
porary slavery and abusive child labor are examples of severe
violations of the rights of workers that shock the conscience,
the human rights of workers are also threatened when employ-
ers seek to quash union-organizing activities through tactics
such as intimidating or discharging union supporters. The
United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights of
1948 (UDHR), in Article 23(1) and (4) respectively, pro-
claims that “everyone has the right to work,” and “everyone
has the right to form and to join trade unions for the pro-
tection of his interests.” Fifty years after the adoption of the
UDHR, the International Labor Organization (ILO) noted
the relationship between the protection of workers’ rights and
the full achievement of human potential in its Declaration of
Fundamental Rights and Principles at Work of 1998. To that
end, this Declaration set forth four core workers’ rights prin-
ciples, the first of which is freedom of association (the right
to organize and join trade unions) and the effective recog-
nition of the right to collective bargaining (the right of work-
ers to seek improvements in their working conditions as a
group rather than individually). Other principles of this Dec-
laration include the elimination of forced labor, child labor,
and employment discrimination.
The National Labor Relations Act
Administered by the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB), the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) regu-
lates the labor-management relationship for many employees
and companies in the United States and provides most pri-
vate sector employees the right to organize, bargain collec-
tively, and engage in peaceful strikes and picketing. The
NLRA also prohibits unfair labor practices, which may result
from either employer or employee action, such as employer
discrimination against employees for union organizing activ-
ities and employee secondary boycotts. One of the NLRB’s
main functions is to review allegations of unfair labor prac-
tices and institute remedial measures available under the
NLRA. These remedial measures include posting notices of
unfair labor practices at worksites, obtaining employer com-
mitments not to violate the NLRA in the future, reinstating
unlawfully discharged employees, and distributing back pay
to such employees. No private rights of action are permitted
under the NLRA, and no fines or other penalties are levied
against employers committing unfair labor practices.
Back pay, under the NLRA, is monetary compensation,
including interest, for the wages not earned by a worker
because of the employer’s unfair labor practice violation. In
most cases, reinstatement with back pay is the remedy for
employee complaints of being discharged for pro-union
activities. If the worker takes another job between the date of
the unlawful discharge and the NLRB’s decision, the earned
wages are deducted from the amount the violating employer
must pay. This limit to the back pay remedy illustrates that the
purpose of the NLRA is not to punish employers, but to
restore employees to their status before the unfair labor
practice occurred. The NLRB awards back pay to approxi-
mately 20,000 workers each year. 
Shortcomings of the NLRA
Critics of the NLRA remark on the inadequacy of the
remedial system. Many employers consider remedies like
back pay for workers to be routine business costs that are worth
the expense to suppress union activities. Orders to post writ-
ten notices of violations and “cease and desist” orders are like-
wise not taken seriously by employers, because they carry no
economic consequences. Furthermore, supervisors and man-
agers, independent contractors, employees of certain small
businesses, domestic service workers, agricultural workers, and
public-sector employees are exempt from protection under
the NLRA. Although other federal, state, or local statutes may
cover these workers, the U.S. government estimates that as
many as one-quarter of U.S. workers—32 million individuals—
lack collective bargaining rights under any federal or state
statute. 
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Hoffman may sig-
nificantly limit undocumented workers’ rights under an
already insufficient NLRA. The Court’s decision may also lead
to a reduction of undocumented workers’ rights under other
labor laws, through a broad application of Hoffman by the
courts or through a chilling effect directly caused by the
case. In a broader sense, the decision calls into question the
commitment of the United States to promoting freedom of
association and preventing employment discrimination. 
Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB 
In January 1992, the NLRB found that Hoffman Plastic
Compounds, Inc. illegally discharged several employees,
including an undocumented worker from Mexico, because
the employees were union supporters. In its decision, the
NLRB reasoned that the most effective way to further U.S.
immigration policies would be to provide the protections
and remedies of the NLRA to undocumented workers whose
employers commit unfair labor practices. 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Hoffman reversed the
NLRB, 5-4, reasoning that the NLRB decision undermined
federal statutes and policies outside the scope of the NLRA.
The Court found the NLRB’s prescribed remedy inconsistent
A Wink and a Nod: The Hoffman Case and Its Effects on
Freedom of Association for Undocumented Workers
by Jill Borak*
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with the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), which
prohibits employees from submitting fraudulent identification
documents to secure work and prohibits employers from
knowingly hiring undocumented workers. Although the
Court affirmed its earlier rulings in Sure-Tan v. NLRB and
other related cases, reaffirming that undocumented workers
are employees covered under the NLRA, the Court stated that
allowing undocumented workers to receive back pay would
encourage workers’ evasion of immigration authorities, con-
done prior violations of the immigration laws, and encourage
future violations. The Court disagreed with the NLRB’s con-
tention that by limiting the undocumented worker’s back pay
award to the time when the company became aware of his sta-
tus, the NLRB accommodated the IRCA. Instead, the Court
found that the NLRB’s position focused on employer mis-
conduct while discounting the misconduct of employees.
Moreover, the Court reasoned that the orders to “cease and
desist” and to post a notice to its employees were sufficient
sanctions against the company. 
The Dissent
The dissenting members of the Court maintained that
the back pay award would not undermine U.S. immigration
policy. Reports from all the relevant government agencies—
including the U.S. Department of Justice, the agency then
responsible for enforcement of the immigration laws—
supported this point. The minority disagreed that orders to
post notices and to cease and desist were sufficient sanctions
against employers. Back pay, the minority noted, serves not
only as compensation to employees, but also as a deterrent
to employers who commit unfair labor practices. With back
pay, employers lose money after violating the law; with notices,
however, employers lose nothing. 
As expressed in the dissenting opinion, the Court’s deci-
sion may encourage employers to hire workers that are poten-
tially undocumented “with a wink and a nod.” The dissent pre-
dicted Hoffman will create a preference among employers for
hiring undocumented workers, because employers may hire
undocumented workers confident that the workers will not
qualify for remedies under U.S. law. Indeed, undocumented
workers are often less likely to complain about unfair wages
and working conditions and to defend their rights due to their
immigration status and related fear of deportation. 
In a final irony, the Hoffman decision may secure an effect
opposite to that intended by the Court, making both labor and
immigration policy vulnerable. The employer preference for
undocumented workers will likely increase the number of
undocumented immigrants seeking to enter the United
States. Therefore, far from upholding U.S. immigration pol-
icy, as hoped by the majority, the Hoffman decision may actu-
ally undermine it.
Effects of the Hoffman Decision on the Rights of Workers
Issues immediately raised by the Hoffman decision include
the relevance of immigration status in cases where workers
allege their employers have committed labor violations, and
the applicability of the decision to other labor laws. Since the
Supreme Court’s decision is predicated on a worker’s immi-
gration status, employers have begun to argue that evidence
of workers’ undocumented status is relevant to their cases.
Advocates report a sharp rise in the number of cases where
employers request that courts order an inquiry into the immi-
gration status of the employees; most courts, however, have
refused to compel workers to disclose their immigration sta-
tus. Similarly, after the Hoffman decision, immigrants’ and
workers’ rights advocates reported an increase in employers
who argue that undocumented workers simply have no labor
rights. Some federal agencies, such as the Department of
Labor and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion, have attempted to limit Hoffman’s impact by stating that
the decision does not necessarily apply to laws other than the
NLRA. 
Action in International Forums in Response to the Hoffman
Decision
The impact of the Hoffman decision is not limited to the
rights of individual undocumented workers. The decision
also affects immigrant workers, and more broadly all U.S. work-
ers. Therefore, the Mexican government, the AFL-CIO, and
other groups have recently attempted to use international pres-
sure to limit Hoffman’s impact on workers’ rights.
Request for an Advisory Opinion from the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights
On May 10, 2002, in response to discriminatory laws and
precedents such as the Hoffman decision, the government of
Mexico submitted a request for an advisory opinion from the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights (Inter-American
Court). In the request, the Mexican government noted that
the protection of immigrant workers’ rights is a matter of par-
ticular interest because many Mexican nationals migrate out-
side of Mexico. They then become targets for exploitation
because of their vulnerability due to their immigration status.
Specifically, the Mexican government requested that the
Inter-American Court give its opinion as to whether a state may
limit workers’ rights based on immigration status, or if such
a practice violates the principles of non-discrimination and
equality before the law. The Mexican government observed
that undocumented workers are subject to hostile treatment
and are considered inferior in relation to others under the
laws of some states. In the government’s view, when any state
continued on next page
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authorizes different treatment of work-related rights solely on
the basis of the immigration status of a worker, such action
is discriminatory. 
The American Convention on Human Rights (American
Convention), Article 64(1), authorizes the Inter-American
Court to issue advisory opinions interpreting treaties con-
cerning the protection of human rights in the American
States. The purpose of an advisory opinion is not to compel
states to change their laws, but to determine the scope of the
obligations of members states of the Organization of Amer-
ican States (OAS) under international law. The opinion also
seeks to assist states in complying with and applying human
rights treaties without bringing a complaint against any state.
The government of Mexico asked the Inter-American Court
to consider concrete rather than theoretical situations in
which states may take actions that might limit the rights of
immigrant workers.
A concrete example of United States treatment of undoc-
umented workers was offered by a group of U.S. labor, civil
rights, and immigrants’ rights organizations that submitted
an amicus brief to the Inter-American Court in January 2003,
supporting the Mexican government’s request. The brief,
pointing to the Hoffman decision and relevant U.S. labor
laws, supports the position that the United States denies
basic protections to workers based on their immigration sta-
tus, and that U.S. labor laws violate international norms of
non-discrimination and freedom of association. The brief dis-
cusses provisions of several laws explicitly excluding undoc-
umented workers from the scope of their protection. For
example, temporary non-immigrant agricultural workers are
exempted from the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker
Protection Act, the primary U.S. labor law for the protection
of agricultural workers. Undocumented workers are excluded
from the Unfair Immigration-Related Employment Practices
Act, which protects workers against employment discrimi-
nation based on citizenship and national origin. These and
other laws, the groups argue, clearly demonstrate the dis-
criminatory nature of U.S. law concerning undocumented
workers. Such discrimination violates fundamental interna-
tional norms of non-discrimination. 
Although the organizations acknowledge that interna-
tional law recognizes the right of states to control the flow of
immigration across their borders, international law prohibits
many forms of discrimination against immigrants regardless
of their immigration status. Once an immigrant is present in
a country’s territory and secures employment, the organiza-
tions contend, the state is not free to deny the immigrant’s
fundamental workplace protections, even if the worker is
undocumented. In short, the organizations take the opposite
view of the U.S. Supreme Court’s reasoning in Hoffman that
immigration policy must prevail over protection of the rights
of workers. The organizations rely on provisions of the Amer-
ican Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (the Amer-
ican Declaration); the American Convention; the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); the
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights (ICESCR); the UDHR; and the ILO Convention Con-
cerning Discrimination in Employment. Each of these inter-
national instruments expressly prohibits discrimination on the
basis of national or social origin or other status.
The organizations also argue that U.S. law violates inter-
national norms by failing to protect undocumented workers’
freedom of association. They cite several instruments applic-
able to the United States that protect rights inherent in the
right to freedom of association, including the rights to orga-
nize a union, bargain collectively, and strike. The instru-
ments include the American Declaration, the American Con-
vention, the OAS Charter, the ICCPR, the ILO convention
on the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right
to Organize, and the ILO Convention regarding the Right to
Organize and Collective Bargaining. The ILO conventions do
not recognize any exception to the freedom of association.
The American Convention, ICCPR, and ICESCR recognize
only narrow exceptions to the freedom of association for
purposes of national security, public safety, health or morals,
the rights of others, and public order. The organizations
concede that the public order exception could be impli-
cated by the Hoffman decision, but argue that denial of free-
dom of association to workers is not a necessary or propor-
tional response to the goal of immigration control. 
Any advisory opinion issued by the Inter-American Court
will not legally bind the United States. The Inter-American
Court has no jurisdiction over the United States, but the orga-
nizations nonetheless hope that the request for an advisory
opinion provides an opportunity to clarify the obligations of
members of the inter-American system to protect undocu-
mented workers. The organizations note that undocumented
workers are uniquely vulnerable to human rights abuses, and
point to the need for strong regional standards for the pro-
tection of undocumented workers’ rights. 
Complaint to the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association
In November 2002, the AFL-CIO filed a complaint with the
ILO’s Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA), claim-
ing the Hoffman decision violates key international labor
conventions. The CFA receives complaints concerning vio-
lations of freedom of association directly from workers’ and
employers’ organizations. Although ILO conventions codify
the basic rights associated with the freedom of association, a
state need not have ratified the conventions for a complaint
to be filed. The authority for the examination of complaints
comes from the ILO Constitution, agreed to by all member
states of the ILO. Therefore, although the United States has
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not ratified key conventions such as the ILO Convention on
the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to
Organize, or the ILO Convention on the Right to Organize
and Collective Bargaining, complaints may still be heard
against the United States before the CFA. 
The AFL-CIO, a federation of 66 national and interna-
tional unions representing approximately 13 million workers
in the United States, alleged that the Hoffman decision violated
the ILO Convention on the Freedom of Association and Pro-
tection of the Right to Organize, by creating a distinction based
on immigration status. The complaint further maintained
that Hoffman violates the requirement of the ILO Convention
on the Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining for ade-
quate protection against acts of anti-union discrimination.
Finally, Hoffman is alleged to violate the ILO Declaration of
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work by denying the
freedom of association to undocumented workers. 
The complaint illustrates that the rights of all workers
are diminished by the Hoffman decision. Union organizers will
not be able to reassure undocumented workers that they
will be protected if fired for pro-union activities. Since most
undocumented workers are employed alongside documented
workers and U.S. citizens, the AFL-CIO predicts union orga-
nizational efforts will result in employee fear and division.
Such a climate will adversely affect all workers. 
The AFL-CIO’s complaint is not likely to result in a direct
change to the Hoffman decision. Although the United States
has accepted jurisdiction and review by the CFA of com-
plaints filed against it under these conventions, the ILO has
no enforcement powers. In past complaints before the ILO
the United States took no action to implement the organi-
zation’s recommendations. If the CFA makes an ultimate
finding that the United States has encountered problems in
guaranteeing freedom of association, the implementation of
such a decision will follow guidelines established for all ILO
member states: the CFA will simply ask the government to
report to it on the status of the problem. 
Conclusion
The General Accounting Office, the independent inves-
tigatory office of the U.S. Congress, recently concluded that
Hoffman goes beyond merely limiting undocumented work-
ers’ available remedies, to effectively diminish their collective
bargaining rights. Advocates have further argued that the deci-
sion promotes employment discrimination against immi-
grant workers and diminishes the freedom of association
enjoyed by all workers in the United States. Despite the reluc-
tance of federal agencies and many courts to expand Hoffman’s
reach beyond the NLRA, nothing exists to prevent a broad
application of the case or to remedy the decision of the U.S.
Supreme Court. Due to the anti-immigrant climate that cur-
rently prevails in the United States, it is unlikely that federal
legislators will propose legislation to assist undocumented
workers. The onus falls on advocates at state and local levels
to promote workers’ rights, and on international human
rights forums to continue to exert pressure on the U.S. gov-
ernment to balance its immigration policy with the rights of
workers. 
*Jill Borak is a J.D. candidate at the Washington College of
Law and a staff writer for the Human Rights Brief.
The Hoffman Case, continued from previous page
EIGHTH ANNUAL
INTER-AMERICAN
HUMAN RIGHTS
MOOT COURT
COMPETITION
MAY 18–23, 2003
• First moot court competition based on the 
Inter-American System
• Only competition conducted in Spanish,
English, and Portuguese
• Intensive day-long training seminar
The Inter-American Human Rights Moot Court
Competition is designed to enhance the development
of human rights law in the Americas. This trilingual com-
petition will provide students with an interactive expo-
sure to the institutions and legal instruments of the
Inter-American System, as well as the academics, experts,
government representatives, and NGOs that work within
this framework to strengthen democracy and the rule
of law in this hemisphere. International human rights
scholars and practitioners volunteer as judges to provide
students with current information on the practice of
international human rights law. 
We are searching for volunteer judges to help us
administer the competition. We need judges to score the
written memorials (or briefs) and judge the oral rounds
of the competition between May 18 and May 23 in Wash-
ington, D.C. Last year we had 70 judges join us. As the
competition continues to grow, so does our need for
more volunteer practitioners.  For more information on
volunteering, please contact Shazia N. Anwar, the com-
petition coordinator, at the Center for Human Rights
and Humanitarian Law.
For more information, please contact:
Shazia N. Anwar, Competition Coordinator
Inter-American Human Rights 
Moot Court Competition
American University 
Washington College of Law
Center for Human Rights & Humanitarian Law
4801 Massachusetts Ave., NW
Washington, D.C. 20016-8181
Phone: (202) 274-4180
Fax: (202) 274-0783
E-mail: humlaw@wcl.american.edu
Web site: www.wcl.american.edu/pub/
humright/mcourt
EI
GH
TH
IN
TE
R-
AM
ER
ICA
N HU
MAN RIGHTS MOOT COURT COM
PETITION
OCTAVO
CONCURSO INTERAMERICANO DE
DER
EC
HO
S
HU
M
AN
OS
OITAVO
CONCURSO INTERAMERICANO D
E DI
REI
TO
S H
UM
AN
OS
During 2002, as part of its ongoing efforts to move pastthe ravages of its brutal civil war, the new governmentof Sierra Leone issued a request for the assistance of an
international nongovernmental organization (NGO) to per-
form a “Documentation and Conflict Mapping Program.” It
was envisioned that this effort would help the local populace
develop a sense of ownership of, and partnership in, the gov-
ernment’s attempt to establish a just accountability for past
wrongs. The program would pursue two related objectives: pre-
senting basic information about the government’s account-
ability efforts, specifically regarding the Special Court for
Sierra Leone, and documenting the individual and collective
experiences of Sierra Leoneans to create a balanced, accurate
picture of the events of the civil war, specifically those occur-
rences that may constitute crimes within the jurisdiction of the
Special Court. 
This move by the Sierra Leonean government to seek
NGO participation in governmental functions is remarkable
in that it is indicative of a development in the manner in
which international organizations respond to societies torn by
conflict. One of the most important features of this develop-
ment is the possibility for cooperation, both among non-
governmental organizations and between the nongovern-
mental and intergovernmental communities. An evaluation of
the origins, benefits, and opportunities of “conflict mapping,”
including a mapping project recently undertaken in Kosovo,
is useful to assist the improvement of initial efforts already
undertaken in anticipation of future projects, such as in Sierra
Leone. 
A paradigm shift is underway with respect to international
responses to conflict. The international community has
renewed its interest in holding perpetrators of mass human
rights violations accountable for their actions. The 1990s saw
the establishment of two ad hoc international tribunals for the
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the deployment of interna-
tional judges and prosecutors in East Timor and Kosovo, and
now the development of the joint international-domestic Spe-
cial Court in Sierra Leone. The other side of the accountability
coin, the establishment of the “truth” of the past, which is often
undertaken through a truth commission, has seen growth as
well. From groundbreaking work during the 1980s in Latin
America, truth commissions have been established in South
Africa as well as in East Timor and now, in parallel with the
Special Court, in Sierra Leone. 
In the last decade, the international community has sought
accountability for human rights violations more aggressively
and has significantly reworked its efforts to redevelop societies
fractured by conflict. The international community, through
the United Nations, has responded to several recent conflicts
with expansions of peacekeeping responsibility. Intergov-
ernmental monitoring missions have likewise expanded, as evi-
denced by the European Community monitors in Bosnia,
the Kosovo Verification Mission of the Organization for Secu-
rity and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the United
Nations missions in Bosnia and Sierra Leone. To greater or
lesser extents, the territories of Bosnia, Kosovo, and East
Timor have also come under the jurisdiction of international
administrations. 
In short, in a multi-polar, post-cold war international envi-
ronment, governments and multilateral institutions are more
willing to intervene in or otherwise become part of the affairs
of states and regions. One result of this willingness to inter-
vene will likely be more missions in more post-conflict regions.
As many scholars have noted, the tasks, responsibilities, and
risks of doing so are enormous. With increasingly scarce
resources, the international community must develop more
strategic means of responding to violent conflict and its after-
math. The international community should adapt its responses
to such conflict to include among its available resources the
information, skills, and experience of NGOs. 
The effectiveness of the international community in post-
conflict prosecution and reconciliation depends in large part
upon its access to accurate, verifiable information regarding
the events that occurred. This information must be credible
and comprehensive, thereby allowing the international
community to target manpower and funds where they are most
needed. Without such information, it is difficult for the
international community to make these resource allocation
decisions.
As the international community becomes increasingly will-
ing to address conflicts more aggressively, the rapid response
capability of international and national NGOs is also expand-
ing. However, the ability of multilateral institutions to work
with, and incorporate the resources of, NGOs into the over-
all effort is relatively undeveloped. The need for improvement
in this area is especially pointed in the cases of accountabil-
ity and rule of law endeavors. NGOs have substantial experi-
ence promoting justice and human rights. If, as has hap-
pened in Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor, and now in Sierra
Leone, multilateral institutions and intervening governments
take the lead in accountability and rule of law development,
they must work harder to bring the innovation, experience,
and dexterity of NGOs into their efforts.
Conflict Mapping Revisited: From Political Science Analysis to
Practical Accountability Solutions
The Sierra Leonean government’s decision to request the
assistance of an NGO to undertake its conflict mapping exer-
cise is hopefully indicative of a developing understanding of
the expertise and efficiency the nongovernmental community
can provide to post-conflict societies. In publishing its request,
the government of Sierra Leone may have recognized that
there are some aspects of judicial and legal reform that gov-
ernments or intergovernmental organizations are not well
suited to perform. Nevertheless, the choice of the term “con-
flict mapping” is significant in that it is being used in an
accountability context, as opposed to its traditional applica-
tion in political science analysis. Sierra Leone has thereby taken
the first steps towards providing a foundation for joint inter-
national-national as well as intergovernmental-nongovern-
mental cooperative efforts to promote accountability and the
rule of law in Sierra Leone. 
The term “conflict mapping” may or may not have been
chosen deliberately by the members of the Sierra Leonean gov-
ernment’s task force that created the organizational outlines
of the Special Court. It is, however, gaining new currency in
an age that is seeing a new iteration of the melding of politics
and law. Originally, as the writings of political scientist Paul
Wehr indicate, the term was part of the lexicon of political
science; it was a methodology for studying conflict through
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separating the constituent parts of a conflict, such as the his-
torical background, parties, issues involved, and context within
which the conflict is occurring so as to better devise means of
resolving it. This sort of conflict mapping was largely an intel-
lectual exercise with practical benefits once serious efforts to
resolve the conflict had begun. Decisions about intervention
and mediation could be made on the basis of a well docu-
mented map. Such a map allows parties who may be too
invested in particular details of a conflict to understand a
larger process with which they may not be familiar. 
The original purpose behind the idea of a conflict map
echoes today in the accountability and development objectives
of the international community. Specifically, multilateral insti-
tutions now promote justice and reconciliation as mutually
reinforcing goals to help a society move past a conflict. The
United Nations has endeavored through the international
tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia to hold those
most responsible for atrocities during conflict accountable and
thereby give the populations of those regions a measure of jus-
tice. The underlying idea is that if the international commu-
nity holds these individuals responsible in an impartial man-
ner, there will be no need for retribution and the conflict cycle
can come to an end. Likewise, truth com-
missions serve a similar goal: assembling a
picture of the past, of what happened, and
publishing it for all to see and hear, creat-
ing a space for society to acknowledge what
occurred and thus contribute toward end-
ing the conflict. Both of these goals contain
the implicit assumption that a society that
benefits from such international account-
ability assistance will take the opportunity
to develop, re-invigorate, or strengthen its
domestic means of nonviolent conflict res-
olution through the rule of law. 
Accountability mechanisms must begin
their work with a sense of who did what to
whom and where. Whether performed by
a court or truth commission, the inquiry
that leads to accountability begins with the actions, orders, and
omissions of individuals and the resultant impact on those vic-
timized. Thus, a conflict map is crucial. In cases of mass
human rights violations during armed conflict, a conflict
map of the sort contemplated by Sierra Leone outlines the uni-
verse of events and provides a verifiable starting point for a soci-
ety overcoming impunity. This information is the founda-
tion of either bringing indictments or of concentrating scarce
investigative resources. The results of the mapping can be used
in the establishment of an accepted national history that
acknowledges the past, helping to enable and embolden the
public to call for a new way forward. Likewise, the same results
can aid the effort to bring perpetrators to justice by providing
evidence for courts and tribunals. It also provides a roadmap
to humanitarian assistance needs, a basis for targeting rec-
onciliation projects, a guideline for judicial reform, and a
platform for civil human rights education.
Recent examples of the need for this sort of mapping
information abound. In the course of investigating the Kosovo
conflict, it was accurately anticipated that the answer to why
Kosovar Albanians fled the province in 1999 would figure
prominently in subsequent efforts to hold individuals account-
able for crimes committed during this time. Likewise, in the
aftermath of the terrible events in Guatemala during the
1980s, the question of whether or not genocide had been com-
mitted against the country’s highland Indian population
became fundamental both to ending the conflict there as
well as to the success of the Guatemalan Historical Clarifica-
tion Commission. Sierra Leone now represents the next exam-
ple of this need. Its experimental combination of a domesti-
cally based judicial accountability mechanism, the Special
Court, and non-punitive investigative accountability mecha-
nism, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, is more
likely to be successful if provided with the information gen-
erated by conflict mapping. 
NGOs and Conflict Mapping
The conflict mapping project contemplated in Sierra
Leone and its antecedents provide important examples of the
possibilities that arise from cooperation between develop-
ment and human rights NGOs and between governments or
multilateral institutions and NGOs. Conflict mapping requires
close cooperation between these two important types of NGOs
that respond to conflict situations, and between the NGO
community and international multilateral institutions. The
NGOs responding to conflict situations generally include a few
having a human rights focus and many having a develop-
ment mandate. Human rights organizations, such as Human
Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and Federation des
Droits de l’Homme, are often first on the ground in regions
likely to experience or already experienc-
ing conflict, gathering information for
their narrative reports. These human rights
organizations are also at the forefront of
ensuring that human rights principles and
standards develop in response to the
inevitable capacity of individuals and gov-
ernments to create original means of
repression. From the genesis of United
Nations human rights treaties through the
current day, human rights organizations
have provided crucial impetus and infor-
mation to support the development of the
international law of human rights. Along
the way, they have developed substantial
skill in advocacy, education, fact-finding,
and information dissemination. 
Development organizations are also active in human rights
work, particularly in building local capacity and encouraging
societal change toward a culture of human rights, such as
through the promotion of the rule of law. In post-conflict envi-
ronments, development and human rights NGOs find com-
mon ground. Indeed, both types of NGOs have collaborated
to assist accountability efforts of the international community.
NGOs have provided the International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) with significant documen-
tary, statistical, and testimonial evidence. They have also
worked closely with the ICTY’s Outreach Programme to
increase awareness of the ICTY, its mission, accomplishments,
and limitations. Truth commissions have benefited as well.
NGO assistance to the Guatemalan Historical Clarification
Commission and to the South African Truth and Reconcilia-
tion Commission was central to those organizations’ very exis-
tence as well as to their efforts to interview deponents about
human rights violations, manage the volumes of data col-
lected, and accurately report them. Indeed, without the assis-
tance of NGOs, these particular bodies would have been sig-
nificantly less successful. 
Conflict mapping is fundamentally different from human
rights reporting. Narrative human rights reporting—that most
common to “first reporter” human rights organizations—
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usually involves portraying a situation through a few particular
instances of grievous human rights violations. The reporting
organization thereby calls the attention of its targeted audience
to the likelihood that others are suffering similar wrongs, some-
one is at fault, and something can be done by the audience. This
is the basic premise of human rights reporting: highlight a
larger problem with a few significant examples, and suggest a
course of action to ameliorate the problem and prevent its
recurrence. The power of these reports lies in the implications
of the shocking nature of what they report. While valuable, such
narrative reports have a fundamental drawback: they can give
concrete information about few events and individuals. 
Creating a conflict map involves data collection and report-
ing on a larger and different scale
from more common forms of
human rights reporting. It
includes a quantitative analysis that
can identify trends and patterns of
abuses not readily apparent from
narrative reporting. This aspect of
conflict mapping enables it to help
verify the extent and distribution
of alleged atrocities. It is a more
comprehensive representation of
the conflict—the forest, not the
individually impressive trees. As
Dr. Patrick Ball of the American
Association for the Advancement
of Science (AAAS) has illustrated, this relatively new manner
of human rights reporting utilizes established statistical method-
ologies to help answer the important questions of what hap-
pened to whom and who did what when. The answers to these
simplistically stated but complex questions have evidentiary
value not only in the crucible of courtroom proceedings, but
also in the more reconciliation-oriented efforts of truth and rec-
onciliation commissions. Whether the goal is retributive justice
or the promotion of a kind of national healing, the starting
point is nearly always “what can we say for sure?” Obviously, con-
flict mapping will not and should not displace mainstream
human rights reporting; rather, they should complement each
other. In a more interventionist world, international actors will
benefit from the collection and presentation of large amounts
of data from a variety of sources. Human rights and develop-
ment organizations should find new opportunities for collab-
oration therein. 
Providing Important Evidence for Accountability Mechanisms: 
The Conflict Mapping Project in Kosovo
Perhaps one of the most recent and comprehensive exam-
ples of this collaboration is the conflict mapping exercise
recently undertaken in Kosovo by the American Bar Associa-
tion Central European and Eurasian Law Initiative
(ABA/CEELI), AAAS, and their partners. Immediately fol-
lowing the cessation of hostilities of the Kosovo conflict, many
organizations moved into Kosovo to report on events that
occurred there. These organizations, which included human
rights organizations as well as more development-focused
organizations, collected interviews and other information
regarding the terrible events that occurred during the conflict.
Ultimately, most published their findings in narrative reports. 
After the publication of their individual reports, a number
of these human rights organizations agreed to pool their data
with that collected by development organizations to form the
foundation for creating a statistical analysis of the conflict. What
emerged was a powerful form of conflict mapping that brought
together in a comprehensive format information about the
events of the conflict: the migration of Kosovar Albanians
from Kosovo; killings committed around the province; and the
NATO bombing campaign. These events were analyzed as they
occurred geographically as well as over time, thereby forming
a picture of how these complicated events interacted with
each other during the conflict. In a subsequent report, the orig-
inal foundation of data was expanded with the addition of
information gathered by the OSCE and the ICTY.
The resultant conflict map had significant evidentiary
value. The report, like any high-quality scientific study, ana-
lyzed the data in an effort to determine whether it supported
or contradicted hypotheses regarding whether the exodus
of Kosovar Albanians from Kosovo was related to the actions
of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), the bombing cam-
paign conducted by the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO), or the actions of
Yugoslav forces. These hypotheses
dealt with the most prominent
political and legal issues impli-
cated by the Kosovo conflict,
which in turn made the answers
to these hypotheses fundamen-
tal to the work of the ICTY. 
ABA/CEELI and AAAS found
that killings and refugee flow
occurred in a regular pattern
characterized by three phases. In
each phase, a high volume of
killing and refugee flow was followed by a much lower level
of killing and refugee flow. Moreover, killings and refugee flow
tended to occur at the same times and places. Using common
statistical methodologies, the authors were able to demonstrate
a supportable estimate of 10,356 Kosovar Albanians killed
during the conflict. The authors were able to state that the data
was inconsistent with the hypotheses that KLA activity or
NATO air strikes were causes of the refugee exodus from
Kosovo, but was consistent with the assertion that the activi-
ties of Serb forces caused the refugee flow. The information
was eventually presented as expert evidence in the trial at the
ICTY of former Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic. 
As the international community responds to future internal
and international conflicts with peacekeeping missions, tran-
sitional administrations, and accountability mechanisms, hav-
ing an understanding of the important political and legal issues
means understanding where and when who did what to whom. 
Building Local Capacity
In addition to the evidentiary value of conflict mapping, by
its very nature, it can have an important capacity building
impact on the local community. Capacity building is an orga-
nizational goal human rights and development NGOs share,
though it is perhaps more fundamental to the work of the lat-
ter. It is also a goal NGOs are uniquely qualified to meet and
intergovernmental institutions are relatively unprepared to
pursue. Analysis of the progress of the intergovernmental
institutional efforts in Bosnia, East Timor, and Kosovo suggest
strongly that, by comparison, NGOs are making steadier
advances in capacity development. Through close work and
cooperation with local institutions and organizations, inter-
national development and human rights NGOs ultimately
seek to leave an organizational legacy. They work to promote
the development of indigenous institutions that can carry on
the work begun together. 
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Again, the Kosovo conflict mapping project provides a
useful starting point. First, it is important to note that the pro-
ject was founded in nongovernmental organization coopera-
tion. Human rights and development NGOs pooled their
data and were able to achieve an effect that they likely could
not have achieved individually. In addition, these NGOs all
worked with local organizations. For example, ABA/CEELI
helped develop and improve the operational capacity of three
local partners while working alongside them to gather data.
Its first interviews were conducted with Kosovar refugees in
Albania with the Albanian umbrella NGO, The Center for
Peace Through Justice (The Center). Later, ABA/CEELI
worked closely in Kosovo with the Albanian human rights
NGO, Council for the Defense of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms and with the Croatian NGO, Partnership for
Social Development. 
Each of these cooperative projects involved crucial assistance
to these regional NGOs. Interviewing projects involved train-
ing the regional NGO personnel in international law, project
design and implementation, and financial management. In
addition, the regional NGOs were able to work with their
international counterparts to create a “foundation”—such as
technology, publications, and a track record of experience—
that will be important for their future development. For exam-
ple, to support the work of the ICTY Outreach Programme,
ABA/CEELI and The Center created a short brochure out-
lining the basic principles of international humanitarian law.
The Center continues to use the brochure today, long after
the conflict mapping project has ended. 
Capacity Building through Technology Innovation and 
Transfer
Ultimately, the basic mission of any international effort in
a post-conflict society is to establish the conditions necessary
for withdrawal of the international personnel, which requires
capacity building among local personnel. While transfer of
experience and training is important, it is equally vital to
equip local NGOs with the modern tools employed by inter-
national organizations and the expertise to use them. Account-
ability mechanisms, especially those established with inter-
national assistance, will utilize modern methodologies and
tools. Providing a local organization with training in financial
project management and a few computers is a useful endeavor,
but teaching its personnel to use sophisticated database or Web
publishing technology as part of their operations enables
these organizations to work effectively after the internation-
als have departed. The former is the initial development step
of providing basic tools for operations, while the latter is a step
toward promoting the local organization’s fundamental
independence.
By way of example, consider database technology. Modern
database technology, when applied with the correct protocols,
can be utilized to identify trends in the often chaotic settings
in which war crimes and incidents of human rights violations
occur. Therefore, modern database technology is a basic
requirement for indigenous nongovernmental actors and
organizations to continue the work begun by and with inter-
national NGOs to document the events of the conflict. Initially,
in their project in Kosovo, ABA/CEELI and AAAS trained their
local partner organizations in the basic skills necessary to
accomplish the project: interviewing skills, project manage-
ment, and financial record keeping. These are important
skills for any nascent organization; however, AAAS has since
taken this effort one step further in other post-conflict soci-
eties. In Sri Lanka, AAAS is working with a coalition of NGOs,
providing technical assistance to establish a local capacity for
sophisticated data collection and analysis. As part of this
effort, AAAS is using and will leave with this local NGO coali-
tion database technology developed by AAAS and ABA/CEELI
during their Kosovo project. As a result of this technology trans-
fer, the Sri Lankan groups will have the human rights infor-
mation management techniques and technology to contribute
to their peace process through the eventual establishment of
a “massive, objective and undeniable statistical record of
human rights violations” in Sri Lanka. 
Conclusion
As international involvement in conflict mitigation has
increased, the nature of the information required and
demanded by the international community has also expanded
and changed. A growing need now exists for comprehensive
quantitative studies to complement more traditional narrative
human rights reporting. The manner in which such conflict
mapping is undertaken should serve not only to express the
conflict and its major trends and effects in quantitative and sta-
tistical terms, but also to transfer important skills and tech-
nology. The very process of the study should include a con-
certed training and transfer effort to empower local NGOs in
communities affected by the conflict. 
The growing interventionist tendencies of the interna-
tional community and its concomitant emphasis on account-
ability require a focus on both documenting mass human
rights abuses and building local capacity for seeking account-
ability. This focus must engage the efforts of human rights and
development NGOs. The success of, and lessons to be learned
from, projects like the CEELI/AAAS project in Kosovo suggest
that closer cooperation between multilateral institutions and
NGOs is crucial. Prospective projects, such as the one in
Sierra Leone, also demonstrate the need for this cooperation
if multilateral institutions and NGOs are to effectively assist con-
flict mitigation efforts.
That a sea of change in international relations and the appli-
cation of international human rights principles is upon us is
no longer the subject of debate. Rather, the challenge now fac-
ing governments, multilateral institutions, foundations, and
nongovernmental organizations around the world is one of col-
laboration and innovation. Intergovernmental and non-
governmental organizations must begin to explore new means
of collaborating, even if doing so means opening previously
closed bureaucracies. The decision of the Sierra Leonean
government provides both an example and opportunity to
begin this exploration. Within the nongovernmental com-
munity, organizations and individuals must pursue techno-
logical solutions and other original ideas and mechanisms as
a means of making this type of collaboration more efficient
and effective. International actors should share their experi-
ences and innovations widely and promote the creative use of
their advances in support of international accountability
mechanisms and the rule of law generally. Parochialism in
human rights reporting and development dilutes scarce
resources in the field and undermines shared goals. 
* Wendy S. Betts is the coordinator of Conflict Mitigation Programs
for ABA/CEELI and co-directs its War Crimes Documentation Pro-
ject. Gregory Gisvold directs ABA/CEELI’s Kosovo programs and is
the co-director of its War Crimes Documentation Project.
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On February 26, 2003, the government of the HongKong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR orHong Kong) of the People’s Republic of China for-
mally introduced a preliminary draft of a controversial new
national security bill to Hong Kong’s legislature. Opponents
of the proposed legislation, including pro-democracy camps
within the Legislative Council, Hong Kong’s legislative body,
as well as local civil and human rights groups, fear that China
could use the new laws to suppress certain fundamental
rights and freedoms. Despite efforts to curtail dilution of
the national security measures proposed in the original draft,
following a three-month public consultation period and a
series of domestic and international protests, the bill still
poses a serious threat to civil liberties in the HKSAR. 
Background
The HKSAR, located on the southeastern coast of China,
consists of Hong Kong Island, the Kowloon Peninsula, and
the New Territories. The area constituting Hong Kong proper
consists of 236 islands and part of the Chinese mainland. On
July 1, 1997, China reclaimed Hong Kong, a territory that its
last feudal regime, the Qing Dynesty, ceded to Great Britain
at the end of the Opium War in the mid-1800s. The conver-
gence of two nations with a similar ethnic makeup but radi-
cally different political and economic systems has been the
subject of consistent international scrutiny. 
The 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration on the Future of
Hong Kong (Joint Declaration) insured that Hong Kong’s
1997 reversion to Chinese control after 155 years of British
colonial rule would not undermine its success as a major
trading, manufacturing, and industrial partner. The Joint
Declaration provides that Hong Kong will retain, for 50 years,
the same legal and economic systems, rights and freedoms,
and basic way of life that existed therein before the han-
dover of sovereignty. The treaty binds China to allow the peo-
ple of Hong Kong a high degree of autonomy—except in mat-
ters of defense and foreign affairs—under the twin dicta of
“One Country, Two Systems,” China’s policy, stemming from
former president Deng XiaoPing’s approach to the reincor-
poration of the Hong Kong lands and governmental system
under the umbrella of the People’s Republic of China, with
the goal of maintaining the status quo in this region. 
In 1990, China’s legislature, the National People’s Con-
gress, approved the Basic Law of the HKSAR, which entered
into force with the 1997 change of sovereignty. It serves as
Hong Kong’s “mini constitution,” ensuring the implemen-
tation of the basic policies contained in the Joint Declaration.
Subject only to China’s constitution, the Basic Law is the
supreme law of Hong Kong and functions as the territory’s
principal constitutional instrument. The Basic Law protects
individual rights and freedoms in two limited ways: (1) it
lists specific rights enjoyed by Hong Kong citizens; and (2)
it expressly incorporates the provisions of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the Inter-
national Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR), and international labor conventions. Article 39 of
the Basic Law provides this safeguard: “The rights and free-
doms enjoyed by Hong Kong residents shall not be restricted
unless as prescribed by law” of the HKSAR. 
The Chinese Government’s Introduction of Article 23 into the
Basic Law
After a million Hong Kong people demonstrated locally
in support of the pro-democracy movement at Beijing’s
Tiananmen Square in June 1989, China added Article 23 to
Hong Kong’s Basic Law. Article 23 requires that the HKSAR
“enact laws on its own to prohibit any act of treason, secession,
sedition, and subversion against the Central People’s Gov-
ernment,” addressing issues of state secrets and the activities
of foreign political organizations in Hong Kong. Rather than
directly prohibiting treason, sedition, and subversion, or pre-
cisely defining these crimes, Article 23 mandates that the
HKSAR enact laws to define and penalize such actions.
Although acts constituting the crimes delineated in Article 23
have not been an issue in the HKSAR to date, the Hong
Kong government is nevertheless required to implement
laws to address these crimes under Article 23.
The Chinese government seems to have introduced
Article 23, at least in part, to avoid future anti-Chinese
demonstrations by the people of Hong Kong. Although the
original 1988 draft of Article 23 merely requested that Hong
Kong enact laws by February 1989 against “any act designed
to undermine national unity or subvert the Central People’s
Government,” the draft of Article 23 had evolved to include
both concepts familiar to Hong Kong’s common law system
and the constitutional requirement to implement national
security legislation— laws that “prohibit any act of treason,
The Threat of Article 23 to Civil Liberties in the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region
by Inbal Sansani*
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secession, sedition, or theft of state secrets.” The final draft
of Article 23, published in April 1990, nontheless, stipulates
that the HKSAR “enact laws on its own to prohibit any act of
treason, secession, sedition, and subversion against the Cen-
tral People’s Government, or theft of state secrets, to prohibit
foreign political organizations or bodies from conducting
political activities in the Region, and to prohibit political
organizations or bodies of the Region from establishing ties
with foreign political organizations or bodies.”
Due to China’s generally dismal human rights record,
specifically the June 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre and the
subsequent promulgation of Article 23, the Hong Kong gov-
ernment enacted the Bill of Rights Ordinance in 1991. The
Bill of Rights compensates for inadequacies in the Basic Law’s
enumeration of individual rights by providing many addi-
tional rights and freedoms for Hong Kong residents. The
Bill of Rights reiterates almost verbatim the provisions of the
ICCPR, thereby making those enumerated rights directly
applicable to the citizens of Hong
Kong. The Bill of Rights combines with
the Joint Declaration and the Basic
Law to ensure that the provisions of
the ICCPR remain in force after the
1997 handover and are implemented
through Hong Kong domestic law. 
The HKSAR’s Proposals regarding
the Implementation of Article 23
On September 24, 2002, the gov-
ernment of the HKSAR published the
Consultation Document on Proposals to Implement Article
23 of the Basic Law (Consultation Document). Although
having the actual power to implement Article 23 is an impor-
tant aspect of the HKSAR’s autonomy, concern over the
necessity to implement Article 23 has plagued Hong Kong
since the Basic Law came into effect in July 1997 with the end
of British colonial rule. A three-month consultation period
with local NGOs and the general public followed the Con-
sultation Document’s introduction, after which the Hong
Kong government explained in a press release that it had care-
fully considered each submission. Secretary for Security
Regina Ip Lau Suk-Yee said that the submissions were classi-
fied into four categories, including: (1) submissions from orga-
nizations; (2) submissions from individuals; (3) submissions
in the form of standard letters and pre-printed opinion
forms; and (4) signature forms. 
Together with the subsequent legislative work, most notably
the introduction of draft bills to the Legislative Council
scheduled to occur between January and July 2003, the imple-
mentation of Article 23 represents one of the most important
constitutional developments in the HKSAR since its estab-
lishment more than five years ago. Indeed, the implemen-
tation of Article 23 is a major test of whether the concept of
“One Country, Two Systems” enshrined in the Basic Law can
be executed in a way that strikes a proper balance between
Beijing’s directives and the status of civil liberties enjoyed by
the population of the HKSAR. 
Criticisms of the HKSAR’s Proposals to Implement Article 23
Although for five years the government of the HKSAR
avoided the inevitable controversy that would surround the
introduction of legislation implementing Article 23, increas-
ing pressure from Beijing and the HKSAR’s legal obligation
to implement legislation caused the government to move
forward with the Consultation Document. Critics of the gov-
ernment’s approach to implementing Article 23 legislation
claim that the consultation exercise is incomplete in that
the Consultation Document outlines the government’s broad
policy and intentions in a lengthy document to which specific
responses are difficult to formulate. Opponents criticize the
glaring ambiguities in the Consultation Document and argue
that in the context of treason, secession, sedition, subversion,
theft of state secrets, and increased police powers, the small-
est errors in legal drafting or in the legal definitions provided
by the new laws can easily have draconian consequences. 
The government explains that implementing Article 23
would not compromise either the region’s liberal features or
laissez-faire economy. It argues that since Britain, Canada, and
the United States have legislation similar to Article 23, then
Hong Kong, as a part of China, should also have it. Opponents
to the implementation of a broad Article 23 argue that the
aforementioned countries balance comparable legislation
with democratic attributes including, inter alia, regular elec-
tions, a vibrant civil society, and a
powerful, free press, each of which
Hong Kong lacks. In theory, therefore,
any arbitrary application of anti-
sedition or subversion laws in those
countries would be subject to plausible
counter-pressures by one or all of the
available democratic elements. Addi-
tionally, the Hong Kong chapter of
Amnesty International posits the inclu-
sion of sedition as an example of the
excessive proposals to implement Arti-
cle 23. The organization claims that according to current legal
thought, sedition laws are archaic and unprincipled and are
no longer used in the majority of countries that have retained
sedition laws. 
The Scope of the Original Proposals to Implement Article 23
Although the government of the HKSAR is obligated to
implement Article 23, domestic and international human
and civil rights organizations are concerned with the scope
of the provisions as outlined in the Consultation Document.
The Consultation Document stemmed from existing Hong
Kong law as set out in the Crimes Ordinance (covering, inter
alia, treason and sedition), the Societies Ordinance (address-
ing activities of foreign political bodies in Hong Kong), the
Emergency Regulations Ordinance, and the Official Secrets
Ordinance. The Consultation Document included chapters
on treason, secession, sedition, subversion, theft of state
secrets, foreign political organizations, investigation powers,
and procedural matters. Although Article 23 recognized that
“the manner in which the state’s sovereignty and security are
protected in the Mainland and in the HKSAR may legiti-
mately differ,” the breadth and ambiguity of the proposals
drew significant international attention.
Another far-reaching example of the proposals to imple-
ment Article 23 can be found in the Hong Kong govern-
ment’s addition of a new mechanism for banning any orga-
nization “affiliated with a Mainland organization which has
been proscribed in the Mainland by the Central Authori-
ties, in accordance with national law on the ground that it
endangers national security.” The Hong Kong Human Rights
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Monitor (HKHRM) labeled this proposal “sinister,” because
Article 23 does not reference links between organizations in
the HKSAR and mainland organizations. The HKHRM was
suspicious of the Hong Kong government’s inclusion of a
proposed restriction that the promulgation of Article 23
does not require.
A proposal to ban organizations on security grounds based
on a link with the Chinese mainland had the potential to per-
mit the Chinese government to ban any organization of
which Beijing disapproves. In addition, any branch of an
organization banned by China for state security reasons could
be banned in the HKSAR at any time, and the Hong Kong gov-
ernment was not even required to conduct any independent
investigation. This provision would have effectively made the
laws of the Chinese mainland applicable in the HKSAR.
According to the February 2003 draft law, any group of two
or more persons, regardless of location, will be considered a
“Mainland organization” if the group was formed or established
on the Mainland or its main place of business is in the main-
land. Further, a Hong Kong group is considered “subordinate”
to a “Mainland organization” if any of its policies are deter-
mined, directly or indirectly, by the “Mainland organization.” 
A main complaint of Hong Kong NGOs is that many of the
offenses outlined in the Consultation Document are ade-
quately covered by existing legislation, since Hong Kong’s cur-
rent laws already contain considerable regulations on the
seven crimes prohibited in Article 23. Therefore, most mem-
bers of Hong Kong’s legal and administrative communities
maintain that another anti-subversion law is unnecessary.
The Hong Kong government insists on passing the law, how-
ever, although the suggested definitions of the crimes are
ambiguous and could potentially create avenues for abuse.
Another major criticism of the HKSAR’s proposals is that
the concepts of government and country are confused and
used interchangeably in the proposed document. In a demo-
cratic country, citizens are empowered to monitor and check
the government, whereas the proposed enactment of Article
23 equates opposing the government with opposing the
country. In addition, speech deemed provocative may be
regarded as illegal in oral, written, and electronic forms.
People who express or hear such speech and fail to report it
would be regarded as complicit in the crime. Finally, the
law extends to Hong Kong permanent residents, regardless
of their current residence, as well as to people who are in the
HKSAR, regardless of their nationality, including people
who visit or transit through Hong Kong. The possible effects
of Article 23 are chilling in that its violation may result in as
much as a life term in prison.
Under the Article 23 legislative proposals, police powers
would also be expanded, enabling officers to enter and
search residential buildings, confiscate materials, and make
arrests at any time without a search warrant. Such practices
would not differ from the random searches practiced in
Mainland China. The human and civil rights community is
outraged by these proposals in part because, rather than
modernizing existing legislation, the Hong Kong govern-
ment has created new offenses such as sedition. In addition,
the implementation proposals have increased penalties for
offenses included in existing legislation, including greatly
increased prison sentences and unlimited fines.
The Legal Bases for Criticizing Proposals to Implement 
Article 23
Condemnations of the proposals for the implementation
of Article 23 are based on a few key instruments, most notably
the Joint Declaration and the ICCPR. For example, Article
3(5) of the Joint Declaration provides that HKSAR law ensures
rights and freedoms including, inter alia, those of the person,
speech, press, and association. A fundamental critique of
Article 23, therefore, is that its provisions are in breach of the
Joint Declaration because they apply legal concepts from
mainland China that are incompatible with the rights and free-
doms Hong Kong guarantees in Article 3(5). 
These provisions also violate Article 39 of the Basic Law
which stipulates that restrictions placed on the rights and free-
doms enjoyed by Hong Kong residents must not contravene
the ICCPR, the ICESCR, and international labor conven-
tions as applied to Hong Kong. Article 23 also requires that
the HKSAR prohibit, among other matters, “subversion
against the Central People’s Government.” Such a prohibi-
tion, however, would be contrary to ICCPR articles relating
to freedom of expression (Article 19) and association (Arti-
cle 21). Further, prohibition against subversion would con-
travene Article XIII of Annex 1 to the Joint Declaration,
which states that the HKSAR will protect the rights and free-
doms of inhabitants and other persons within the region, and
that the ICCPR and the ICESCR shall remain in force. Finally,
the proposals also run counter to the spirit of safeguarding
fundamental rights and freedoms as upheld in Hong Kong’s
Bill of Rights.
The HKSAR Government’s “Concessions” and 
“Clarifications”
Although the Hong Kong authorities do not admit that
some of the provisions first found in the Consultation Doc-
ument have been diluted,this has occurred as a result of
public pressure. On January 28, 2003, approximately one
month after the end of the three-month consultation period,
HKSAR Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa discussed the out-
come of the consultation exercise and assured the public that
after an extensive analysis and examination of the views
expressed during the period the Executive Council, Hong
Kong’s cabinet, had clarified certain legislative proposals
and delineated clear directions for the drafting work to
begin. The government plans to pass the legislation by July
2003. Despite Tung’s confidence that the rights and freedoms
of Hong Kong’s people will remain fully protected after the
enactment of laws promulgating Article 23, widespread reser-
vations continue to haunt a broad spectrum of organizations
in the HKSAR. In response to opinions expressed during the
consultation period, the government has decided to exempt
foreign nationals from prosecution for treason, for example,
and has also abolished the offense of seditious publication.
In an attempt to safeguard freedom of the press and the
free flow of information, the government has also limited the
definition of “unauthorized access” to protected informa-
tion, restricting it to access through criminal means such as
hacking, theft, or bribery. In a January 28, 2003 press release
outlining changes to the Consultation Document, Secretary
for Security Ip said that more precise definitions and clearer
concepts have been included in the implementation pro-
posals. For example, the government restricted the definition
of the crime of “levying war” under the offense of treason from
“a riot or insurrection involving a considerable number of peo-
ple for some general public purpose” to actual war or armed
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conflict. Further, the government abolished the offense of mis-
prision of treason, committed when a person knows that
another person has committed treason but fails to disclose this
information to the proper authority within a reasonable
amount of time. In its list of concessions, the government also
provided a clearer definition of a new class of protected
information originally entitled “relations between the Cen-
tral Authorities . . . and the HKSAR.” The new definition is
confined to information on matters concerning the HKSAR
that are within the responsibility of the Beijing Central
Authorities under the Basic Law. Moreover, disclosure of
such information would constitute an offense only if it is
damaging to the interests of national security. Although the
Article 23 clarifications released in late January were wel-
comed in Hong Kong business circles, pro-democracy legis-
lators and human rights activists dismissed the changes as min-
imal and maintained that the proposed law, despite its
changes, would ultimately violate the “One Country, Two
Systems” principle upon which the 1997 handover of sover-
eignty was based by outlawing local groups linked to organi-
zations banned in mainland China. Law Yu Kai, director of
HKHRM, criticized the concessions as minor, citing the pro-
posals as still insisting on the protection of national interest
“as a pretext to protect one-party rule in China.” 
Introduction of the Draft Bill to Hong Kong’s Legislative
Council
Although a blue paper containing the draft legislation was
issued to Hong Kong’s legislature on February 26, 2003, this
process excluded members of the public from voicing their
concerns. Prior to the bill’s introduction, leading democratic
politicians, lawyers, the Hong Kong Bar Association, and
newspaper editorials had all called for the government to
publish a white paper setting out the actual drafting of the new
legislation, including legal definitions. The government con-
sistently rejected this proposal. In response to the bill’s intro-
duction, Hong Kong’s Democratic Party is pushing for with-
drawal on the ground that it lacks public support. The limits
of public pressure are evident in the continued inclusion of
certain provisions in the proposed legislation. For example,
the original proposal to ban organizations based on a link with
the Chinese mainland on security grounds is more tightly
defined and subject to review by the courts, a check previously
missing. Albeit in a modified form, the legislation still allows
the Chinese authorities to use Beijing’s directives to ban an
organization on the Mainland as the basis for banning affili-
ated bodies in Hong Kong—without providing reasons for so
doing. The government of the HKSAR posits the fact that a
decision to impose a ban can be challenged in the courts as
a limiting test on the legislation’s power. However, the text of
the law shows that “the Court may order that all or any por-
tion of the public shall be excluded during any part of the hear-
ing,” thereby allowing secret court trials. Further, the text
states that a hearing can “take place without the appellant being
given full particulars of the reasons for the proscription” and
that the Court can “hold proceedings in the absence of any
person, including the appellant and any legal representative
appointed by him.” This manipulated access to the court sys-
tem undermines any sort of balance of the power of pro-
scription that a the right to a court hearing could have pro-
vided. The HKSAR government also “points to various tests that
would have to be met before a ban could be imposed, such as
being satisfied that it is necessary for national security.” It
does not seem difficult for government officials to convince
themselves that the appropriate standards for banning an
organization have been met; judiciaries everywhere are reluc-
tant to question governments on national security matters. 
Conclusion
Despite its willingness to modify other unpopular pro-
posals, the Tung administration’s refusal to abandon the
subversion law, which would empower the government of the
HKSAR to ban local organizations linked to organizations that
are outlawed on the mainland, calls into question the gov-
ernment’s claim that it is simply fulfilling its duty to imple-
ment Article 23. This particular proposal goes beyond what
Article 23 requires, strongly suggesting that Beijing, for the
first time since the 1997 handover, will gain power to play a
role in which groups are banned in the HKSAR. 
Beyond the consultation period and the current legislative
work occurring in the HKSAR, the context for this debate is
the Basic Law’s appeal for greater democratization, a goal that
requires serious attention by the local authorities. Hong
Kong has always been known for its rule of law, the inde-
pendence of its judiciary, the free flow of information, and
all of the fundamental freedoms guaranteed under the Basic
Law. These freedoms have contributed to Hong Kong’s sta-
tus in the international community, and its appeal to investors.
Implementing the proposed Blue Paper for the implemen-
tation of Article 23 would quickly and definitively curtail
these freedoms. 
*Inbal Sansani is a J.D. candidate at the Washington College of
Law and a staff writer for the Human Rights Brief.
Article 23, continued from previous page
Birth registration—the official recording of a child’sbirth by a government agency—is one of the mostimportant events in a child’s life. Birth registration
establishes the existence of the child under law and pro-
vides the foundation for ensuring many of the child’s rights.
Although birth registration alone does not guarantee that a
child will have access to adequate healthcare, receive an edu-
cation, or be free from abuse or exploitation, its absence leaves
a child at significantly greater risk of a range of human rights
violations. Despite the importance of birth registration,
according to UNICEF, approximately 50 million newborn
babies are not registered each year, accounting for over 40
percent of the children born annually. 
Birth Registration Defined
Birth registration is the process by which a child’s birth is
recorded in a civil register by the applicable government
authority. This step provides the first legal recognition of the
child, and generally is required for the child to obtain a
birth certificate. A child’s birth record typically includes the
name of the child, the names of his or her parents, the name
of the attending healthcare professional or birth attendant,
and the date and place of birth. Once this information is pro-
vided, the birth record is signed by the local registrar and filed
with the relevant government agency for that region. The birth
record may also include the name, address, and nationality
of each parent. Such additional information, along with the
child’s place of birth, can help establish the nationality of the
child. Although birth registration can be achieved in a vari-
ety of ways, the registration of a newborn child typically is facil-
itated by the local hospital where the child is born or the com-
munity healthcare worker present at the birth. If the birth does
not take place in a hospital or is not presided over by a com-
munity health worker, the parents are expected to take their
child to the local government office to register the child as
soon as possible after the birth.
Current Data on Birth Registration Rates
Although the issue of unregistered children is a global
problem, most unregistered children are found in develop-
ing countries. The problem of unregistered children is most
prevalent in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, where over
70 percent and 63 percent of births go unregistered in each
region, respectively. In the Middle East/North Africa region,
31 percent of children are not registered, and in Asia and the
Pacific the rate is 22 percent. In addition, 14 percent of chil-
dren born in Latin America and the Caribbean region are not
registered. By comparison, only 2 percent of births in indus-
trialized countries are not registered.
Nearly half the countries for which data is available fail to
register at least one in ten children born within their juris-
diction. In 39 countries, over 30 percent of all children under
age five were not registered at birth, and in 19 of these coun-
tries, over 60 percent of such children were not registered at
birth. For example, registration rates in Bangladesh and
Tanzania are reportedly less than 15 percent, while Nigeria
registers only 30 percent of newborns. Meanwhile, in India
and Nepal, little more than one third of the children under
five have been registered. In addition to these and other
countries where the registration systems currently in place
have great room for improvement, a small number of coun-
tries, including
Eritrea, Ethiopia,
Namibia, Oman,
and Somalia, have
no birth registra-
tion system at all.
Still others, such as
the Democratic
Republic of the
Congo, have birth
registrations sys-
tems that have
essentially collapsed
due to civil war or
internal strife. 
Disparities between birth registration rates exist not only
from country to country but also within the borders of individual
countries. Generally, birth registration systems are more effec-
tive in urban centers than in rural areas. For example, in
Niger the birth registration rate is 85 percent in urban areas
but only 40 percent in rural areas. In Indonesia, 47 percent of
births in urban areas are registered compared to only 20 per-
cent of births in rural areas. In addition to the failure of some
birth registration systems to reach rural areas effectively, cer-
tain populations—particularly refugees, internally displaced
groups, and children of indigenous or migrant populations—
are particularly at risk of not having their children registered.
Such populations are often already at risk of exploitation and
the failure to register these children increases that risk. 
Finally, even though most industrialized countries have very
high birth registration rates, the approximately two percent
of children who go unregistered in these countries are often
overlooked and relegated to the margins of society. As a
result, such children are often subject to the same human
rights violations typically thought to be prevalent only in
poorer, more resource-constrained environments, and they
too need the benefit of birth registration. 
The Right to Birth Registration
The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the
Child (CRC), the most widely ratified international human
rights treaty, recognizes birth registration as a fundamental
human right. Immediately after setting forth the child’s most
basic and fundamental right (the child’s “inherent right to
life”) in Article 6, the CRC recognizes the right to birth reg-
istration in Article 7, as birth registration provides the initial
foundation for the fulfillment of other rights of the child. Arti-
cle 7 of the CRC establishes that each child “shall be registered
immediately after birth and shall have the right from birth to
a name, [and] the right to acquire a nationality. . . .” Impor-
tantly, the CRC requires each child to be registered imme-
diately after birth so that there is no delay in officially rec-
ognizing the existence of the child and granting that child
access to the privileges and protections afforded to each
member of society. In addition to the CRC, the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) also establishes
that “[e]very child shall be registered immediately after birth
and shall have a name” and that each child “has the right to
acquire a nationality.” This right to birth registration is impor-
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tant not only as an individual right but also because it enables
each child to assert a broad range of other human rights,
including not only civil and political rights but also eco-
nomic, social, and cultural rights. 
Implications of Birth Registration for Children’s Civil and
Political Rights
The Right to a Name and Nationality 
First and foremost, birth registration is fundamental to
securing the child’s rights to a name, identity, and national-
ity—rights recognized by both the CRC and the ICCPR. Birth
registration officially records a child’s birth, providing the first
legal recognition of the child, and generally is required in
order to obtain a birth certificate. As a birth record or birth
certificate typically includes such details as the child’s birth-
place and information on the child’s parents, it can help estab-
lish the nationality of the child and the child’s right to know
his or her parents. By contrast, if the child’s birth is not reg-
istered and neither his or her nationality nor citizenship is
established, the child is vulnerable to being left stateless.
Having set forth the right to a name and nationality in Arti-
cle 7, the CRC reinforces its importance in Article 8, by man-
dating that states parties respect “the right of the child to pre-
serve his or her identity, including nationality, name and
family relations as recognized by law without unlawful inter-
ference,” and requiring that “Where a child is illegally
deprived of some or all of the elements of his or her identity,
States Parties shall provide appropriate assistance and pro-
tection, with a view to re-establishing speedily his or her
identity.” 
The CRC and the ICCPR are not the only human rights
instruments that acknowledge the fundamental importance
of birth registration and the child’s right to a name and
nationality. Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, which though a non-binding declaration is regarded
by many as customary international law, affirms that “[e]very-
one has the right to a nationality.” In addition, the right to
birth registration and the right to a name and nationality are
also set forth in the Convention on the Reduction of State-
lessness, the International Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination, and the International Con-
vention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Work-
ers and Members of Their Families. This proliferation of
international declarations and treaties reflects the consensus
that a child’s rights to a name and nationality, rights which
can be secured in large part through birth registration, are
fundamental rights upon which many others are predicated. 
The Right to Be Free from All Forms of Exploitation
Registration of a child’s birth offers benefits beyond secur-
ing the child’s right to a name and nationality. Although birth
registration does not provide guarantees by itself, birth reg-
istration can assist in efforts to combat various forms of
exploitation of children. Falsification of a child’s age and iden-
tity is harder to detect among unregistered children. There-
fore, the illicit trafficking of children, whether for purposes
of inter-country adoption, child labor, or child prostitution,
often thrives in areas where birth registration rates are low.
Thus birth registration plays an important role in a govern-
ment’s efforts to protect children from all forms of exploita-
tion, including child labor (CRC, Article 32), sexual exploita-
tion (CRC, Article 34), the sale or trafficking of children
(CRC, Article 35), and any other form of exploitation of
children (CRC, Article 36). Article 38 of the CRC and the
Optional Protocol to the CRC on the involvement of children
in armed conflicts also set forth prohibitions on the involve-
ment of children in armed conflicts, the enforcement of
which again relies on the ability to establish the age of the
child. Low birth registration rates increase the incidence of
underage recruitment, such as in Myanmar and the Central
African Republic. The right to be free from all forms of
exploitation is also set forth in Article 8 of the ICCPR, which
prohibits “slavery and the slave-trade in all their forms.”
The Right to Protections in the Juvenile Justice System
The impact of birth registration also extends to the juve-
nile justice system, as access to certain protections are con-
tingent on the child’s ability to prove his or her age or nation-
ality. Article 37 of the CRC establishes guidelines for juvenile
justice and requires countries to treat any child deprived of
his or her liberty “in a manner which takes into account the
needs of persons of his or her age.” Being able to prove that
a child is a juvenile affords a child the additional protec-
tions required under international law, as well as national laws,
while in custody and may ensure that the child is not prose-
cuted as an adult.
Additional Civil and Political Rights beyond 
Childhood 
Finally, the impact of birth registration extends beyond the
adolescent years. A birth certificate may also be required to
vote, obtain a passport, be a candidate for office, or otherwise
participate in the civic and political affairs of one’s country. 
Implications of Birth Registration on Children’s Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights 
The Right to Healthcare 
Pursuant to Article 24 of the CRC, states parties “recognize
the right of the child to the enjoyment of the highest attain-
able standard of health” and are required to “pursue full
implementation of this right.” The right to enjoy “the highest
attainable standard of physical and mental health” is further
recognized in Article 12 of the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which requires
that states parties take steps necessary for the “healthy devel-
opment of the child.” Despite these requirements, each year
more than ten million children die before they reach the age
of five, and most of these deaths are preventable. Ineffective
birth registration systems play a role in this crisis, as unregis-
tered children are harder to reach for community healthcare
workers and may be overlooked entirely in public health plan-
ning. As such, these children may not gain access to immu-
nization programs and other important healthcare programs
(e.g., 26 percent of the world’s children under 2 years do not
receive immunizations for diphtheria, pertussis and tetanus).
Even where a child’s family can provide access to community
health centers, a birth certificate may be required to obtain free
or subsidized immunizations, thus illustrating the importance
of early birth registration for all children. 
The Right to an Education 
Birth registration is also important in ensuring each child’s
right to education, as recognized under Article 28 of the
CRC and Article 13 of the ICESCR. For example, birth cer-
tificates are required for enrolling in school in certain coun-
continued on next page
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tries, including Cameroon, Lesotho, Sudan, and Yemen.
Thus, a child whose birth was not registered may be unable
to obtain an education. In other countries, such as Malaysia,
birth certificates are not required to enroll in school but
still form a barrier because they are required for those students
applying for educational scholarships. This type of economic
obstacle has a greater impact in poorer regions, which also
generally have lower birth registration rates. Elsewhere, birth
certificates are needed to obtain a primary school diploma and
thus advance to secondary school, as in Turkey, or are
required in order to sit for exams, as in Sri Lanka. In each of
these cases, unregistered children are at a disadvantage and
may find it impossible to overcome these obstacles to obtain-
ing an education. Today, it is estimated that approximately
120 million primary school age children are not in school.
Without adequate educational opportunities, these children
are more vulnerable to the various forms of exploitation dis-
cussed above, including forced labor, prostitution, and involve-
ment in armed conflict. Effective birth registration systems can
help ensure that children will have access to schooling.
The Right to Be Free from Economic and Social 
Exploitation
Beyond providing healthcare and education to children,
states must take additional steps to protect children from eco-
nomic and social exploitation, as mandated by Article 10 of
the ICESCR. Birth registration can play a role in combating
other violations of economic and social rights, among them
child labor. Article 32 of the CRC requires countries to take
the measures necessary to eliminate harmful child labor
practices. In addition, Article 7 of the ICESCR recognizes the
“right of everyone to the enjoyment of just and favourable con-
ditions of work” including fair wages, “safe and healthy work-
ing conditions,” and “reasonable limitation of working hours.”
Article 10 of the ICESCR specifically addresses the issue of chil-
dren, stating that 
Children and young persons should be pro-
tected from economic and social exploitation.
Their employment in work harmful to their
morals or health or dangerous to life or likely
to hamper their normal development should be
punishable by law. States should also set age
limits below which the paid employment of
child labour should be prohibited and punish-
able by law.
Similar protections are set forth in Article 32 of the Char-
ter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union . 
In addition to these obligations under international law,
most countries have enacted child labor laws, yet the exploita-
tion of child laborers persists. An estimated 250 million chil-
dren between the ages of 5 and 14 work for a living. In
Kenya, for example, where the rural birth registration rate is
57 percent, an estimated 3.5 million children aged 6 to 15
work, more than one quarter of all children in the country.
Enforcement of child labor laws requires the capability of prov-
ing the ages of children involved, a process made much
more difficult when dealing with unregistered children whose
ages cannot be confirmed accurately. In addition, as unreg-
istered children do not exist in any government records,
their absence from school as a result of forced labor may not
even draw the attention of authorities. 
The same holds true in cases of child prostitution. The
global sex trade continues to expand at an alarming rate, as over
one million children are drawn into the world sex trade each
year. While it is difficult to obtain precise statistics or determine
the exact correlation between unregistered births and traf-
ficking of children for prostitution, children whose births go
unregistered and thus have no identity under any govern-
ment’s records are much more difficult to track. As a result,
these children are clearly more vulnerable to such exploitation.
Additional Economic and Social Rights beyond 
Childhood 
Birth registration and the ability to assert one’s national-
ity may also prove important in terms of securing additional
economic and social rights during adulthood. Providing offi-
cial identity documents is a common step in securing employ-
ment. Later in life, proof of nationality may be necessary to
receive social security, a right set forth in Article 9 of the 
ICESCR, which states that “States Parties . . . recognize the
right of everyone to social security, including social insurance.”
The Impact beyond Unregistered Children
Failure to obtain universal birth registration may con-
tribute to harmful realities for all children of a community,
even those who have been registered. Obtaining accurate pop-
ulation statistics is essential in social services planning for any
government and in ensuring that adequate resources and bud-
gets are made available to address the needs of the popula-
tion. If a government’s birth records are incorrect, it may not
allocate adequate resources to immunization programs, edu-
cation budgets, or programs designed to combat exploitation.
Moreover, developing countries may request and receive
insufficient international aid based on this underreporting
of births. As a result, unregistered children who gain access
to the local healthcare system or schools may receive inade-
quate care or education because government budgets and
planning have not accounted for these children. Further, even
those children whose births are registered may suffer as they
may find themselves accessing an over-burdened social ser-
vices system. Finally, as birth registration systems are often less
effective in poorer rural areas of a country, these areas which
may have the greatest actual need may receive dramatically
insufficient resources or aid.
Developing Successful Birth Registration Programs
Despite the clear mandate set forth under international
law, the latest figures on birth registration demonstrate
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urgent need for additional action. Birth registration must
become a priority for all countries, as it starts the child on the
path to receiving the full benefits of society to which every indi-
vidual has a right. 
At the international level, there are indications that birth
registration is receiving greater priority. The value of birth reg-
istration was recognized at last year’s United Nations Special
Session on Children, as the final outcome document and Plan
of Action adopted by the UN General Assembly included the
requirement that governments “[d]evelop systems to ensure
the registration of every child at or shortly after birth, and ful-
fil his or her right to acquire a name and a nationality, in
accordance with national laws and relevant international
instruments” (emphasis added). The inclusion of this lan-
guage remedied a significant oversight in the previous Plan
of Action adopted at the World Summit for Children in
1990, which neglected to mention birth registration at all. In
addition, the Committee on the Rights of the Child has
emphasized the importance of improving birth registration
rates in its observations and recommendations on reports
submitted by a number of states parties, including Bhutan,
Cambodia, the Dominican Republic, India, and Paraguay.
Finally, UNICEF and nongovernmental organizations, work-
ing in conjunction with civil registry offices in numerous
countries, have begun implementing programs designed to
establish new birth registration systems or further strengthen
existing ones. 
To date, a number of countries have developed success-
ful birth registration systems. Uzbekistan has provided an
incentive-based system, in which the state pays a bonus to par-
ents registering their children. As a result, in Uzbekistan
almost 100 percent of children under age five are registered.
Other countries have had success even without offering a
financial incentive, often by building on their existing health-
care infrastructure. For example, in Algeria, 92 percent of chil-
dren are born in medical facilities and registered immediately.
As a result of this approach, 97 percent of children born in
Algeria are registered within five days of their birth. 
Still other countries have much lower registration rates but
are making efforts to address this issue. Bangladesh has com-
menced a program in collaboration with UNICEF to reach
unregistered children in remote areas and establish a better
system for newborns in the future. This pilot program shows
signs of success. For example, in Rajshahi, Bangladesh, birth
registration rates improved from below 12 percent in 1997 to
over 70 percent in 2002. This improvement is attributed to
a number of factors, including: effective decentralization of
the registration process, which helps reach poorer popula-
tions; reliance on existing networks, which encourages col-
laboration and minimizes costs for establishing new net-
works; and an awareness program designed to educate parents
on the value of birth registration. Such programs may offer
important lessons for other countries working to improve the
effectiveness of their birth registration systems.
Recommendations for Improving Birth Registration Rates 
The experience of countries working to implement suc-
cessful birth registration systems suggests the need to focus
on three key areas in order to achieve universal birth regis-
tration: education, law, and local factors. 
First, greater emphasis must be placed on educating both
government leaders (at national and local levels) and the
general public on the importance of birth registration for
children. Birth registration must be considered not just a
bureaucratic exer-
cise in record-
keeping; rather,
governments must
recognize it as a
significant child
rights issue. If gov-
ernment leaders
are not convinced
of its importance,
the political will to
implement or
strengthen birth
registration systems
is likely to be insufficient. In turn, governments must educate
parents on the value of birth registration so that parents bet-
ter understand its importance in ensuring the rights of their
children. 
Second, countries must review their laws and take steps to
remove any legislative barriers to birth registration. Specifi-
cally, governments should revise applicable laws or regulations
with a view toward simplifying the process of birth registra-
tion, removing any existing economic barriers (e.g., charges
for birth certificates), encouraging immediate registration
without penalizing children who are registered later, and
finding ways in which the law can help minimize fear among
refugees or other displaced persons who may suspect that reg-
istering their newborn children will lead to deportation or
other harm. In addition countries that require the presence
of the father to register a birth or have patriarchal national-
ity laws that grant citizenship based only on the father’s
nationality, must also review such laws to eliminate gender dis-
crimination.
Finally, governments must properly account for local fac-
tors, including geographic and cultural barriers, in imple-
menting birth registration systems. In a number of coun-
tries, the disparity in registration rates between urban and
rural areas is significant, as it is often difficult or expensive
for families in remote areas to travel to the designated civil
registry office to register their children. Governments must
also address concerns among ethnic minorities and other vul-
nerable populations who for cultural or other reasons may be
unaware of the value of birth registration or fearful that reg-
istration of their children will lead to government recrimi-
nation. Failure to account for these local factors will likely
cause such programs to fall far short of success. 
Focusing on these three areas should help improve the
success rate of birth registration programs around the globe.
In turn, comprehensive birth registration will enable each
child to begin his or her life recognized as a person under the
law, entitled to the full benefits and protections of society. While
birth registration is essential, it remains only a first step. At every
stage thereafter, governments still have a great deal of work to
do in order to ensure the rights of all children. Such work will
be made easier, and will ultimately be more successful, if all chil-
dren are registered immediately after birth. 
* Jonathan Todres is vice-chair of the American Bar Association’s
International Human Rights Committee, co-chair of the ABA’s Sub-
committee on the Rights of the Child, and an associate with Davis
Polk & Wardwell in New York. Views expressed herein are those of
the author. 
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International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda Appeals Chamber
Alfred Musema v. The Prosecutor, 
Case No. ICTR-96-13-A 
On January 27, 2000, Trial Chamber I found Alfred
Musema guilty of genocide and crimes against humanity (for
extermination and rape) but not guilty of complicity in geno-
cide, conspiracy to commit genocide, crimes against human-
ity (for murder and other inhumane acts), or violations of Arti-
cle 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional
Protocol II. The Trial Chamber sentenced Musema to life
imprisonment. Musema appealed both the conviction and the
sentence. On November 16, 2001, the Appeals Chamber
rendered its Judgment in Alfred Musema v. The Prosecutor,
Case No. ICTR-96-13-A. 
Musema’s first ground of appeal alleged that the Trial
Chamber failed to apply the correct burden and standard of
proof to the facts before it and, thereby, made errors of law
and fact in its assessment of the evidence. In particular,
Musema challenged the Trial Chamber’s findings with regard
to the credibility of Prosecution witnesses and took issue
with the Trial Chamber’s rejection of the alibi he raised at trial.
The Appeals Chamber dismissed all of Musema’s arguments
except those regarding the rape of Nyiramusugi on May 13,
1994. With respect to that charge, the Appeals Chamber
noted that the Defense’s submission of out-of court statements
by Witnesses CB and EB contradicted Prosecution Witness N’s
testimony during trial. The Appeals Chamber found that if
the testimonies of all three witnesses had been presented, a
reasonable tribunal of fact would have reached the conclu-
sion that there was reasonable doubt as to Musema’s guilt. The
Appeals Chamber concluded that the Trial Chamber’s factual
and legal findings regarding the rape of Nyiramusugi were
incorrect and had occasioned a miscarriage of justice. Accord-
ingly, it quashed the conviction against Musema for the
crime against humanity involving rape. 
In his second, fourth, and fifth grounds of appeal,1 Musema
argued that the Trial Chamber did not ensure his right to a
fair trial in that it failed to respect his right to be informed
promptly and in detail of the nature of the charges against
him, his right to have adequate time for the preparation of
his defense and, lastly, his right to be tried without undue
delay. Specifically, in his second ground of appeal, Musema
claimed that his right to adequate time for the preparation
of his defense was prejudiced by the Trial Chamber’s decision
to allow the Prosecution to add witnesses to the initial witness
list, to call an expert witness, and to call witnesses whose
written statements were not disclosed to the Defense 60 days
before the trial date, as required by the ICTR Rules of Pro-
cedure and Evidence. The Appeals Chamber dismissed Muse-
ma’s argument, holding that Musema had waived his right to
appeal this issue by failing to raise it at trial. 
In the fourth ground of his appeal, Musema alleged that
the Trial Chamber erred by allowing the Prosecution to add
new charges to the Indictment during the trial. In the fifth
ground, Musema alleged that the Trial Chamber erred by find-
ing that the Prosecution’s failure to formally serve him with
the Amended Indictment did not infringe his rights under
Articles 19 and 20 of the ICTR Statute. The Appeals Cham-
ber deemed it unnecessary to consider these last two grounds
of appeal since both concerned Count 7 of the Indictment
(crime against humanity for rape), which was quashed based
on Musema’s first ground of appeal. However, the Appeals
Chamber observed in dicta that when granting the Prosecu-
tion leave to amend an indictment, the Trial Chamber must
respect the Accused’s fundamental rights and “the more
belatedly the amendment is effected, the more it is likely to
penalize the Accused.”
In his sixth ground of appeal, Musema argued that the
Trial Chamber erred in finding him guilty of both genocide
and crimes against humanity (for extermination) based on
the same set of facts. In addition to ruling that cumulative
charging of offenses is generally permitted, the Appeals
Chamber applied the criteria discussed in the 
v
Celebic´i ICTY
Appeal Judgment to determine when multiple convictions
based on the same set of facts may be entered or affirmed.
Quoting from 
v
Celebic´i, the Appeals Chamber stated that:
“‘multiple criminal convictions entered under different statu-
tory provisions but based on the same conduct are permissi-
ble only if each statutory provision involved has a materially
distinct element not contained in the other. An element is
materially distinct from another if it requires proof of a fact
not required by the other.’” Applying the 
v
Celebic´i test, the
Appeals Chamber held that the convictions for genocide
and crimes against humanity (extermination) are permissi-
ble since there are distinct elements under each crime. The
distinct element in genocide is an intent to destroy a targeted
group in whole or in part. Extermination as a crime against
humanity requires proof that the act form part of a widespread
or systematic attack against a civilian population. Thus, the
Appeals Chamber dismissed Musema’s sixth ground of appeal.
In his appeal against the sentence, Musema argued that
the Trial Chamber erred by failing to: 1) consider the need
to develop a range of sentences based on an accused’s role
in the broader context of Rwanda’s conflict; 2) pass a sentence
commensurate with other sentences imposed by the ICTR for
genocide convictions; and 3) duly consider the mitigating
factors in his case. Articulating the standard of review for
sentences imposed by the ICTR, the Appeals Chamber noted
that it would not revise a sentence unless it believed that the
Trial Chamber had committed a “discernible error” in exer-
cising its discretion, or failed to follow the applicable law.
While acknowledging the existence in ICTY jurisprudence of
a general principle that sentences should be graduated
according to the relative position of a convicted person in a
command structure, the Chamber emphasized that the grav-
ity of the offense is the primary consideration in imposing
sentence. Noting that Musema’s offenses were of the utmost
gravity, the Appeals Chamber found that Musema had failed
to demonstrate that the Trial Chamber ventured outside its
“discretionary framework in imposing the maximum sen-
tence of life imprisonment” and dismissed Musema’s first
argument. After an assessment of the aggravating and
mitigating circumstances in Musema’s case, the Appeals
Chamber found material differences between his case and that
of Serushago, who plead guilty to one count of genocide and
three counts of crimes against humanity (murder, extermi-
nation, and torture), and dismissed his second argument. In
response to his third argument, the Appeals Chamber found
that Musema failed to demonstrate that the Trial Chamber
erred in exercising its discretion as to the weight accorded to
36
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the mitigating circumstances in his case. In affirming the
sentence, the Appeals Chamber noted that the quashing of
the conviction for the crime against humanity (for rape)
had no impact on its dismissal of Musema’s appeal, as “[t]here
is no doubt that the Trial Chamber’s findings as to the sen-
tence to be imposed on Musema would have been the same
if it had acquitted Musema of the charge in question.” 
Judge Shahabuddeen supported the judgment but wrote
separately to clarify his understanding of two issues: 1) the reli-
ability of evidence; and 2) the test for upholding a conviction
based on additional evidence admitted during appellate pro-
ceedings. He stated that in general, the credibility of evi-
dence must be assumed, rather than assessed, at the admis-
sibility stage; reliability is a component of credibility and, as
such, goes to weight of the evidence and must be assessed later.
However, a different rule applies with respect to hearsay evi-
dence. Because of its nature, hearsay evidence may require
an initial determination of reliability at the admissibility
stage. Even then, ICTY jurisprudence demonstrates that
definitive proof of reliability is not necessary as a condition
of admissibility; rather provisional proof is all that is required
at that stage. Secondly, Judge Shahabuddeen noted that the
test for upholding a conviction based on additional evidence
submitted at the appellate level should be whether such evi-
dence could have been a decisive factor in reaching the deci-
sion below, not whether the conclusion reached by the tri-
bunal below on the assessed evidence was one which no
reasonable tribunal would have reached on that evidence.
The Prosecutor v Clément Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana
Appeal, Case No. ICTR-95-1-A
On May 21, 1999, the Trial Chamber rendered its judgment
in the case of Clément Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana, who
were both accused of involvement in the massacres that took
place in the préfecture of Kibuye in 1994. The Trial Chamber
convicted Clément Kayishema of four counts of genocide
and sentenced him to life in prison. Obed Ruzindana was con-
victed of one count of genocide and sentenced to 25 years
imprisonment. The Trial Chamber found the accused not
guilty of crimes against humanity, finding that those charges
were fully subsumed by the counts brought under the charge
of genocide, and acquitted the accused of violations of Arti-
cle 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional
Protocol II. Both accused appealed the conviction and the sen-
tence. The Prosecution appealed the judgment and sentence
against Ruzindana. On June 1, 2001, the Appeals Chamber ren-
dered its judgment in the case of The Prosecutor v.Clément Kay-
ishema and Obed Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-A. 
In his appeal, Kayishema argued that the trial was unfair
and that the Trial Chamber erred in its: 1) assessment of his
role as préfet; 2) evaluation of his individual and command
responsibility as préfet; 3) assessment of the meaning and
application of civil defense to the Rwandan conflict; and 4)
findings and application of the law regarding the crime of
genocide. Ruzindana also claimed that the trial was unfair.
In addition, he alleged that the Trial Chamber erred in law
and fact with respect to its: 1) assessment of intent; 2) find-
ings regarding individual responsibility; 3) findings on his role
regarding the crime of genocide; 4) findings on common
criminal intent; 5) findings on his personal status; 6) findings
regarding his alibi defense; and 7) appraisal of the Prosecu-
tion’s evidence. With respect to sentencing, both Kayishema
and Ruzindana alleged that the Trial Chamber erred in its
assessment of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances
in their case. Because several issues and grounds of appeal
overlap, the Appeals Chamber grouped together some
grounds of appeal and addressed others separately. Simi-
larly, this summary will discuss the general issues decided by
the Appeals Chamber rather than addressing each ground of
appeal separately.2
Fair Trial Issues
The Appeals Chamber rejected all arguments presented
by Kayishema in ground one and Ruzindana in ground eight
of their respective appeals that they were denied a fair trial.
Kayishema alleged his trial was unfair for various reasons,
including that: 1) the Tribunal was under the political influ-
ence of the United Nations and the government of Rwanda
and, therefore, lacked independence; and 2) the Trial Cham-
ber violated the principle of “equality of arms” by failing to,
inter alia, guarantee the parties equality of means and
resources. Noting that the Tribunal is a judicial organ inde-
pendent of other UN organs and that Kayishema failed to
articulate any particular pressure allegedly exerted by Rwanda
on the Tribunal, the Appeals Chamber rejected Kayishema’s
first argument. The Chamber also rejected Kayishema’s argu-
ment that the principle of “equality of arms” had been com-
promised. Citing the standard adopted by the ICTY Appeals
Chamber in the Tadi´c case, the Chamber noted that the rule
providing the parties with equal opportunity to present their
cases does not compel an equality of resources.3
Ruzindana claimed he was denied a fair trial because, as
a result of the lack of specificity in the indictment, he was not
promptly informed of the nature of the charges against him
or allowed adequate time and resources to prepare his
defense. The Appeals Chamber rejected his claim because he
had neither raised this issue at trial nor alleged special cir-
cumstances that would have permitted the Chamber to con-
sider the issue on appeal. 
Defense of Alibi
Both Kayishema and Ruzindana raised several arguments
relating to their alibi defenses, including that the Trial Cham-
ber erred by shifting the burden of proof to the accused
and incorrectly assessing the evidence submitted in support
of their alibi defenses. The Appeals Chamber rejected Kay-
ishema’s claim that the Trial Chamber shifted the burden of
proof to the defense. Relying on the Foca and 
v
Celebic´i cases,
the Chamber affirmed that it is the duty of the Prosecution
to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt,
even when an alibi defense is raised. In other words, while the
accused must provide the Prosecution with notice and the evi-
dence upon which he will rely to establish his alibi, the Pros-
ecution retains the burden of establishing the truth of the facts
in the indictment. The accused must merely produce suffi-
cient evidence to raise reasonable doubt regarding the Pros-
ecution’s case. The Appeals Chamber found that Kayishema
failed to provide sufficient evidence to raise such doubt. 
In his sixth ground of appeal, Ruzindana asserted that the
Trial Chamber erred by failing to consider the evidence relat-
ing to his alibi defense in a comprehensive manner. The
Appeals Chamber noted that it was bound to respect the
Trial Chamber’s approach as long as it was reasonable. The
Appeals Chamber stated that the Trial Chamber had not only
considered individual witness statements, but also conducted
an overall assessment of the evidence in order to verify the cred-
ibility of the witnesses and to evaluate whether the evidence
raised doubt regarding the accused’s presence at the site of
the alleged massacres. Noting that such an approach was rea-
sonable, the Appeals Chamber dismissed Ruzindana’s claim. 
Genocide
In his sixth ground of appeal, Kayishema alleged errors in
the Trial Chamber’s findings on the evidence offered to prove
the crime of genocide, in addition to the manner in which the
Trial Chamber applied the law to the facts when assessing Kay-
ishema’s individual circumstances. The Appeals Chamber
continued on next page
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confirmed that the Trial Chamber has broad discretion with
respect to its analysis of evidence for fact-finding purposes. Not-
ing that a successful challenge must show that the Trial Cham-
ber’s analysis was unreasonable, the Appeals Chamber con-
cluded that Kayishema failed to meet this burden and, thus,
rejected his challenge on this matter. In particular, the Appeals
Chamber rejected Kayishema’s claim that he lacked the req-
uisite mens rea for the crime of genocide because he had
ordered 72 children who survived the massacre to be taken to
a hospital. The Chamber noted that in light of all the evidence
presented, this fact had little bearing on whether Kayishema
possessed the requisite mens rea. 
On the mixed factual and legal ground of appeal relating
to the interpretation of the word “meurtre,” the Appeals Cham-
ber affirmed the Trial Chamber’s conclusion that there is “vir-
tually” no difference between “meurtre” and “killing” within
the context of genocide. The Appeals Chamber concluded
that even if there were a difference between the two terms,
both refer to intentional but not necessarily premeditated
murder and that, in any event, such interpretation would not
improve Kayishema’s case.
Ruzindana’s first ground of appeal asserted that the Trial
Chamber erred in its findings on mens rea. Specifically, he
asserted there was no proof that he had the requisite specific
intent to commit the crime of genocide. The Appeals Cham-
ber concurred with the Trial Chamber’s conclusions that
while explicit manifestations of criminal intent are often
rare, intent may be demonstrated by persistent patterns of con-
duct and inferred from an individual’s utterances and actions.
Therefore, the Trial Chamber appropriately considered this
kind of evidence in arriving at the conclusion that Ruzindana
possessed the requisite intent. Noting the distinction between
motive and intent, the Appeals Chamber also rejected Ruzin-
dana’s claim that his personal motives for acting the way he
did precluded the presence of the requisite mens rea for
genocide. Finally, the Appeals Chamber accepted Ruzin-
dana’s argument that the Trial Chamber failed to define the
phrase “persistent pattern of conduct.” However, it noted that
because such a pattern is not an element of the crime of geno-
cide, the Trial Chamber was not obliged to define it. 
The Chamber also rejected Ruzindana’s third ground of
appeal, in which he claimed that a nexus was required
between the manner in which genocide was carried out and
the personal circumstances of an accused. Specifically, Ruzin-
dana claimed genocide requires proof that the accused had
the means or resources necessary to prepare for and commit
genocide. The Chamber held that proof of such a nexus is
unnecessary under the law.
Individual Responsibility
In his second ground of appeal, Ruzindana argued that the
Trial Chamber erred in finding him individually responsible
for committing killings because the Prosecution failed to estab-
lish a resulting death. Citing the Tadi´c case, the Appeals
Chamber noted that the test for direct commission under Arti-
cle 6(1) of the ICTR Statute is whether the individual directly
participated in the crime and had the requisite knowledge.
The Chamber concluded that establishing individual respon-
sibility does not require a showing that the individual’s actions
resulted in death. However, where there is a question regard-
ing the material fact of whether a death resulted, it is appro-
priately determined by the Trial Chamber in its assessment
of the evidence. The Appeals Chamber noted that the Trial
Chamber had found Ruzindana responsible for at least one
death, that of victim Beatrice. Additionally, the Appeals
Chamber noted that individual responsibility under Article
6(1) of the ICTR Statute attaches not only to direct physical
participation, but also to acts of participation that contribute
to, or have an effect on, the commission of the crime. The
Appeals Chamber recalled that Ruzindana was also found indi-
vidually responsible under Article 6(1) for instigating, order-
ing, committing and otherwise aiding and abetting in the
preparation and execution of a massacre with genocidal
intent. As proof of resulting death is not a necessary ele-
ment in the determination of individual responsibility under
Article 6(1), the Appeals Chamber dismissed this claim.4
Although Ruzindana’s fourth ground of appeal was not
clear, the Appeals Chamber interpreted his claim to be that
the Trial Chamber erred in its definition of criminal respon-
sibility on the basis of participation in a common purpose or
design and in its application of this definition to his case.
Citing the Tadi´c case, the Appeals Chamber noted that this
mode of participation in one of the crimes under the ICTR
Statute does not require that the plan or purpose be previ-
ously arranged or formulated. Therefore, while meeting
physically or by telephone may be a relevant factor to be
considered, those acts are not constitutive of the actus reus
element required for individual responsibility to attach
pursuant to the common purpose doctrine. Thus, this claim
was dismissed.5
In his third ground of appeal, Kayishema challenged the
Trial Chamber’s findings regarding his individual criminal
responsibility for genocide. In particular, he challenged the
Chamber’s findings regarding his intent and actual partici-
pation in the crime. The Appeals Chamber noted that intent
may be inferred from an individual’s participation in a crime,
particularly from his aiding and abetting behavior. The
Appeals Chamber affirmed the Trial Chamber’s finding that
Kayishema had the requisite criminal intent because the
combination of his authority and passive presence at crime
sites amounted to tacit encouragement. Additionally, the
Appeals Chamber dismissed Kayishema’s claim that the Trial
Chamber erred in finding actual participation, noting that the
Appellant had failed to show that any of the Trial Chambers
findings were so unreasonable as to result in a miscarriage of
justice. 
In his second ground of appeal, Kayishema challenged the
Trial Chamber’s finding of criminal command responsibility
under Article 6(3) of the ICTR Statute. He suggested that the
Trial Chamber erroneously concluded that as préfet, he had
de jure authority over the assailants present during the mas-
sacres in question. Further, he claimed that as he had no de
jure authority, he could not in fact exercise any authority
over those individuals, such as preventing or punishing the
crimes in question. Citing the
v
Celebic´i case, the Appeals Cham-
ber noted that the appropriate test, whether in the context
of de jure or de facto authority, was whether the superior had
effective control over the persons committing the alleged
crimes. The Appeals Chamber found that Kayishema failed
to show that the Trial Chamber’s findings regarding his
effective control were so unreasonable as to result in a mis-
carriage of justice. 
Additional Fact-Finding Issues
In their appeal, the Appellants challenged the Trial Cham-
ber’s evaluation of witness credibility and other evidence. The
Appeals Chamber reaffirmed that the Trial Chamber retains
broad discretion with respect to determining witness credi-
bility and overall assessment of the evidence. 
In his claim that the Trial Chamber made factual errors
with respect to its genocide analysis, for instance, Kayishema
argued that testimony regarding injuries sustained by a wit-
ness should have been corroborated. The Appeals Chamber
rejected the argument, stating that under Tadi´c, corrobora-
tion was not necessary. In his third ground of appeal,
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Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
The Implications of Sentencing Aliens without 
Consular Notification
Case 11.753: Ramón Martínez Villareal
On October 10, 2002, the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights (Commission) issued Report No. 52/02 on the
merits of Case 11.753 regarding Ramón Martínez Villareal. This
report is the culmination of an investigation initiated on May
16, 1997 against the United States concerning the murder con-
viction of Ramón Martínez Villareal, a Mexican national. Mr.
Martínez Villareal was convicted of two counts of first degree
murder on May 20, 1983, and has since been incarcerated and
placed on death row in Arizona. The petitioner, the Center
for Justice and International Law, alleged five violations of Mr.
Martínez Villareal’s rights: the failure of the United States to
provide notice of consular assistance under Article 36(1)(b)
of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Vienna
Convention) to which the United States is bound; the failure
of the United States to provide and guarantee effective assis-
tance of counsel to Mr. Martínez Villareal; the failure of the
United States to take into account Mr. Martínez Villareal’s men-
tal competence at the trial and sentencing phases of his crim-
inal proceeding and its obligation not to execute Mr. Martínez
Villareal due to his mental incompetence; the delay in Mr.
Martínez Villareal’s execution; and the unequal application
of the death penalty throughout the United States. The peti-
tioner claimed that these violations of Mr. Martínez Villareal’s
rights by the United States contravene Articles I (right to life,
liberty, and personal security), II (right to equality before
law), XVIII (right to a fair trial), and XXVI (right to due
process of law) of the American Declaration of the Rights and
Duties of Man (American Declaration).
Analysis
The Commission limited its analysis of the merits to the
petitioner’s first claim, based on its finding that the United
States’ failure to comply with Article 36(1)(b) of the Vienna
Convention was a sufficient basis to find violations of the rights
to a fair trial and to due process of law under the American
Declaration. The Commission further noted it would apply
a heightened level of scrutiny, consistent with the restrictive
approach previously taken by the Commission and other
international human rights authorities in considering issues
regarding the imposition of the death penalty.
In response to the government’s argument that the Vienna
Convention does not vest any private rights in a criminal
defendant, the Commission stated that, based on the current
jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights,
it does not have competence to adjudicate the United States’
responsibility for violations of the Vienna Convention per se.
The Commission nonetheless maintained that Mr. Martínez
Villareal’s right to information and consular assistance under
Article 36 of the Vienna Convention constitutes a funda-
mental component of the due process protections to which
he is entitled pursuant to Articles XVIII and XXVI of the
American Declaration. Accordingly, the state’s failure to
respect and ensure this obligation constituted serious viola-
tions of Mr. Martínez Villareal’s rights to a fair trial and due
process. In arriving at this conclusion, the Commission con-
sidered current developments in international law in the
decision of the International Court of Justice in the LaGrand
case and the decision of the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights in Advisory Opinion 16, which asserted that Article 36
of the Vienna Convention creates individual rights that give
rise to the international responsibility of a state.
At no point did the United States ever allege that Article
36(1)(b) had been satisfied. Rather, it claimed that the Mex-
ican Consulate should have been on notice because of the
media attention attracted by Mr. Martínez Villareal’s arrest.
The Commission not only found this defense to be insuffi-
cient, but stated that the possible knowledge of the Mexican
consular staff did not address Mr. Martínez Villareal’s right
to be informed of his right to consular assistance. 
In evaluating the importance of the state’s compliance
with Article 36 of the Vienna Convention, the Commission
noted that granting consular assistance to a criminal defen-
dant helps ensure the protection of the defendant’s due
process rights through the provision of services, including trans-
lation, the collection of mitigating evidence from the defen-
dant’s country, and the preparation of an adequate defense.
In this case, the Commission considered that the record
showed that Mr. Martínez Villareal was arrested and tried
without having a clear understanding of the proceedings.
Mr. Martínez Villareal did not speak English, his attorney did
not speak Spanish, and the earlier stages of the proceedings
were not translated into Spanish. The record also reflected that
Mr. Martínez Villareal did not understand the purpose or com-
position of the jury. There was further evidence that Mr.
Martínez Villareal suffered from mental deficiency at the
time of the trial against him, and that this mental deficiency
was not adequately explored by his attorney. Based on these
findings, the Commission held that the United States’ failure
to comply with the Vienna Convention placed it in violation
of Articles XVIII and XXVI of the American Declaration.
The Commission further concluded that if the United States
executes Mr. Martínez Villareal, it will be violation of Article
I of the American Declaration.
Recommendations
In light of the Commission’s finding regarding the viola-
tion of Mr. Martínez Villareal’s rights to due process and a fair
trial, it urged the United States to retry the case in accordance
with the protections prescribed by Articles XVIII and XXVI
of the American Declaration. If a retrial in compliance with
these protections is not possible, the Commission recom-
mended Mr. Martínez Villareal’s release. The Commission fur-
ther advised the United States to review its laws and procedures
relating to foreign nationals who are arrested and incarcerated
to assure that consular notification is integrated into the ear-
liest stages of criminal proceedings. The Commission
announced that it would continue to evaluate the measures
adopted by the United States with respect to the above rec-
ommendations until it reaches full compliance.
Establishing an International Ban on the Execution of Juveniles
Case 12.285: Michael Domingues
On October 22, 2002, the Commission issued Report No.
62/02 on the admissibility and the merits of case 12.285
regarding Michael Domingues. Mr. Domingues was con-
victed of two counts of first-degree murder and sentenced to
death for crimes he committed when he was 16 years old. On
May 1, 2000, the Commission received a petition from the
Magnus Hirschfield Center for Human Rights and Mark
Blaskey of the Clark County Public Defender on behalf of
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Nomi Dave, a 1999 J.D.graduate of the Wash-ington College of Law
(WCL), is currently working as
an associate protection officer
with the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) in Guinea, West
Africa. Ms. Dave is a member
of the Junior Professional Offi-
cers (JPO) program, which pro-
vides opportunities for nationals of different countries to
work with UN agencies for a two-year period. She applied to
the JPO program through the U.S. government, which spon-
sors JPOs for UNHCR and the World Food Program.
Although Ms. Dave is a staff member of the UNHCR, her posi-
tion is funded through the U.S. Department of State. Upon
acceptance to the program, she was posted to the UNHCR
Branch Office in Conakry, Guinea. At this duty station, she
works primarily with refugees from Cote d’Ivoire, Liberia, and
Sierra Leone, which are currently the main sources of the
refugee population in Guinea.
Ms. Dave’s work focuses on the protection of refugees,
including analysis of issues pertaining to international refugee
law and the legal and physical protection of refugees. In
addition, UNHCR addresses other human rights issues affect-
ing refugees, including arbitrary arrest and detention, free-
dom of expression, freedom of movement, and rights specific
to the needs of women and children in the refugee com-
munity. According to Ms. Dave, the most challenging aspect
of her work involves addressing the basic needs of individu-
als and groups on a daily basis. Each morning she greets a
queue of refugees outside the UNHCR office. She explains
that this group may include people who have not eaten for
days, people who have nowhere to sleep, or those whose
spouses or siblings have been arrested. One of her first
lessons was that working at UNHCR involves a variety of
responsibilities including counseling, social services, and
informal dispute resolution in addition to engaging in legal
analysis. 
Immediately after law school Ms. Dave worked as a
researcher and writer for the UN Secretariat in New York,
focusing on economic and social affairs. Ms. Dave’s advice to
law students is to study topics that they find stimulating and
to keep focused on their chosen fields of interest. Her favorite
law school experience was participating in the International
Human Rights Law Clinic, which she found to be both instruc-
tive and enjoyable.
Ms. Dave is currently beginning to explore new areas of
interest in the law, including issues of cultural rights, economic
and social development, and the protection of children and
the elderly in conflict situations. She plans to pursue writing
opportunities in the future. 
*Inbal Sansani is a J.D. candidate at the Washington College of
Law and a staff writer for the Human Rights Brief.
Mr. Domingues. The petition alleged that by sentencing Mr.
Domingues to death for crimes he committed while he was
a juvenile, the United States breached Articles I (right to life),
II (right to equality before the law), VII (right to protection
for mothers and children), and XXVI (right to due process
of law) of the American Declaration. The petitioner alleged
that the United States violated Article I of the American Dec-
laration by breaching the jus cogens norm prohibiting the exe-
cution of juveniles. The petitioner further argued that the use
of the death penalty in a limited number of U.S. states
resulted in arbitrary deprivation of life and inequality before
the law in the United States.
Analysis
After ruling that the case was admissible based on evi-
dence that Mr. Domingues had been denied a substantive
appeal of his “illegal sentence” and had therefore exhausted
all domestic remedies, the Commission considered the mer-
its of the claim, focusing first on the allegation that the
United States violated a jus cogens norm. The Commission indi-
cated that it would apply a heightened level of scrutiny
reserved for capital cases. The Commission began its analy-
sis with its 1987 decision, Roach and Pinkerton v. United States,
in which it determined whether a jus cogens norm that pro-
hibits the execution of juveniles existed. The Commission held
in Roach and Pinkerton that, although there was a recognized
jus cogens norm among member states of the Organization of
American States (OAS) that prohibits the execution of chil-
dren, there was no consensus as to the age of majority. Based
on the precedent set by that decision, the Commission
defined the question before it as being whether, since 1987,
the international community had established 18 as the age of
majority.
In determining whether a jus cogens norm had developed
for the age of majority since its 1987 decision in Roach and
Pinkerton, the Commission considered the development of
international treaty law, United Nations resolutions and stan-
dards, domestic practices within individual states, and prac-
tices within the United States. The Commission noted numer-
ous developments that it considered indicative of an
international consensus on 18 as the age of majority. In
reaching its conclusion, the Commission relied on the fact that
191 states are currently parties to the UN Convention on the
Rights of the Child, which provides that no person under the
age of 18 shall receive the death penalty; that 64 countries have
acceded to or ratified the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, which provides that death sentences shall not
be imposed on individuals below the age of 18; that 5 mem-
ber states of the OAS have ratified or acceded to the Ameri-
can Convention on Human Rights, which prohibits the exe-
cution of persons below the age of 18; that 49 countries have
abolished the death penalty since 1986 (making the total of
nations that do prohibit the death penalty 111), and that 20
additional countries that have not carried out an execution
in 10 or more years; and that 16 states in the United States
have expressly chosen the age of 18 as the minimum age for
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eligibility for the death sentence. In considering this and
other evidence, the Commission established that a jus cogens
norm had developed that prohibits the execution of people
under 18. The Commission found that the United States
violated this norm in the Domingues case and breached Arti-
cle I of the American Declaration.
Recommendations
Based on these findings the Commission recommended
that the United States offer Mr. Domingues a commutation
of sentence. The Commission further recommended that
the United States review its laws and procedures to ensure that
the death penalty is not imposed on anyone who was under
the age of 18 at the time of his or her crime. The Commis-
sion announced that it would continue to evaluate the
measures adopted by the United States with respect to the
above recommendations until the United States reaches full
compliance. 
*David Baluarte is a J.D. candidate at the Washington College
of Law and an articles editor for the Human Rights Brief. Ariel
Dulitzky, a principal human rights specialist of the Inter-American
Commssion on Human Rights, provided research support.
courts above, that Yaser Hamdi, a U.S. citizen captured during
battle in Afghanistan, was properly designated an unlawful
combatant under the president’s war powers. The court, how-
ever, also held that the Third Geneva Convention was a non-
self-executing treaty, meaning that Hamdi could not invoke its
provisions without further congressional action to implement
the treaty domestically. To the contrary, the district court deci-
sions in both Lindh and Padilla found the treaty to be self-exe-
cuting. The court’s decision effectively leaves Hamdi, now in
custody in a naval detention center in Norfolk, Virginia, with-
out access to counsel or further access to the courts. 
Two other related decisions recently before domestic courts
merit mention. In late January 2003, the trial judge in the
federal trial of Zacarias Moussaoui ruled in a closed hearing
that Moussaoui should be provided with access to Ramzi Binal-
shibh, the self-described coordinator of the September 11,
2001 terrorist attacks in the United States and also in U.S.
custody, in order to be able to effectively prepare Moussaoui’s
defense to capital charges of his own involvement in those
attacks. Close followers of the trial suggest that the government’s
resolve not to permit the two alleged terrorists to meet may com-
pel them to seek the first known trial before a military com-
mission, a decision which would unquestionably raise further
criticism of such tribunals. Finally, in Boston, the judge who
recently sentenced Richard Reid, the admitted al-Qaeda “shoe-
bomber,” was praised for his strong condemnation of Reid dur-
ing the sentencing hearing. The judge, responding to assertions
by the defense that Reid was a combatant in a war, responded
by repeatedly asserting, “You are not an enemy combatant—
you are a terrorist.” By that reference, the judge seemed to sug-
gest that the criminal law, not the law of war, was the way to deal
with terrorism, thus ironically undermining the administration’s
assertions that their actions are justified as legitimate actions
in the war on terrorism. 
The term “legal black hole” in reference to the status of
the Guantánamo detainees seems to originate with a decision
by the British courts in R (on the Application of Abbasi and
another) v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs.
In this case, a British national named Feroz Ali Abbasi, a
Guantánamo detainee since January 2002, complained to
British judges that he had been without access to a court or
any other tribunal, or even to a lawyer, since his arrival in
Guantánamo. His representatives sought to compel the British
Foreign Office to take some action on his behalf to challenge
his arbitrary detention in Cuba. The British court declined,
noting that there were several legal actions pending in the
United States dealing with the matter, and that Mr. Abbasi is
“within the sole control of the United States executive.” The
court did note, however, that although Mr. Abbasi’s deten-
tion as an “illegal combatant” may ultimately be justified,
the judges found it “objectionable . . . that Mr. Abbasi should
be subject to indefinite detention in territory over which the
United States has exclusive control with no opportunity to
challenge the legitimacy of his detention before any court or
tribunal.” It was in that context that the British tribunal
expressed its profoundest desire that the U.S. courts assume
jurisdiction so as not to leave Mr. Abbasi in arbitrary deten-
tion in that “legal black hole” alluded to by Amnesty Inter-
national and others. The British court also noted that the issue
of the validity of the detention in Guantánamo Bay was pend-
ing before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights,
but that “it is as yet unclear what the result of the Commis-
sion’s intervention will be.” 
Finally, the Canadian courts also may take on the issue of
the Guantánamo detentions. Press reports in February of 2003
indicate that a former member of Parliament asked the Que-
bec Superior Court to rule whether Canadian soldiers in
Afghanistan had surrendered alleged enemy soldiers to the U.S.
military for transport to Guantánamo in violation of Canada’s
obligations under the Geneva Conventions. The filing of the
suit followed criticism of the government in the Canadian
House of Commons for its failure to determine if those cap-
tured were prisoners of war prior to their surrender.
The core of the Commission’s precautionary measures rul-
ing lies in its conclusion that the executive branch of the U.S.
government is not entitled to unilateral and unreviewable des-
ignation of the Guantánamo detainees as unlawful combat-
ants under international humanitarian law. What is com-
mon to all three of the domestic court decisions in the cases
involving Lindh, Padilla, and Hamdi is the courts’ assumption
that there was no doubt as to the status of the individuals
involved in those cases; all were legitimately and properly des-
ignated as “illegal,” or more properly “unprivileged” com-
batants, by the executive branch. The petitioners’ position in
the Guantánamo case relies on Article 5 of the Third Geneva
Convention, which requires that the detainees are entitled to
a presumption of protection of the Third Convention “until
such time as their status has been determined by a competent
tribunal.” Their argument also relies on customary law and
the assertions of many leading international law experts who
maintain that the detainees are entitled to a presumption of
treatment as privileged combatants until a competent tri-
bunal has determined their status. The detainees must be des-
ignated as civilians, combatants, or criminals rather than
lumped into a single composite group of unlawful combat-
ants by presidential fiat. The Commission’s view is not a rad-
ical position but one consistent with established interpreta-
tions of international human rights and humanitarian law. 
*Richard J. Wilson is a professor of law, co-director of the Center
for Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, and director of the Inter-
national Human Rights Law Clinic at the Washington College of Law.
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To Provide for the Withholding of United
States Contributions to Any United
Nations Commission, Organization, or
Affiliated Agency That Is Chaired or
Presided over by a Country That Has
Repeatedly Provided Support for Acts of
International Terrorism, and for Other
Purposes, H.R. 800
Major Sponsor: Rep. Vito Fossella (R-NY)
Status: Forwarded to the House Com-
mittee on International Relations in Feb-
ruary 2003.
Substance: This legislation seeks to halt
U.S. funding to any United Nations com-
mission, organization, or affiliated agency
chaired by any country, the government
of which the U.S. State Department has
labeled a supporter of acts of interna-
tional terrorism. The bill provides that
the funding will cease until the president
determines that the UN body is no longer
chaired by such country, and it has revised
its leadership succession system by setting
minimum standards for leadership posi-
tions and eliminating automatic rotation
of such positions. 
The Terror Immigration Elimination Act,
H.R. 488
Major Sponsor: Rep. Ron Paul (R-TX)
Status: Introduced and referred to the
House Committee on the Judiciary in Jan-
uary 2003.
Substance: This legislation seeks to limit
the number of student and diversity immi-
grant visas granted to nationals of Saudi
Arabia, countries that support terrorism,
and countries not cooperating fully with
U.S. antiterrorism efforts. The Act will
also deny student and diversity immigrant
visas to anyone coming from a country
currently on the U.S. State Department’s
list of countries sponsoring terrorism.
To Provide Compensation for the Fami-
lies of Noncombatants Killed in United
States Military Actions in Afghanistan after
September 11, 2001, H.R. 602
Major Sponsor: Rep. Major R. Owens 
(D-NY)
Status: Referred to the House Committee
on International Relations in February
2003.
Substance: This legislation recognizes the
loss of innocent civilian lives resulting
from U.S. military action in Afghanistan
following September 11, 2001. The bill
calls for direct compensation in the
amount of $10,000 to the family of each
noncombatant national of Afghanistan
who was killed as a direct result of U.S. mil-
itary actions in Afghanistan after Sep-
tember 11, 2001.
Global Climate Security Act 2003, S. 17
Major Sponsor: Sen. Tom Daschle 
(D-SD)
Status: Referred to the Senate Committee
on Environment and Public Works in Jan-
uary 2003.
Substance: This legislation calls on the
president and the Congress to prioritize
the preparation for and reduction of the
risks of global warming and climate
change. The Act emphasizes the need for
the president to satisfy the U.S. commit-
ment under the United Nations Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change and
lays out mechanisms to achieve these
goals. The Act calls for a commission to
facilitate the fulfillment of this commit-
ment, including legislation to adopt cost-
effective and technologically feasible mea-
sures that would reduce net greenhouse
gas emissions in the United States and
elsewhere. The Act also calls on Congress
to pass a multi-pollutant bill to reduce
carbon dioxide, nitrogen oxide, sulfur
dioxide, and mercury emissions from
power plants and to create and promote
clean energy domestically and globally.
Further, the legislation requires a national
greenhouse gas emissions inventory and
registry. The Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) would operate the emis-
sions data collection program with manda-
tory reporting for all sources of emissions
above the threshold levels determined by
the EPA. Additionally, the Act authorizes
$2 billion annually for grants to states or
local governments for utilizing green-
house gas data collection, inventory, and
trading systems; instituting emissions
reduction or sequestration projects; and
participating in research, planning, and
modeling efforts.
Prosecuting Remedies and Tools against
the Exploitation of Children Today Act of
2003 (PROTECT Act), S. 151
Major Sponsor: Orrin G. Hatch (R-UT)
Status: Passed in the Senate on Febru-
ary 24, 2003 and referred to the House
Committee on the Judiciary.
Substance: This legislation amends federal
criminal code provisions regarding child
pornography to prohibit: (1) advertising,
promoting, distributing, or soliciting in
interstate or foreign commerce any mate-
rial constituting a virtual obscene visual
depiction of a minor, or an actual visual
depiction of a minor engaging in sexually
explicit conduct; or (2) offering or pro-
viding to a minor any such visual depiction
to induce the minor to participate in any
illegal activity. The Act limits an accused’s
affirmative defense that the alleged child
pornography was not produced using
actual minors and that the defendant did
not promote the material in such a man-
ner as to convey the impression that it is
or contains a visual depiction of a minor
engaging in sexually explicit conduct. The
legislation sets penalties for knowingly
producing, distributing, receiving, or pos-
sessing an obscene visual representation
of the sexual abuse of children. Visual
representation, according to the Act,
includes a depiction of any kind (includ-
ing a drawing, cartoon, sculpture, or paint-
ing) that: (1) depicts a minor engaging in
sexually explicit conduct and that is
obscene; or (2) depicts an image that is or
appears to be of a minor engaging in
graphic bestiality, sadistic or masochistic
abuse, or sexual intercourse, and that
lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value. The Act makes clear that
it is not a required element of the offense
that the minor depicted actually exist, but
specified circumstances must exist, such as
the element of interstate or foreign com-
merce, including via computer, related
to any communication involved in or
made in furtherance of the offense. Fur-
ther, the Act amends the Victims of Child
Abuse Act of 1990 to authorize disclosure
of child pornography by an electronic
communication service provider to state
officials for purposes of enforcing state
law. The Act also sets penalties for using
or inducing a minor to engage in sexually
explicit conduct outside of the United
States to produce any visual depiction of
such conduct for transportation to the
United States and authorizes civil reme-
dies, including injunctive relief and puni-
tive damages, for child pornography
offenses. 
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Congress Condemns Executions by Stoning
by Chanté Lasco*
Introduction
In March 2002, a Sharia Court in Nigeria sentenced Amina
Lawal, a 30-year-old Nigerian woman, to death by stoning for
having a child outside of wedlock. Despite the fact that the
Sharia penal code is unconstitutional under Nigerian law, the
federal government of Nigeria has not required those north-
ern states of Nigeria that have chosen to institute Sharia law
to abolish such codes in favor of secular penal codes. Amina
Lawal’s case brought international attention to the issue of
execution by stoning, and was highly publicized in the media
by organizations such as Amnesty International and on pro-
grams including the Oprah Winfrey Show. The international
community expressed outrage at the cruelty of the penalty
itself, as well as the sexual discrimination apparent in any legal
system that punishes women for adultery at a dispropor-
tionate rate. In response to such publicity, the Nigerian
government has made assurances that it will not carry out the
penalty against Lawal. 
Unfortunately, Amina Lawal is not the only potential vic-
tim of this barbaric practice. In 2001, Safiya Hussaini was sen-
tenced to death by stoning in a case very similar to Lawal’s.
Fortunately, Hussaini’s case was dismissed on appeal in March
2002. In response to these and other similar cases, Repre-
sentative Betty McCollum (D-MN) introduced House Con-
current Resolution 26 in the U.S. House of Representatives,
a bill “condemning the punishment of execution by stoning
as a gross violation of human rights.”
An Overview of the Legislation Introduced in the House
House Concurrent Resolution 26 highlights the fact that
stoning is often “applied to women who have been accused
of adultery, some of whom are coerced into prostitution, or
even raped.” While the bill does not focus solely on women,
it recognizes that “women around the world continue to be
disproportionately targeted for discriminatory, inhuman,
and cruel punishments.” Additionally, the resolution argues
that execution by stoning is an “exceptionally cruel form of
punishment that violates internationally accepted standards
of human rights, including those set forth in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, and the United Nations Convention
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment.” The resolution also cites Amnesty
International in characterizing “execution by stoning as ‘a
method specifically designed to increase the victim’s suffer-
ing.’” The bill concludes by requesting that the president for-
mally communicate the resolution to governments imposing
this cruel punishment and urge the suspension of death by
stoning. It also requests that the president direct the secre-
tary of state to work with the international community to
repeal stoning laws and adhere to international human rights
standards. 
Implications of House Concurrent Resolution 26
For those individuals condemned to death by stoning,
this resolution provides support that is more symbolic than
practical. Expressing congressional condemnation can help
call attention to an issue and perhaps exert diplomatic pres-
sure on nations employing this method of execution. The
effectiveness of this resolution, however, is hampered by the
fact that the United States continues to use the death penalty,
even if it does so by way of methods it considers more humane,
such as lethal injections and electrocution, rather than ston-
ing. This practice places the United States in the company of
such countries as Afghanistan, China, Iraq, Libya, and Myan-
mar, while 111 countries have abolished the death penalty
entirely. 
As the International Helsinki Federation for Human
Rights has noted, “The use of the death penalty by the USA
is a ‘failure of moral leadership.’” This organization further
stated that there is a need for the United States “to abide by
Helsinki principles and international standards if we are to
convince other states of the importance of those standards to
human rights and freedoms.” Amnesty International has also
addressed the likelihood that the United States may be viewed
as hypocritical, focusing on the fact that the United States exe-
cutes prisoners for crimes they committed as minors, in vio-
lation of international law. In addressing this concern,
Amnesty International stated that “The USA’s repeated claims
that it is the most progressive force for human rights in the
world are contradicted by its blatant flouting of the global
moral and legal consensus that killing people for their child-
hood crimes is wrong.” According to Amnesty International,
other organizations such as the Organization of American
States, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights,
Defense for Children International, and the American Bar
Association have also called for an end to the execution of pris-
oners for crimes committed before the age of 18. In the face
of such widespread opposition to U.S. death penalty policy
by international human rights organizations, it is difficult for
U.S. lawmakers to convince other death penalty countries that
methods such as stoning are inhumane.  
Conclusion
House Concurrent Resolution 26 calls attention to a very
important issue and denounces the brutal practice of ston-
ing, noting specifically that it is predominantly used against
women. It is commendable that our lawmakers are taking a
stand to help those sentenced to stoning, particularly con-
demned women, around the world. Until the United States
joins the international community in renouncing the death
penalty entirely, however, the U.S. government will continue
to lack the moral legitimacy required to effect real change on
this issue. 
*Chanté Lasco is a J.D. candidate at the Washington College of
Law and a staff writer for the Human Rights Brief.
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Mexican Commission for Defense and Promotion of Human
Rights (CMDPH)
CMDPH, a civil society organization, has worked since 1989
to promote international human rights standards within Mexico.
The organization has also worked to defend human rights in Mex-
ico within international and regional human rights systems.
This year, CMDPH has been working on a campaign to stop vio-
lence against women in the Ciudad Juárez and in the northern
state of Chihuahua. Since 1993, more than 300 hundred women
have been killed in Ciudad Juárez in a series of gender-based serial
killings and domestic violence incidents. Recently, the problem
appeared to be expanding through Chihuahua, in large part
because of the discriminatory manner in which authorities are
handling the situation. In many instances, authorities have
attempted to justify the killings by focusing on the manner in
which the women lived. Three hundred  fifty Mexican and inter-
national organizations, including Amensty International, are
working with CMDPH to stop the killings and promote the
accountability of authorities. CMDPH has already prepared
reports for the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
and the United Nations regarding this campaign. Currently,
CMDPH is working with local organizations in Ciudad Juárez and
in the state of Chihuahua to compile the information necessary
to bring unsolved cases before the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights. For more information about the work of
CMDPH, please e-mail comunicacion@cmdpdh.org, or visit its
Web site at http://www.cmdpdh.org.
The Palestinian Human Rights Monitoring Group (PHRMG) 
PHRMG is a Palestinian, independent, nongovernmental
organization working to end human rights violations committed
against Palestinians in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and East
Jerusalem. PHRMG’s main task is monitoring the ever-changing
human rights situations for Palestinians. The group’s field
researchers responsibilities include keeping abreast of local
developments, pursuing long-term monitoring tasks, and respond-
ing to urgent human rights situations in order to record eye-
witness testimonies of victims, witnesses, and other actors.
PHRMG also works on outreach programs that aim to educate
both Palestinians and the international community about the
human rights violations committed against Palestinians. These
outreach programs include publication of a bi-monthly magazine,
the “Palestinian Human Rights Monitor,” distributed through-
out the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem in Arabic and
English; and maintenance of one extensive Web site that includes
information about human rights violations committed against
Palestinians, in both Arabic and English. 
Recently, PHRMG established the Settler Watch Hotline.
The hotline provides Palestinian victims of settler violence a
phone number to call 24-hours a day where they can receive legal
advice or assistance from a PHRMG lawyer. The hotline has suc-
cessfully empowered Palestinians to file complaints and utilize
the legal process when they are victimized. By providing legal
advice to people who would have otherwise not filed a com-
plaint, the hotline has also forced the Israeli courts to address
complaints that were previously often overlooked or disregarded.
PHRMG is currently updating its programs to coincide with the
evolving human rights situation in Palestine and to meet the
needs of the Palestinian people. For further information about
the organization’s activities, please contact Tara J. Close, public
relations officer, at admin@phrmg.org, or visit the organiza-
tion’s Web site at www.phrmg.org.
Indian Social Institute (ISI) 
ISI is a social center committed to working toward the creation
of a society based on the values of justice, equality, freedom, and
fraternity in India. The organization, which was founded over 25
years ago, is run by the Jesuits and works to empower India’s Dal-
its, tribals (India’s indigenous peoples), women, and other dis-
advantaged groups in Indian society by providing legal literacy
training, human rights education and support.
From July 14-28, 2003, ISI will host a course entitled, “Legal
Resources for Social Action and Empowerment.” Today, social
activists require a minimum level of legal knowledge and exper-
tise to make their work effective and useful. To become more effi-
cient in providing assistance, social activists need to be equipped
with adequate legal knowledge. Many ordinary Indian people,
particularly Dalits, tribals, and women, suffer unnecessary injus-
tice and hardship for want of legal awareness and guidance. ISI
believes that social activists and those working at the grassroots
level, if provided with adequate legal training, have the poten-
tial to make social change and empower disadvantaged groups.
This potential needs to be exploited fully and effectively in
order to achieve social change and build a just society. 
For more information about all of ISI’s programs, please
contact D. Albert, coordinator of the Human Rights & Legal Ser-
vice Unit, at devalbert@yahoo.co.in. 
Corporation for Peace and Development in Magdalena Medio
(CDPMM) 
CDPMM is a non-profit organization currently working in the
Magdalena Medio region of Colombia, one of the country’s
most violent regions due to fighting between paramilitary groups
trying to control the area. The violent deaths in the Magdalena
Medio region equal the number of violent deaths in all of Colom-
bia’s other regions combined. The organization‘s Peace and
Development Program in Magdalena Medio (PDPMM), is a
dynamic social process that works to empower citizens networks
to make changes in their communities’ economic development.
The program has two main objectives: 1) to create a sustainable
human development, equal for all; and 2) to create a culture of
peaceful coexistence and a common space for all, based on
democratic principles that respect common interests and human
rights. In December 2002, the PDPMM process was used in
Micoahumado, Bolívar, in order to work toward protecting cit-
izens’ freedom from the actions of illegal armed groups in that
community.
In addition to the organization’s Peace and Development Pro-
grams, CDPMM works to overcome poverty and to achieve a
peaceful coexistence in 29 regions distributed though 4 depart-
ments in Colombia. The backbone of CDPMM is a citizen’s net-
work comprised of citizens and social organizations working
together voluntarily to achieve their objectives. 
BADIL, Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and
Refugee Rights
The BADIL Resource Center, located in Bethlehem, pro-
vides a resource pool of alternative, critical, and progressive
information regarding Palestinian refugees and their quest to
achieve a just and lasting solution for exiled Palestinians based
on their right of return. 
This year, BADIL will launch the International Expert Forum
for the Promotion of Palestinian Refugee Rights (Expert Forum).
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Kayishema also challenged the Trial Chamber’s assessment
of the credibility of the witness who identified him. The
Appeals Chamber dismissed the argument, holding that it is
within the Trial Chamber’s discretion to assess the probative
value of testimony, including how to resolve apparent con-
tradictions. 
Similarly, in ground seven of his appeal, Ruzindana sug-
gested that the Trial Chamber erred in not using established
criteria to analyze the credibility of Prosecution witnesses; in
particular, he claimed that accepting the testimony of one wit-
ness on a particular matter was unreasonable and unreli-
able. In its rejection of Ruzindana’s claim, the Appeals Cham-
ber noted that it is impossible to draw up an exhaustive list
of criteria for the assessment of evidence, given that the cir-
cumstances of each case are different and that a judge must
rule on each case in an impartial and independent manner.
Dismissing Ruzindana’s specific claim, the Chamber rea-
soned that accepting the uncorroborated testimony of a wit-
ness does not necessarily constitute error. 
Sentencing
Kayishema’s ground eight and Ruzindana’s ground nine
challenged the Trial Chamber’s analysis of aggravating and
mitigating circumstances in general, and with respect to
their particular circumstances. As a general point, the Appeals
Chamber noted that the Trial Chamber has broad discretion
in weighing mitigating and aggravating circumstances at sen-
tencing. Additionally, the Appeals Chamber stated that, pur-
suant to Articles 6(4) and 23 of the ICTR Statute and Rule
101, the Appellant must prove that the Trial Chamber acted
beyond its discretion in sentencing the accused. 
The Appeals Chamber rejected Ruzindana’s claim that by
taking into account the heinous means by which he commit-
ted the killings, the Trial Chamber confused a material element
of the crime with an aggravating circumstance. The Appeals
Chamber reasoned that the fact that an act of killing supported
a conviction of genocide does not prevent a separate finding
that the manner in which it was carried out gave rise to an
aggravating factor. It also concluded that there was no abuse
of discretion in the way the Trial Chamber weighed the aggra-
vating against the mitigating circumstances in his case. 
The Appeals Chamber also rejected Kayishema’s claim that
the Trial Chamber punished him twice by identifying his
position of authority as an essential element in the crime of
genocide and an aggravating factor. The Chamber explained
that although a mere finding of command authority cannot
be considered an aggravating circumstance, the manner in
which an accused exercises that authority can be an aggra-
vating circumstance. In addition, the Chamber found that the
zeal shown by the accused in committing the crimes and the
harm suffered by the victims were properly characterized as
aggravating factors. Finally, the Appeals Chamber stated that
even if the Trial Chamber had erred in finding that Kay-
ishema’s denial of guilt and assertion of an alibi constituted
aggravating factors, such error did not invalidate the sentence
imposed since the primary aggravating factor was the gravity
of the offense. 
*Maria Allison, author of the summary of the Kayishema and
Ruzindana appeals, is a political analyst in the District of Colum-
bia. Leslie Wilson, author of the summary of the Musema Appeal,
is a J.D. candidate at the Washington College of Law. 
**Susana SáCouto is the legal coordinator of the War Crimes
Research Office at the Washington College of Law.
ENDNOTES
1 Musema withdrew his third ground of appeal. 
2 The Appeals Chamber did not address the merits of the Prosecu-
tion’s appeal, finding the appeal inadmissible because of the Prosecu-
tion’s failure to file its appellate brief on time and to demonstrate good
cause for filing out of time. In his dissenting opinion, Judge Sha-
habuddeen concluded that the Prosecution had filed its appellate brief
on time and that even if it had not, the Appeals Chamber could have
granted the Prosecution an extension of its own accord, as, in his opin-
ion, the Prosecution had demonstrated good cause for an extension of
time to file. 
3 Kayishema raised three additional arguments supporting his unfair
trial claim, namely that: 1) the expression “persons responsible for” in Secu-
rity Council Resolution 955 and procedural improprieties in the case com-
promised his right to the presumption of innocence; 2) the court failed
to adhere to the adversarial principle; and 3) the Prosecution failed to
timely disclose evidence. The Appeals Chamber dismissed all three
arguments, finding the first two allegations meritless and rejecting the
third claim because it had not been raised at trial.
4 In support of his argument regarding the insufficiency of evidence
provided by the Prosecution on the specific intent requirement of geno-
cide, Ruzindana also challenged the Trial Chamber’s findings regard-
ing his authority during the events in question, claiming the Prosecution
had not established that he had either de jure or de facto authority. Not-
ing that neither is required for a finding of individual criminal respon-
sibility under Article 6(1) of the ICTR Statute, the Appeals Chamber
rejected this argument as well.
5 Ruzindana’s fifth ground of appeal asserted that the Trial Cham-
ber made errors of fact with respect to its analysis of his personal status.
This ground failed because Ruzindana failed to put forward an argument
in support of his claim.
The exclusion of international law, human rights standards, and
UN resolutions from past Israeli-Palestinian negotiations has been
extremely detrimental to Palestinian refugees and has contributed
to the breakdown of the political process. BADIL asserts that the
Expert Forum will bring together legal and academic experts, politi-
cians, and practitioners of refugee and general human rights law
to pave the way toward treaty-based human rights solutions to the
Palestinian refugee issue in accordance with UN Resolution 194.
The first international seminar, “The Role of International Law
in Peacemaking and Crafting Durable Solutions for Palestinian
Refugees,” will be hosted by the University of Ghent in Ghent, Bel-
gium from May 22-23, 2003. Additional seminars will follow in
Europe and Cairo, focusing on property restitution, international
and regional protection mechanisms, and obstacles to the imple-
mentation of refugee return and restitution. 
In March, BADIL will publish, in Hebrew, an information
packet on the Right of Return. The packet will be based on
BADIL’s Arabic and English language information packets pub-
lished on the same topic in 2000. BADIL’s Hebrew packet was
created in order to answer the questions and concerns raised in
the Israeli debate about Palestinian refugees’ right to return to
their homes and properties now located in Israel. The Hebrew
language packet will serve as a tool for exploring the potential
of a rational, rights-based dialogue with Israeli peace and human
rights activists, educators, academic researchers and journalists.
The packet will include facts and figures, responses to frequently
asked questions, and international legal briefs and testimonials
from Palestinian refugees regarding their vision for a just and
durable solution to their plight. For more information about
BADIL, please e-mail info@badil.org, or visit its Web site at
www.badil.org. 
The Human Rights Brief is accepting submissions for the next edi-
tion of “Brief Community News,” which will be published in September.
If your organization has an event or situation it would like to publicize,
please send a short description to hrbrief@wcl.american.edu, and include
“Brief Community News” in the subject heading of the message. Please
limit your submission to two paragraphs. The Human Rights Brief
reserves the right to edit for content and space limitations.
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center NEWS
On February 26, 2003, the Center for Human Rightsand Humanitarian Law (Center) at the WashingtonCollege of Law (WCL) hosted the Honorable Nil-
mario Miranda, minister of human rights of Brazil, at WCL.
Minister Miranda met with WCL students, administrators,
and faculty, and gave an address entitled, “Human Rights
in Brazil in the 21st Century.” He was accompanied by a del-
egation of Brazilian dignitaries, including Ambassador Val-
ter Pecly of the Brazilian Mission to the Organization of
American States (OAS); Ambassador Hidelbrando Val-
adares, director general of the Department of Human
Rights in Itamaraty; Minister Antônio Carlos Nascimento
Pedro, head of the Human Rights Division within the
Department of Human Rights in Itamaraty; and Secretary
Silvio Albuquerque from the Brazilian Mission to the OAS. 
In March, the Center launched the first Indigenous
Rights Training Institute (IRTI), co-directed by Center
executive director Hadar Harris and Dr. Osvaldo Kreimer,
rapporteur of the OAS Working Group on Indigenous
Rights and special advisor to the secretary-general of the
OAS. The Institute was sponsored by the Inter-American
Development Bank, the Open Society Institute, and the
Inter-American Institute of Human Rights, and brought
together 35 indigenous rights leaders and experts from 14
countries to attend an intensive two-day training session on
emerging issues in international law. Participants included
attorneys, activists, diplomats, and government officials.
The IRTI provided participants with a unique opportunity
to learn about cutting-edge international legal issues (includ-
ing topics such as self-determination, land use, environ-
mental law and sustainability, intellectual property, and
human rights) and discuss how these issues relate to indige-
nous rights. The IRTI included lectures by Dean Claudio
Grossman; Santiago Cantón, executive secretary of the
Inter-American Commission; Professor Maivan Lam; Pro-
fessor Marcos Orellano; Professor Durwood Zaelke; Professor
Daniel Bradlow; and Professor Peter Jaszi. 
The Center and WCL’s Program on Law and Government
co-sponsored the centerpiece conference of the Washing-
ton College of Law Founder’s Events, co-chaired by Hadar
Harris and Jamin Raskin, WCL professor of constitutional
law. The conference, entitled, “International Perspectives
on the Right to Vote and Political Democracy in the United
States,” took place at the Library of Congress on March 20.
The conference brought together international experts,
legal academics, and civil rights activists to discuss and
debate the state of political democracy in the United States.
The conference sought the input and comparative exper-
tise of international election experts from the OAS, the
UN, and the Office of Democratic Institutions and Human
Rights of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe. In addition, U.S.-based activists and academics,
including Wade Henderson of the Leadership Council for
Civil Rights, Harvard Professor Alan Keyssar, Michael Mau-
rer of the Sentencing Project, and Tim Cooper from Democ-
racy First, attended the conference. 
This semester, the Center selected its first Student Advi-
sory Board, a highly qualified and committed group of
students who will assist in developing programming, creat-
ing infrastructure, and promoting the Center’s activities. Stu-
dent Advisory Board members have a wealth of experience
in the fields of human rights and humanitarian law. They
have lived and worked in countries as diverse as Brazil,
Turkmenistan, Guatemala, and Zimbabwe, and they have
worked for national and international nongovernmental
organizations. The Center’s Student Advisory Board mem-
bers for 2003 are David Baluarte, Julia Graff, Sarah
Hymowitz, Jamal Jafari, Christine Louise Lin, Chai Shenoy,
and R. Michael Waller.
The Munching on Human Rights series, which the Cen-
ter launched last semester, continued with programs by
Professor Claudia Martin, “A Road Map to the Regional
Human Rights Systems,” and Professor Paul Williams, “Inter-
national Law and Peacemaking: Stories from the Field.” The
Munching on Human Rights series is a monthly lunch and
learn non-credit introductory course on human rights and
humanitarian law for students without an international law
background. The series was instituted this year and has
had an overwhelming response, with over 100 students
attending each session. 
Additionally, the Center sponsored an interactive dis-
cussion with returned Peace Corps volunteers who debated
whether the Peace Corps and similar programs positively
affect international development or promote American
cultural imperialism. First-year WCL students Kat Fotovat
(Moldova), Sarah Hymowitz (Turkmenistan), Jey Jeyalingam
(Benin), Roger Phillips (Togo), and Stephanie Richards
(Ukraine), shared their experiences and insights. 
From May 18–23, 2003 the Center will sponsor the
Eighth Annual Inter-American Human Rights Moot Court
Competition. Forty-five teams from around the world will
convene at WCL for the only trilingual (English-Spanish-
Portuguese) moot court competition based on the inter-
American human rights system. The competition includes
presentations of written memorials and oral arguments
based on a hypothetical case, seminars on human rights law,
and activities with governmental and international
nongovernmental organizations located in Washington,
D.C. This year’s hypothetical is a compelling case involving
the derogation of rights under a state of emergency
declared by a democratically elected government facing
intense political and economic pressures. The competition
is open to students enrolled in a juris doctor degree pro-
gram or its equivalent. For more information about the
Inter-American Human Rights Moot Court Competition,
see www.wcl.american.edu/humright/mcourt. 
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John Cerone, executive director of the War Crimes
Research Office and adjunct professor of law at American Uni-
versity’s Washington College of Law (WCL), coached the
first WCL student team to participate in the Concours Jean-
Pictet. This international humanitarian law moot court com-
petition was held in Greece in March 2003. 
Robert K. Goldman, professor of law and co-director of the
Center for Human Rights and Humanitarian Law (Center),
was interviewed by Pacifica Radio on January 9, 2003 regard-
ing the United States Supreme Court’s decision that the U.S.
government’s indefinite detention of “enemy combatants” is
permissible. On January 13 the Canadian Broadcasting Com-
pany interviewed him regarding the United States policy on
targeted assassinations. In January 2003 Professor Goldman
also conducted a live interview with Radio Nacional de España
on the prospects of war with Iraq and issues concerning civil
liberties in the United States in the wake of September 11; an
interview in Spanish with BBC Worldwide radio on the report
of the UN inspectors and the Bush administration’s reac-
tion to the report; and an interview with Efe Spanish News
Agency regarding President Bush’s comments on Iraq con-
tained within the State of the Union Address.
Claudio Grossman, dean and co-director of the Center, was
invited to serve as the keynote speaker for Peru’s Human
Rights Day commemorations by the Commission on Human
Rights of the Congress of Peru in December 2002. Also in
2002, Dean Grossman published, “Reflecciones sobre la carta
internacional de los derechos humanos” (“Reflections on
the international charter of human rights”) in Las Comisiones
de Verdad y los Nuevos Desafios en la Promoción de los Derechos
Humanos (Truth Commissions and New Challenges in the Promo-
tion of Human Rights), Santiago, Chile. Dean Grossman was a
guest speaker at the Fred J. Hansen Institute of Peace Stud-
ies lecture series at San Diego State University in February
2003. Also in February, he led a breakout session entitled
“Changes at a Global Level—Post 9/11/01” at the American
Bar Association Mid-Year Deans’ Meeting in Seattle, Wash-
ington. In March 2003, Dean Grossman chaired the Accred-
itation Committee for the Middle States Commission on
Higher Education for the Inter-American University of Puerto
Rico School of Law.
Hadar Harris, executive director of the Center, recently
organized and facilitated the Indigenous Rights Training
Institute, which brought together 35 indigenous leaders and
experts from around the world to discuss emerging issues of
public international law as they relate to the rights of Indige-
nous Peoples. In March 2003, Ms. Harris gave an interview to
WTOP radio about the Indigenous Rights Training Institute.
Also in March, Ms. Harris delivered a paper and moderated
a panel discussion of international experts at the WCL
Founder’s Centerpiece Conference entitled, “International
Perspectives on the Right to Vote and Political Democracy in
the United States,” held at the Library of Congress.
Claudia Martin, visiting associate professor and co-direc-
tor of the Academy on Human Rights and Humanitarian
Law, participated in a seminar from February 3–5, 2003 on
“International Protection of Human Rights and Methodolo-
gies to Teach Human Rights Law” in Quito, Ecuador. During
this seminar, which was coordinated by the Academy on
Human Rights and Humanitarian Law in cooperation with the
Pontificia Universidad Católica de Quito (PUCE), and the
Centro de Derechos Económicos y Sociales in Ecuador, Pro-
fessor Martin lectured on new developments in the case law
of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. In addition,
Professor Martin, together with Professor Diego Rodríguez
Pinzón, submitted an amicus brief before the Inter-American
Court on Human Rights regarding Advisory Opinion 18.
This brief was produced in partnership with the Human
Rights Program of Universidad Iberoamericana, Ciudad de
México, as part of their current project on human rights
legal education. This spring, Professor Martin and Professor
Rodríguez Pinzón will co-publish a law review article entitled,
“The International Status of the Rights of Elderly Persons.” 
Diane Orentlicher, professor of law and co-director of the
Center, presented commentary at a January 2003 Sympo-
sium on Justice for International Crimes Committed in the
Territory of East Timor, held at the University of Melbourne
Law School in Melbourne, Australia. The symposium was co-
sponsored by the Asia Pacific Centre for Military Law and the
Judicial System Monitoring Programme. Also in January, Pro-
fessor Orentlicher was invited by the Council on Foreign
Relations to serve on a Task Force on Iraq. In February 2003,
Professor Orentlicher presented a lecture on “Universal Juris-
diction after Pinochet: Prospects and Perils,” at the Univer-
sity of California, Irvine. Professor Orentlicher was also quoted
in an article appearing in the February 8, 2003 issue of the
National Journal entitled “Safe Harbor for Saddam.” 
Diego Rodríguez Pinzón is currently a visiting associate pro-
fessor, co-director of the Academy on Human Rights and
Humanitarian Law, and director of the Human Rights Legal
Education-Partnership Projects in Ecuador and Colombia. Pro-
fessor Rodríguez Pinzón co-organized the first seminar on
“International Protection of Human Rights and Human
Rights Legal Education,” from February 3-5, 2003. Professor
Rodríguez Pinzón also gave a lecture on “The Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights: Current Issues and Practice.”
Professor Rodríguez Pinzón, together with Professor Mar-
tin, submitted an amicus brief before the Inter-American
Court on Human Rights regarding Advisory Opinion 18.
This spring Professor Rodríguez Pinzón and Professor Mar-
tin will co-publish a law review article entitled, “The Inter-
national Status of the Rights of Elderly Persons.” 
Herman Schwartz, professor of law and co-director of the
Center, was interviewed in January 2003 by NBC Nightly
News regarding President Bush’s federal court nominations.
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Professor Schwartz also conducted an interview with the Asso-
ciated Press in January regarding Chief Justice Rehnquist’s
request for higher pay for judges. This interview was repro-
duced by 13 other news sources, including USA Today, the
Houston Chronicle, CBS News, the Baltimore Sun and Dallas
Morning News.
Richard Wilson, professor of law, co-director of the Center,
director of the International Human Rights Law Clinic, and
director of the WCL Clinical Program, gave a lecture at Colum-
bia Law School in New York City entitled “Litigating U.S.
Human Rights Cases before the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights” in February 2003. On February 8, Profes-
sor Wilson participated in a panel discussion at the Interna-
tional Law Weekend West 2003, held at Loyola Law School of
Los Angeles. The panel was entitled, “Death Penalty Litigation
and the Use of International Law to Interpret the Constitution.”
At this event, Professor Wilson spoke on the amicus curiae brief
he authored for the European Union in Atkins v. Virginia, the
U.S. Supreme Court’s decision striking down the application
of the death penalty to persons with mental retardation. From
February 26-28, 2003, Professor Wilson traveled to the Czech
Republic, serving as the sole U.S. judge on a panel of inter-
national jurists judging a moot court competition focusing on
refugee law for teams from Central and Eastern Europe. 
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